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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Healthcare financing in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
The World Health Organization reports that as many as 11% of the population in some 
countries incur catastrophic expenditures on health each year while about 5% are pushed into 
poverty [1]. The report further indicates that only about 5%-10% of people living in Sub-
Saharan Africa and southern Asia are covered by any type of formal social protection 
compared with 20%-60% in middle income countries. The 2013 World Health Report on the 
other hand estimates that about 150 million people experience catastrophic health 
expenditures each year for making out-of-pocket payments for health care services despite 
advances made towards universal coverage [3]. In an effort to address this problem, several 
low and middle-income countries, including Ghana, have adopted various forms of health 
insurance, including community-based health insurance programs, as a health financing 
strategy to provide safety-nets for insured members to reduce their catastrophic health 
expenditures [2] but the scope of population coverage of these programs is limited [4].  
 
In Kenya, social health insurance has been limited to formal sector employees who constitute 
only a small proportion of the population. Established in 1966, coverage of the population in 
Kenya under the Kenyan National Health Insurance Fund (KNHIF) stands at 20% [5]. In 
Tanzania, health insurance was limited to the formal sector for nearly ten years before it 
began efforts at expanding to accommodate the informal sector and is covering about 15% of 
the population [6]. Nigeria’s health insurance scheme covering only about 3% of the 
population after nearly 8 years of operations [7] has predominantly remained with the formal 
sector until recently when studies are being conducted to determine how to include the 
informal sector population segment in order to accelerate moves towards universal coverage 
(according to a Nigerian delegation to Ghana NHIS, 2013). Rwanda on the other hand 
combines both the formal and informal sector population segments moving its population 
from 1% in 2000 to 85% in 2008 and further to 96% in 2011[8] with the community-based 
insurance scheme  making the highest rate of coverage at  91% of the population in nearly 10 
years of its establishment. Thailand, upon the inclusion of the informal sector has achieved 
nearly 100% population coverage [9] while South Korea which also admits both the formal 
and informal sector population segments into the national health insurance scheme achieved 
universal population coverage in 2012 [10]. 
 
Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 to provide financial 
access to health care service. The Scheme, however, faces challenges, notably, cost escalation 
partly due to both demand-side and supply-side moral hazards. Committed to address these 
challenges, the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) is implementing measures, 
including provider payment reforms with the introduction of capitation as payment 
mechanism for primary out-patient services. This thesis presents findings of a study 
undertaken as part of the monitoring and evaluation system intended to produce evidence to 
inform policy direction with regard to the capitation payment implementation. In particular, 
the study aims to shed more light on whether the capitation payment mechanism contributes 
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to reduction in primary out-patient utilization and related cost to the NHIS; whether capitation 
influences provider behavior in the delivery of primary out-patient delivery and how it affects 
the perception of NHIS subscribers and their uptake of, and or retention, in health insurance in 
Ghana? To begin with, some geo-politico-economic context is provided to appraise readers 
about Ghana. 
 
The Republic of Ghana 
 
Figure 1: Political map of Ghana 
Geography: Ghana, covering a total 
land area of 238,537 square 
kilometres, is located on the west coast 
of Africa. The country can be divided 
into three ecological zones: (i) the 
coastal plains, (ii) the middle and 
western parts of the country 
characterized by a heavy canopy of 
semi-deciduous rainforests, and (iii) 
the northern savannah. It has a tropical 
climate with temperatures and rainfall 
patterns that vary according to 
elevation and distance from the coast. 
The eastern coastal area is 
comparatively dry, the southwestern 
corner is hot and humid, while the 
northern part of the country is hot and 
dry. Average annual temperature is 
about 26ºC (79ºF).  
 
 
History: Ghana gained independence from British colonial rule on 6 March 1957, and 
became a republic on 1 July 1960. Accra is the administrative capital of Ghana.  Ghana 
operates a multi-party democracy with an executive president who is elected for a term of four 
years with a maximum of two terms. There is a parliament elected every four years, an 
independent judiciary, and a vibrant media. There are 10 administrative regions in Ghana: 
Western, Central, Greater Accra, Volta, Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Northern, Upper 
East, and Upper West. Ghana’s population was estimated at 27 million in 2014. The regions 
are subdivided into 216 districts to ensure equitable resource allocation and efficient, effective 
administration at the local level. The Ghanaian population is made up of several ethnic 
groups, with the Akans constituting the largest group (48%), followed by the Mole-Dagbani 
(17%), Ewe (14%), Ga-Dangme (7%), and others. 
 
Economy: The structure of the Ghanaian economy has seen minimal changes over the past 
two decades. The agriculture sector, previously the largest contributor to the Ghanaian 
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economy, has been overtaken by the service and industry sectors. By 2014, the service sector 
was the fastest growing sector of the economy, contributing 52% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP), followed by the industry sector, at 27%, and the agriculture sector, at 22%. 
About 45% of the economically active population is engaged in agriculture, and 41% provide 
services. A high proportion of the employed population of Ghana works in the informal 
sector, the majority being self-employed.  The leading export commodities of Ghana are 
cocoa, gold, and timber. Over the past decade, the government of Ghana has embarked on 
various economic and poverty reduction programmes, including the national health insurance 
scheme, designed to improve the health and general living conditions of its citizenry.  
 
Demography: The most recent population and housing census was held in 2010 and Ghana’s 
population was recorded as 24.7 million and an average growth rate of 2.7%. The population 
density has increased over the years from 29 persons per square kilometre (persons/km
2
) in 
1960 to 103 persons/km
2
 in 2010. The proportion of the population living in urban areas has 
also increased from 23% in 1960 to 51% in 2010. The sex ratio of 102.2 males per 100 
females recorded in 1960 has declined to 95.2 males per 100 females in 2010. The proportion 
of the population under age 15 has also decreased from 45% in 1960 to 38% in 2010 while the 
proportion of the population age 65 years and older increased from 3% to 5% over the same 
period. Over the last five decades, life expectancy at birth has increased from 38 years to 60 
years among males and from 43 years to 63 years among females. Table 1 below presents 
comparative information on the socio-demographics of Ashanti, Volta and Central regions 
where the study took place. 
  
 
 Table 1: Basic socio-demographic and health service/NHIS indicators   
Indicator Ashanti Volta Central National  
Socio-demographics     
Percentage population 19.4 8.6 8.9 24,658,823 
Economically active population 19.1 8.4 8.6 43.9 
Percentage population employed 18.6 8.6 8.5  
Percentage self-employed of the employed 65.5 75.3 69.2 64.9 
Population density (km
2
) 196 103 224.1 103 
Percentage urban population 60.6 33.7 47.1 50.9 
Sex ratio (males/100 females) 94 92.8 91 95.2 
Households (N=) 1,126,216 495,603 526,764 5,467,136 
Average household size 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.4 
Percentage population literate 82.6 73.5 78.2 74.1 
 Sources: GSS 2010 Population and Housing Census, 2013. Available at  
www.statsghana.gov.gh  
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The Ghana health delivery system  
The health delivery system in Ghana is organised on a three-tier level: primary, secondary and 
tertiary, corresponding to district, regional and teaching hospital levels. The primary level is 
further organised on a three-tier level: the district hospital, the sub-district health centre and 
the community-based health planning service (CHPS) compound. The institutional structure 
of the public health care system is made up of the Ministry of Health as policy maker and 
regulator, the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals as care providers and the 
National Health Insurance Authority as purchaser of health care services for insured members 
while non-insured members pay for health care services out-of-pocket. The service provision 
functions of the Ghana health service is complemented by quasi-public, faith-based and 
private health providers. The public health system is decentralised. The Ministry of health has 
delegated the service provision functions to the Ghana Health Service (GHS), the teaching 
hospitals and the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG). The GHS on its part has 
de-concentrated its functional responsibilities to the regional and district health management 
teams. 
 
Table 2: Basic health service/NHIS indicators   
Indicator Ashanti Volta Central National 
a. NHIS service availability     
NHIA District Offices  25 15 13 166 
Active NHIS card-bearing members 1,715,174  910,559  866,831  10,145,196  
Percentage active to regional population 34 28 23 38 
NHIS-credentialed service providers (2013) 619 321 334 3,832 
b. GHS Health personnel availability      
Percentage share of health professionals 18.2 8.5 8.6  
Percentage share of nurses (Professional) 45.5 53.4 39.3  
Percentage share of nurses (Enrolled) 54.5 46.6 60.7  
Number of Doctors  96 36 26 n/a 
Number of Community Health Nurses 157 264 130 n/a 
c. NHIS Health service utilization and 
cost 
      
OPD utilization (per member) 2.62 2.63 2.18 2.64 
IPD Utilization (per member) 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.18 
OPD claims expenditure (GHC per member)  54.52 29.50 42.22 22.14 
IPD claims expenditure ( GHC per member  35.67 24.33 15.41 41.61 
Sources: NHIA Annual Report, 2013. Available at www.nhia.gov.gh ; NHIA Statistical Bulletin, 
2013; GHS Annual Report 2013. Available at www.ghanahealthservice.org     
 
 
Health care financing, including health insurance 
Health care financing in Ghana dates back to the colonial era when in the 1880s, the colonial 
government introduced a fee paying policy for curative health care services. Upon attainment 
of independence in 1957, the Government of Ghana abolished the fee paying policy declaring 
medical services free from out-of-pocket payment until 1971 when minimal fees were re-
introduced with the enactment of the Hospital Fees Act of 1971 (Act 387) as partial cost 
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recovery measure to ensure un-interrupted service provision at the health facilities [11]. 
Between 1969 and 1972, the Government of Ghana initiated moves to introduce a social 
health insurance scheme to help address the financial burden of health care services but the 
government was overthrown with its social health insurance idea in 1972.  
 
In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, Ghana began to experience economic down-turn and upon 
advice and with support of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
initiated the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983. The conditions that came with the 
support required that subsidies, including those on social services were removed. The 
Hospital Fees Regulation, 1983 (L.I. 1277) was therefore introduced to re-enforce Act 387 
and further increase health service charges. In 1985, the Government of Ghana, in compliance 
with health and education sectors loan granted by the WB and IMF had to cut down on its 
expenditure in these sectors. This compelled the Government of Ghana to introduce another 
Hospital Fees Regulation, 1985 (L.I. 1313) [12] which sought to raise substantially fees 
charged at government health facilities with the aim of generating no less than 15% of the 
Ministry’s total recurrent expenditure [13]. Some improvement in equipment and drug supply 
were seen after the introduction of the fees but government still needed a lot more financial 
resources to absorb the excess health bills since the fees were still not adequate to meet the 
total cost of service provision.  
 
With average per capita income of US$390 at the time of user fee payment, and a daily 
minimum wage of less than US$1, a large percentage of the population of Ghana could not 
afford to pay for medical treatment.  The “cash and carry” system, thus, generated debate in 
the country with a section of the public holding the view that the user charges impeded access 
to needed health care services and caused preventable deaths in the population. They therefore 
advocated the withdrawal of the user charges from the health care delivery system in Ghana.  
 
In 1992, the first community-based health insurance scheme was established with the support 
of the Catholic Church to mobilize financial resources to address the health needs of 
members. This initiative attracted the attention of other communities that replicated it in their 
respective communities. In 1998, government piloted a social health insurance in the Eastern 
region of Ghana with the view to replicating it across the country but the initiative could not 
go beyond the pilot stage. It, however, increased the awareness among the populace of the 
need for some form of social health protection to cater for their health care in times of need. 
Consequently, by 2003, about 159 voluntary health insurance schemes had been established in 
67 districts across the country [14] [15]. These community initiatives were, however, not 
coordinated nor regulated by any legal framework and membership was strictly based on 
subscriber contribution and, therefore, the poor and needy were left out of the safety net.  
 
Preparations toward the establishment of the National Health Insurance Scheme: In the 
run-up to elections 2000, health care financing became a politically topical issue and in 
keeping with the promise to establish a health insurance system for the country upon election 
into office, the Government of Ghana, led by the New Patriotic Party (NPP), established the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) through the National Health Insurance Act, 2003 
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(Act 650) in 2003 to provide financial risk protection to all citizens of, and legal residents in, 
Ghana. The Act 650 was replaced in 2012 with Act 852 by the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC)-led government as part of periodic reform of the national health insurance system. The 
law made provision for the establishment of three health insurance schemes, namely District 
Mutual Health Insurance Scheme, Private Mutual Health Insurance Scheme and Private 
Commercial Health Insurance Scheme [16], [17]. It defined a basic benefit package that 
covers about 90% of the most common clinical conditions in Ghana. It also made provision 
for the establishment of a National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) to be financed through 
earmarked tax to provide sustainable funding to the Scheme. The NHIF has seven main 
sources which accumulate funds for payment of claims, support to the health sector and for 
administrative expenditure (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Sources of funding for the NHIS and fund flow 
 
Source: NHIA, 2016 
 
 
Current sources include a 2.5% Value-Added Tax (VAT), 2.5 percentage points of 18.5% 
employees’ Social Security Contributions to the Pension Fund, Government of Ghana annual 
budgetary allocations proposed and approved by parliament to the NHIF, accruals from 
investments of surplus funds held in the NHIF by the NHIA, grants, gifts and donations made 
to the NHIF and graduated premium paid by members in the informal sector. The NHIF has, 
since its establishment, contributed immensely towards health financing in Ghana and the 
reduction of out-of-pocket expenditure in relation total expenditure on health (table 2). 
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Table 3: Health financing statistics 2000-2014 
Year/indicator 2000 2004 2008 2012 2014 
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of gross 
domestic product 
3.0 3.96 4.85 4.9 3.56 
General government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total expenditure on health 
49.92 60.62 66.45 65.45 59.56 
Private expenditure on health as percentage of total 
expenditure on health 
50.03 39.38 33.55 34.43 40.15 
General government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total government expenditure 
7.85 12.58 13.15 9.32 6.82 
External resources for health as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health 
14.84 20.91 12.74 12.11 15.32 
Social security expenditure on health as a percentage of 
general government expenditure on health 
n/a n/a 26.37 25.1 32.46 
Out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health 
31.8 25.58 22.2 26.6 26.84 
Private pre-paid plans as a percentage of private 
expenditure on health 
11.11 9.97 9.13 5.46 2.01 
Source: WHO Ghana Country Statistics, 2016 
 
At the start of this research project in 2013, the NHIS had achieved 38% population coverage 
[18]. As at the end of 2016, population coverage stood at 39% [19]. In its 2015-2018 medium 
term strategic plan, the NHIA noted that growth in membership of the Scheme had stagnated 
around an average of 1.7% during the preceding 4-year medium-term period between 
2011and 2014 [20]; an indication of membership enrolment and retention challenge to the 
NHIA. It is therefore expected that since membership growth is “stunted”, the corresponding 
growth in utilization and claims expenditures would be slow but the contrary was the case as 
the NHIS faces the challenge of cost escalation, partly due to both supply and demand side 
moral hazard, thereby raising concerns about its long-term sustainability [21], [22]. 
 
The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), the agency that is responsible for the 
operation of the Scheme, commits to address this challenge by a two-pronged approach: 
expenditure side intervention and income side intervention, including provider payment 
reforms with the introduction of capitation as provider payment method for primary care.  In 
its medium term strategic plan 2010-2014 the NHIA indicates its primary goal as “to enhance 
the financial sustainability of the scheme through additional sources of funding, cost 
containment strategies, prudent fund management and a mix of payment mechanisms” as it 
seeks to consolidate the position of the NHIS as the preferred mechanism for reducing 
financial barriers to healthcare in Ghana [20]. In the context of growing demand for more 
health care within budgetary constraints, it becomes imperative for governments to implement 
cost-containment measures to ensure un-interrupted provisioning of health care services 
without compromising quality [23]. At point of service, two incentives may be applied to 
contain cost: demand-side incentives to reduce moral hazard and supply-side incentives to 
induce efficient application of resources. Supply-side, as opposed to demand-side incentives, 
are deemed a better option because while the demand side incentives, such as co-payments, 
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are noted to impose financial hardship on care seekers, supply-side incentives could induce 
providers to be cost-conscious in order to control expenditure [24]. Provider payment reforms 
are, therefore, deemed a better option to increase efficiency in the application and use of 
scarce health resources. Hence, the NHIA started reforming its payment methods in 2008 
upon the realization that the fee-for-service payment method, as a sole payment method, was 
deficient in containing cost. 
 
Provider payment methods and payment reforms in Ghana NHIS  
Regulation 37(2) of the Legislative Instrument, 2004 (L.I. 1809) [Available at 
www.nhia.gov.gh]  enjoins the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) to develop 
uniform provider payment mechanisms (PPM) to reimburse credentialed health care providers 
for services rendered to subscribers of NHIS.  The L.I 1809 mentioned capitation and fee-for-
service payments, and “others as determined by the NHIA” as the main provider payment 
mechanisms to be applied to re-imbursement under the NHIS. The NHIA has, since, 
introduced various provider payment methods in its operations. At the inception of the NHIS, 
the NHIA adopted fee-for-service payment system to re-imburse NHIS-credentialed health 
care providers. This provided natural incentives for provider-induced demand for services, 
resulting in unexpected increases in utilization and claims expenditures of the NHIA.  
 
This trend prompted the NHIA to initiate reforms of the provider payment system in 2008, by 
implementing a Ghana version of the Diagnosis-Related Groupings (DRG) payment method 
which became known as Ghana Diagnosis-Related Groupings (G-DRGs). DRGs, first 
introduced in the United States of America (USA), are standard groupings of diseases that are 
deemed clinically similar, have comparable treatment protocols and use similar healthcare 
resources for managing such comparable cases. The G-DRG, by design, is not the inclusive 
type and so, covers services only. Medicines continue to be paid for by fee-for-service but 
within a standard medicines list and price schedule. Under the G-DRG payment method, 
providers are reimbursed the same fixed tariff agreed among stakeholders for cases that fall 
within the same diagnostic category.   
 
The G-DRG notwithstanding and with only 35% percent of the population being active card 
bearing members of the Scheme as at 2012 [25], the NHIA observed that service utilization 
rates, especially out-patients services (OPD), had been increasing, a situation which cast 
doubt in the minds of management as to the effectiveness of the G-DRG to address the issues 
that necessitated its introduction in 2008. Between 2010 and 2012, through clinical audit of 
less than 10% of provider claims, an amount of GHC20.103, 976 ($9,307,396) was found to 
have been paid as un-earned claims to providers as a result of the afore-mentioned provider-
side moral hazards [26]   
 
The Ghana Health Sector Programme of Work, 2012 holistic assessment report [MOH Health 
Sector Holistic Assessment Report, 2013. Available at www.moh.gov.gh] noted that the 
National Health Insurance had led to increase in utilization of OPD services across all the 
regions.  The report highlighted the doubling of OPD per capita rate with 80% of total 
outpatients being NHIS-insured members and noted that the high proportion of OPD services 
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could either “be a reflection of frivolous use of services by NHIS members or a reflection of 
high NHIS membership among those in need of services” and concluded that “a positive 
answer to these questions poses a financial risk to the NHIS, and that these issues should be 
further analyzed and addressed”. After careful consideration of these challenges facing the 
NHIS, the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) commits to address them by 
continuing the provider payment reforms by including capitation as payment method for 
primary outpatient services with the key objective of driving, or at least, slowing down 
growth in claims expenditure while maintaining quality of care provision [27], [28].  
 
Rationale and objectives of thesis 
Being the first time that Ghana is introducing capitation payment in a national health 
insurance system, its effect on health care delivery by providers and utilization by subscribers 
and related costs is unknown. This calls for a study of the implementation process to 
document the experiences that Ghana would go through, for the benefit of other countries as 
well. Besides, following the decision to introduce capitation as payment method for primary 
care, concerns have been expressed about the possibility of capitation payment incentivizing 
providers to reduce the quantity and quality of service provided to the insured clients. These 
concerns reflect the theory of effects of capitation payment on patient care which states: 
“capitation may encourage providers to deliver fewer services because they do not receive 
more revenue for more care delivered” [29]. The concerns also reflect a study of physician 
behaviour under capitation which concludes that “the ways physicians are compensated affect 
their perceived incentives to increase or decrease services to patients ”with the latter adversely 
affecting “perceived quality of care and satisfaction …” [30].  
 
The NHIA, however, believes that notwithstanding the weaknesses of capitation payment 
method, applying it to primary out-patient care would help address the cost escalation, 
especially from OPD services. Learning from the experiences with the implementation of fee-
for-service and G-DRG payment methods, the NHIA decided to implement capitation in a 
step-wise manner, beginning with a pilot in order to learn key lessons to guide strategies for 
country-wide scale up. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to assess the implementation 
of the capitation payment to determine whether or not capitation payment achieved the 
objective for which it was introduced and to identify any un-intended effects it may have had 
on primary care delivery. Findings of the thesis will provide guidance for the NHIA as it rolls 
out the implementation nation-wide. Besides, Ghana having been acknowledged a “trail-
blazer” in social health insurance implementation in Sub-Sahara Africa, its experience with a 
context-specific capitation payment could provide important lessons for other low-middle 
income countries implementing, or about to implement or roll out health insurance and/or 
capitation, especially those that are taking inspiration from the Ghana system.   
 
Scope of the thesis 
There are a number of aspects of the capitation payment system that are amenable to research 
but which cannot be implemented within one PhD project. The scope of study was, therefore, 
limited to the cost containment objective and the effects on provider and subscriber attitude 
towards the payment method and their perception of quality care delivery. Figure 3 below 
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presents the thesis outline by research question, sub-questions and outputs in terms of 
manuscripts. 
 
Main research question:   
Does capitation payment method affect health care utilization and related claims expenditure 
of the NHIS; and quality health care delivery under Ghana’s National Health Insurance 
Scheme? 
 
Specific research questions 
1. What international experience of capitation implementation exists in literature and 
what lessons can Ghana learn from such experience? 
2. What effects does capitation payment method have on primary outpatients utilization 
and related claims expenditure in Ghana? 
3. Does capitation payment affect membership enrolment and retention among members 
of the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme? 
4. What is the attitude of Ghanaian insurance card-bearing members and credentialed 
service providers towards the capitation payment policy and their perception of 
quality care delivery?  
 
 
Figure 3: Overview of thesis outline by research questions and related outputs 
Main study question
Does capitation payment method affect health care utilization and related 
claims expenditure; and health care delivery under Ghana’s national health 
insurance scheme?
3. Does capitation 
payment affect 
membership 
enrolment and 
retention among 
members of the 
national health 
insurance scheme?
2. What effects does 
capitation payment 
for primary care  
method have on 
utilization and 
related claims 
expenditure in 
Ghana?
1. What international 
experience of 
capitation 
implementation exists 
in literature and what 
lessons can Ghana 
learn from such 
experience?
4. Survey design 
(cross-sectional 
survey of NHIS-
credentialed health 
care providers and 
NHIS card-bearing 
members.
3. Quasi-
experimental 
design (pre-post 
intervention study) 
using existing 
administrative data
on membership 
enrolment from 
study areas.
the .
2. Quasi-
experimental design  
(pre-post 
intervention study) 
using existing 
administrative data 
on utilization and 
claims expenditure 
from the study areas.
1. Narrative review of 
the literature on 
capitation payment 
implementation 
experience in 
countries’ health 
system.
Sub-
questions 
1-4
Study 
design 
and data 
collection 
strategy
4. What is the 
attitude of insurance 
card-bearing 
members and 
credentialed service 
providers towards the 
capitation payment 
policy? 
Related 
papers/ 
articles
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
Chapter 4 Chapters 5-7
Source: Author’s own construct
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Conceptual framework 
The main objective of the NHIA for introducing capitation as a provider payment method for 
primary care is to contain cost while maintaining quality of care rendered to NHIS 
subscribers. One way to contain cost is to control utilization without necessarily denying 
access to needed health care services. A way to control utilization is to provide an enabling 
environment for subscribers to freely select their preferred primary care providers (PPP) from 
whom they will seek primary care in times of need. It must, however, be noted that the NHIS 
operates within a “golden tripod”, namely the NHIA, network of NHIS-credentialed service 
providers and insured members of the Scheme.  Therefore, any policy change in the direction 
of the Scheme affects all these three key actors of the NHI system. The introduction of 
capitation as additional provider payment method does not only mark a policy shift in the 
provider payment system of the NHIS but also, it can influence provider behavior which can 
in turn, influence  subscribers’ attitude towards the payment policy and their perception of 
quality care delivery. It also has implications for other payment methods already in place and 
therefore requires a robust monitoring and evaluation system to track its performance. 
 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual framework 
Providers
Membership enrolment 
and retention improved
Improved efficiency in 
health resource use
Income stability and 
improved financial 
planning
Actors 
Insured 
members
Capitation 
payment
Growth in claims 
expenditure reduced or, 
at least, slowed.
Cost 
containment 
and quality 
of care 
Growth in health service 
utilization reduced or, at 
least, slowed 
Insured members’ 
satisfaction increased or, 
at least, maintained
Quality and quantity of 
care improved or, at 
least, maintained
NHIA
Main 
objective
Intervention 
Desired / expected 
effects
Source: Author’s own 
construct
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View points 
NHIA: Theoretically, and from the view point of NHIA, capitation can lead to a genuine 
reduction in primary out-patient utilization and claims cost which will, in turn, contribute to 
cost containment and quality of care for subscribers within the Scheme. But much as in 
theory, capitation may contribute to cost reduction, it is not certain whether, in practice, it will 
reduce cost of claims to the NHIA in Ghana. A study of utilization and claims expenditure 
trend would provide some evidence to support or reject such claim. 
 
Provider: Theoretically and from the view point of the provider, capitation may affect the 
perception of providers and their service delivery pattern which can also influence service 
consumers’ perception of quality care delivery. It is, however, the expectation of NHIA that 
being a prospective payment, capitation should contribute to income stability, increased 
resource availability and improved efficiency in the provision and use of health resources. 
This is expected to translate into quality of service to insured members of the NHIS and 
ultimately cost containment in health service delivery. This expectation of the NHIA may be 
confirmed or proved otherwise through quality perception survey of health insurance card-
bearing members and NHIS-credentialed health care providers. 
 
Subscriber: The theoretical effects of capitation on subscribers are that capitation may 
influence their perception of quality of service they receive, negatively affect patient-provider 
trust relationship and ultimately insured members’ attitude towards the NHIS and the 
capitation payment policy. This view point may be ascertained through a survey of health 
insurance card-bearing members in the region of implementation. 
 
Thesis outline 
Chapter two of the thesis addresses research question one by presenting findings of a 
narrative review of the literature on effects of capitation payment for primary care. We 
reviewed, analysed and synthesized available international experiences and information on the 
motivation for, and effects of using capitation as provider payment method in country health 
systems and drew lessons and implications for Ghana and other low/middle-income countries.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 addressed research questions two and three by assessing the effects of 
capitation payment on utilization and claims expenditure and on enrolment and membership 
retention among NHIS members.  
 
Specifically chapter 3 presents results of a trend analysis of health care utilization and related 
claims expenditure and compared the utilization and claims data for outpatient department 
(OPD) services of Ashanti region as an intervention region with those of Volta and Central 
regions that served as control regions over the years 2010-2014. The chapter further presents 
results of multivariate analyses to determine differences in utilization and claims expenditure 
between the intervention and control regions in order to determine any effect of capitation on 
utilization and related claims expenditure in the intervention region.  
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Chapter 4, on the other hand, presents results of a 5-year trend analysis of administrative data 
on NHIS membership in Ashanti, Volta and Central regions to assess membership growth 
rates over the period before and after introduction of capitation payment. It further presents 
results of individual in-depth interviews that were conducted to understand whether capitation 
payment had any influence on peoples’ enrolment and renewal decision.   
 
Chapters 5 to 7 address research questions four by exploring the perception of both providers 
and clients about the quality of care provided under the capitation payment regime and by 
examining the attitude of NHIS members towards capitation payment under the National 
Health Insurance Scheme.  
 
Thus, chapter 5 specifically assesses NHIS subscribers and care providers’ perception of 
quality of care under the capitation payment policy while chapter 6 presents findings of a 
study that determined whether capitation payment affected insured-patients’ trust relationship 
and their trust in the National Health Insurance Scheme in general during the period of 
capitation payment implementation. Chapter 7, on the other hand, presents findings of a 
survey of NHIS-credentialed health care providers’ preference for payment method under the 
NHIS.   
 
Finally in chapter 8, findings of the study are discussed and recommendations made for the 
benefit of policy makers in Ghana and beyond. 
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ABSTRACT 
Objective: To analyse and synthesize available international experiences and information on 
the motivation for, and effects of using capitation as provider payment method in country 
health systems and lessons and implications for low/middle-income countries.   
 
Methods: We did narrative review and synthesis of the literature on the effects of capitation 
payment on primary care.  
 
Results. Eleven articles were reviewed. Capitation payment encourages efficiency: drives 
down cost, promotes adherence to guidelines and policies, encourages providers to work 
better and give health education to patients. It, however, induces reduction in the quantity and 
quality of care provided and encourages skimming on inputs, underserving of patients in bad 
state of health, “dumping” of high risk patients and negatively affect patient-provider 
relationship.    
 
Conclusion: The illustrative evidence adduced from the review demonstrates that capitation 
payment in primary care can create positive incentives but could also elicit un-intended 
effects. However, due to differences in country context, policy makers in Ghana and other 
low/middle-income countries may only be guided by the illustrative evidence in their design 
of a context-specific capitation payment for primary care.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is growing demand for more health care within budgetary constraints, making it 
imperative for governments to implement cost-containment measures to ensure uninterrupted 
provisioning of health care services for their populations without compromising quality 
[1];[2]. Such cost-containment measures may be embedded in health sector reforms that apply 
various strategies such as making hospitals autonomous, implementing provider-purchaser 
split [3];[4] and reforming the provider payment system [2];[5]. The literature provides many 
forms of payment methods, including salary, budgetary transfers, fee-for-service, case-
based/diagnosis-related-group (DRG), capitation payment, pay-for-performance and mixed 
methods [6;] ;  [1] ;[7]. It must be acknowledged that each payment system elicits specific 
response from providers and, therefore, countries contemplating the adoption of any payment 
method for implementation may have to study the implementation experience of pioneering 
countries to understand the issues that these payment methods raise in order to inform their 
country-specific payment systems design. In Canada policy makers sought guidance from the 
literature on the theoretical effects of payment systems in their choice of payment method [8]. 
The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) in Ghana, as part of its provider payment 
reforms, is exploring capitation payment for primary care and would need to learn from the 
experiences of countries that are implementing capitation payment in order to inform the 
(re)design of its country-specific model. This review forms part of a broader study on the 
provider payment reforms in Ghana and seeks to scan available literature and synthesize 
illustrative evidence on effects of capitation payment for primary care to contribute to on-
going discussion of the payment reforms initiated in Ghana. Findings will also provide useful 
lessons for other health insurance agencies in low/middle-income countries.  We seek to 
addresses three specific study questions: (i) what has been the motivation for implementing 
capitation payment in countries’ health care systems? (ii) What effects has capitation payment 
had on primary care provision? (iii) What lessons can Ghana and other low/middle income 
countries learn from these international experiences? We begin by reflecting on the 
considerations underlying provider payment methods in an attempt to address study question 
one; and then narrow the focus on effects of capitation payment to adduce illustrative 
evidence to address study question two. Study question three will be addressed in the 
concluding part of the discussion where recommendations would be offered the NHIA and 
other health insurance agencies in low/middle-income countries that may be considering 
capitation payment for primary care. . 
 
Considerations underlying provider payment  
The rationale for reforming provider payment systems has been the increasing cost of health 
care services [9]; [10]; [11]; and the need for countries to contain it without compromising 
quality. However, economic theory maintains that changes in provider payment systems 
attract responses from providers [12] which could affect the quality and quantity of service 
provided [13]. In the following paragraphs, we discuss key payment methods and the 
incentives they create in care delivery. 
 
Fee-for-service payment is used to reimburse health care providers on “per item of service 
provided” basis and aligns provider income to quantity of service provided [7]. While it  helps 
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to generate valuable health information to guide clinical decisions and draws providers’ 
attention to patient satisfaction in order to retain them on their list, it may  create incentives to 
increase service provision because the financial risk rests with the payer [14]. It is described 
as reward for “volume and intensity rather than value”; and “inflationary and ineffective in 
containing cost” [15]. Barnum et al [6] associate supplier-induced demand with fee-for-
service but Rosen [14] argues that when providers advise patients in their capacity as agents 
in care delivery, their influence on patients’ actions may only be described as “physician-
initiated” demand. Fee-for-service is widely used in countries such as Belgium, Germany and 
Japan [1]. In many low/middle-income countries fee-for-service may be the dominant 
payment method for reimbursing provider but there are moves to adopt the diagnosis-related-
grouping (DRG) payment as part of measures to address the negative incentives of fee-for-
service payment [16]. In Ghana, the NHIA initially adopted fee-for-service payment but 
switched to DRG payment following the observed negative incentives that the fee-for-service 
created in the system. 
 
DRG provides means for relating diagnosis and treatment to cost. Under DRG, providers are 
paid a pre-determined amount for services rendered based on episode of illness with the initial 
motivation to provide framework for monitoring quality of care and utilization [17]. It is 
deemed to have strong incentive to induce efficiency and cost-containment but requires 
quality control and monitoring systems to forestall possible perverse incentives [1]. DRG was 
introduced by the United States Medicare programme to contain an observed increasing 
health care expenditure [18] and a number of low/middle-income countries including Ghana 
are using various forms of DRG methods to reimburse their health care providers [16]. In 
Ghana DRG rates are fixed in advance for a given diagnosis or diagnosis cluster but the 
reimbursement is made after the services have been rendered. Ghana is exploring capitation 
payment for primary care upon realization that the DRG creates incentives for providers to 
“game” the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). 
 
Under capitation payment, providers are paid agreed sum of money per insured member for a 
period of time to provide pre-determined services for enrolees. Two types of capitation 
systems may be identified: list capitation system and geographic capitation system [2];[19]. 
The list capitation payment ties the aggregate income of the provider to the number of 
patients enrolled to him/her while geographic capitation payment ties reimbursement to the 
population living within a particular geographical area. Capitation payment is expected to 
promote efficient use of resources by controlling prices and volumes of services provided. 
Payers of health care services have the benefit of knowing their budgets in advance under 
capitation payment; while providers pay attention to health literacy to keep their enrolees 
healthy in order to save cost [2]. It is noted to  eliminate supplier-induced demand associated 
with fee-for-service payment [7]; [14] but, unless the capitated rate is risk-adjusted, at least by 
age and sex, providers may provide less care for perceived risk groups on their list [1];[20]. 
Many countries in the world, including the Scandinavian countries, United Kingdom (UK) 
and Thailand apply capitation payment but with variations [21]; [22]. The UK applies full 
risk-adjustment formula for calculating the capitated rate, Denmark adjust its capitated rate by 
age and sex while capitation rate in Thailand is determined by government and has no risk-
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adjustment formula [21]. Many countries in Central Europe and the Baltic states use 
capitation adjusted for age and sex to pay for primary care [23]. Ghana introduced capitation 
payment applied to primary care service under its national health insurance scheme as a pilot 
project in 2012 and plans to scale it up across the country. Unlike other countries, the 
capitated rate in Ghana is not risk-adjusted. Besides, it is organised around institutional 
providers, be they public or private, who serve as the contracting unit of primary care whereas 
in many high-income countries, capitation is organized around General Practitioners (GPs).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Literature selection strategy 
  
 
Source: Adapted from www.prisma-statement.org (2009) 
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METHODS 
We did a narrative review of the literature to present a synthesis of knowledge from published 
complementary studies on the effects of capitation payment. Narrative reviews are useful 
educational materials for faculties and for updating practitioners on clinical protocols and by 
discussing recent and best knowledge on a specific intervention from complementary (but not 
necessarily similar) studies [24]; [25].  We searched for articles in PubMed, Science Direct, 
Web of Science and Google Scholar. We initially limited the scope to low/middle-income 
countries (LMICs) but given the few articles found addressing the issues of interest, we 
expanded the scope beyond LMICs. Publications that addressed capitation-specific effects on 
primary care were considered for the final analysis. Others that compared capitation with 
other payment methods, book chapters and technical working papers that analysed the 
motivation for, and effects of provider payment methods were considered for initial review to 
enrich the background discussion. Articles that did not address capitation-specific effects and 
those which study design and setting were not clearly stated were excluded. Figure 1 depicts 
the literature selection strategy. Articles included in the final analysis are produced in table 1.  
 
 
RESULTS 
We present the results in two sections: description of the search results and findings on effects 
of capitation on primary care.   
 
Description of search results 
We retrieved 1,802 articles during our initial search. Removal of duplicates reduced them to 
1,225. We excluded 1,159 articles which did not meet the selection criteria during screening 
of titles and abstracts. Upon screening of the 66 full text articles for capitation-specific effects 
on primary care, we settled on 11 for final review and reporting: two from Asia, three from 
Europe and six from the Americas. Study design and methods for the studies that were used in 
the analysis included: cross-sectional survey, retrospective (study) analysis, controlled 
experimental investigation, longitudinal study and pre-post design with control group.  
 
Effects of capitation payment mechanism  
To answer our second review question, we present the positive and negative incentives that 
capitation creates in primary care delivery.  
 
Positive effects:  
The key motivation for implementing capitation payment in country health systems has been 
the desire to contain cost of care provision. Consistent with this motivation, we found in our 
review that capitation payment could help contain cost and serve as critical source of income 
for providers  [26]. It  is associated with slower growth of health care expenditures  on 
services that were found to be profitable under fee-for-service [27]. Ponce et al [28] report of 
cost saving of 29% and 21% on pharmaceutical and laboratory services respectively, under 
capitation payment. With regard to quality of care, capitation payment was found to 
encourage better standardization of care and improvement in clinical outcomes alongside cost 
reduction [28]. Findings from studies in the Netherlands [29] and Portugal [28] also suggest 
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that there could be no decrease in the quality of care provided under capitation payment. 
Glazier et al [30] on their part did not find any significant difference in comprehensiveness 
and continuity of care between capitated and fee-for-service patients. Regarding provider 
attitude towards work, we found that Primary Care Physicians (PCPs) worked better within 
capitation payment regime and felt that their patients had reasonable access to appropriate 
care [31]. Capitation was found to be associated with increased adherence to policies and 
general guidelines [29] on the part of providers; and incentivized them to give health 
education to their patients [32] with the view to keeping their clients healthy thereby reducing 
cost of providing curative health care services. 
 
Negative effects 
The negative effects of capitation were mostly noted in the areas of quantity and quality of 
care as well as patient-provider relationship. With regard to quantity of care, a study found 
that PCPs provide services lower than optimal for capitated patients and underserve patients 
in bad and intermediate state of health while similar patients with fee-for-service providers 
receive services higher than optimal with those in good and intermediate state of health being 
over served [33]. It was noted that physicians on capitation payment administered fewer 
medication to chronic patients under capitation and used less expensive health personnel such 
as generalists to manage specialist conditions; and nurse-aides rather than nurses to provide 
care for capitated insured clients [26]. Capitation was found to be associated with the shifting 
of potentially primary care services to other areas of care and as Glazier et al [30] reported,  
providers under capitation payment experienced more visits to emergency department with 
higher proportion being semi-urgent and non-urgent. They had relatively higher number of in-
patients visits than those in enhanced fee-for-service practice and enrolled fewer new patients. 
In terms of quality care, private hospitals were found to use less expensive inputs to provide 
care for insured patients, provided fewer medicines to chronic patients and developed 
strategies to “dump” higher cost insured clients [34]. With regard to provider attitude, we 
noted that primary care physicians had a negative perception about the capitation payment 
with concerns over provider income and strained relationship with patients [31]. Studies that 
reported on patient-provider relationship indicated that patients accessing healthcare from 
capitated physicians showed lower level of trust in their physicians [35] and that were 36% 
more likely to switch their primary care providers than those with fee-for-service-paid 
providers [36]. This finding was, however, contradicted in another study [37] that did not 
establish any negative effect of capitation payment on patients’ trust for primary care 
providers that were paid by capitation method.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 1: Description of studies included in the final analysis, showing major findings/conclusions and effects of capitation payment  
No. Study 
reference 
Country & 
characteristics 
Study objective Study 
design/method 
Sample size Major findings/conclusions Effect 
Positive (+) 
Negative(-) 
1. Mills, A 
et al, 
2000 
Thailand To understand the 
internal responses of 
providers to the 
incentives inherent 
in the capitation 
payment mechanism. 
Cross sectional 
survey using 
extensive semi-
structured 
interviews with 
managers and staff 
of the study 
hospitals. 
2 main provider 
networks and 9 
hospitals in 
Bangkok 
Private hospitals use less 
expensive inputs to provide 
care for insured clients 
under capitation payment.   
Quality of 
care (-)  
Private hospitals provide 
fewer medicines to chronic 
patients as a cost-
containment measure. 
Quality/qua
ntity of care 
provided (-)  
Some private hospitals 
developed strategies to 
“dump” higher cost insured 
clients and deter them from 
re-registering with them. 
Quality of 
care/discrim
ination (-)  
Capitation provides strong 
incentives for contracting 
between different providers  
Provider 
attitude (+)  
Capitation encouraged the 
development of provider 
networks due to 
accessibility concerns and 
relative over-capacity 
among private hospitals in 
Bangkok city. 
Provider 
attitude (+)  
  
3
2
 
 
 
2. Yip et al, 
2004 
China To identify effects of 
supply-side payment 
reform on different 
categories of 
expenditures 
Pre-post study 
designs with 
control group- a 
natural experiment. 
6 hospitals that 
are cost drivers 
in Hainan-
China. 
Capitation payment is 
associated with a slower 
rate of growth of 
expenditure on services 
that are profitable under 
fee-for-service. 
Cost-
containment 
(+)  
3. Ponce P 
et al, 
2013 
Portugal To review the 
components of the 
Portuguese 
Capitation package, 
including efficiency 
changes after the 
introduction of 
capitation. 
Retrospective 
(trend) analyses of 
Portuguese Nephro 
Care clinics (from 
January 2008 to 
December 2010) 
34 Portuguese 
Nephro care 
Clinics with 
4,200 patients 
There was a clear 
improvement in clinical 
outcome alongside cost 
reduction.  
 
Cost-
containment
/quality of 
care (+)  
There was 29% and 21% 
cost savings on 
pharmaceutical and 
laboratory services, 
respectively.  
Cost-
containment 
(+)  
There was better 
standardization of care 
under capitation payment. 
Quality of 
care (+)  
4. Van Dijk 
C. et al, 
2013 
The Netherlands To investigate 
whether changes in 
GP remuneration 
system through 
different financial 
incentives affected 
quality of care in 
terms of guidelines 
adherence 
Longitudinal study 
analysing 
differences in 
trends for 
guidelines 
adherence from 
2002 to 2009 
between publicly 
and privately 
21, 421 to 39, 
828 patients 
record from 32 
to 52 general 
practices. 
General guidelines 
adherence increased by 7% 
for publicly insured 
patients and 10% for 
privately insured patients. 
Provider 
attitude (+)  
Changes in provider 
payment did not have 
significant effect on 
guidelines adherence 
Provider 
attitude (+)  
3
3 
 
 
insured patients. between publicly insured 
and privately insured 
patients. 
5. Pearson 
et al. 
(2013) 
USA To determine 
whether capitation 
payment to primary 
care providers is 
associated with 
patient education 
being included more 
frequently during 
office visits 
compared with other 
payments. 
Cross-sectional 
analysis of 
patients’ visit to 
primary care 
providers using the 
2009 National 
Ambulatory Care 
Survey data. 
9,863 patient 
visits in which 
capitation status 
was available 
and provider 
was the 
patients’ 
primary care 
provider. 
 Patients were more likely 
to receive health education 
from providers paid 
primarily by capitation 
method. 
 
Provider 
attitude (+)  
6. Glazier 
R. H et 
al, 2009 
Canada To evaluate practice 
characteristics and 
patterns under 
capitation and 
enhanced fee-for-
service. 
Retrospective 
cohort study using 
administrative data 
n/a Patients in capitated 
practice had less after work 
hours of care and more 
visits to emergency 
department. 
Quality/qua
ntity of care 
provided (-)  
Physicians paid by 
capitation method enrolled 
fewer new patients than 
those paid by fee-for-
service. 
Provider 
attitude (-)  
7. Cykert et 
al. (1997) 
USA To assess 
physicians’ attitude 
towards HMOs that 
utilize capitation 
Electronic-based 
national survey 
using self-
administered 
482 out of 899 
eligible primary 
care physicians 
responded. 
Primary care physicians 
had negative perception 
about the capitation 
payment method. 
Provider 
attitude (-)  
3
4
 
 
 
payment for 
reimbursement of 
services. 
questionnaires Primary care physicians 
worked better within 
capitated payment regime. 
Provider 
attitude (+)  
8. Hennig-
Schmidt 
et al, 
2011 
Germany To improve 
understanding on 
how incentives from 
the payment systems 
FFS and CAP 
influence Physicians 
behaviour 
Experimental 
investigation 
(controlled 
laboratory 
experiment) 
42 medical 
students 
Physicians provide medical 
services significantly lower 
than optimal for patients in 
capitation payment regime 
but provide services 
significantly higher than 
optimal for patients in fee-
for-service practice. 
Provider 
attitude/qua
lity/quantity 
of care 
provided (-)  
      Physicians paid by 
capitation method 
underserve patients in bad 
and intermediate state of 
health while patients in 
good and intermediate state 
of health are over served by 
those  paid by fee-for-
service method 
Provider 
attitude/qua
lity/quantity 
of care 
provided (-)  
9. Sorbero 
E.S et al, 
2003 
USA To  examine the 
relationship between 
patient case mix, 
utilization, primary 
care physician (PCP) 
payment method and 
the probability that 
patients will switch 
Conceptual model 
Retrospective 
administrative data, 
(multivariate 
analysis) 
67, 131 patients 
and 682 PCPs. 
Patients whose primary 
care providers were paid by 
capitation method were 
36% more likely to switch 
their provider than those 
with fee-for-service-paid 
provider. 
Patient-
provider 
relationship 
/ patients (-)  
Patients with high Patient-
3
5 
 
 
their PCP utilization behaviour were 
significantly more likely to 
switch capitated provider 
than were similar patients 
of FFS-paid provider. 
provider 
relationship 
/ patients (-) 
10. Pereira 
G. Ann et 
al, 2001 
USA To assess patient 
attitude towards 
physician 
compensation model 
and to explore 
patients’ 
characteristics 
associated with these 
attitudes. 
Cross-sectional 
(electronic) survey 
2,000 adult 
patients in New 
England HMO 
Patients who knew their 
primary care physician was 
paid through capitation 
frequently expressed 
discomfort with capitation 
payment. 
Patient-
provider 
relationship 
/ patients (-)  
 
Wealthier and more 
educated patients were 
more likely to express their 
discomfort with capitation 
payment. 
Patient-
provider 
relationship 
/ patients (-)  
11. Hall et al. 
(2002) 
USA To assess the impact 
on trust of disclosing 
HMOs’ primary care 
physicians’ payment 
methods to their 
enrolees. 
Hall et al. (2002) USA Disclosing the positive and 
negative features of 
incentives and increasing 
knowledge of them does 
not reduce trust in 
physicians or insurers and 
may have mild positive 
impact on physician trust. 
Patient-
provider 
relationship 
/ patients 
(+)   
 
3
6
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DISCUSSION 
In this section, we discuss findings/results of the review beginning with the motivation for 
implementing provider payment reforms in country health systems. We then focus the second 
part of the discussion on the effects of capitation on primary care delivery and conclude the 
discussion with some recommendations for consideration by Ghana and other low/middle-
income countries considering introducing capitation payment. 
 
Motivation for introducing payment reforms in country health systems:  
We noted from the background studies that reforms in health system financing, including 
provider payment reforms, in both high and low/middle-income countries are driven by the 
need to improve efficiency in the provision and use of health care services with the view to 
containing the increasing cost of health care services [38]; [39]; [9]; [11]; [40]; [41]; [42]. A 
major area of focus in the provider payment reform is geared towards the application of 
capitation payment. Medicare in the United States of America (USA)  introduced payment 
reforms as a result of increasing expenditure which recorded a 300% increase between 1989 
and 1996 [18]. Hungary introduced capitation payment in 2008 to improve efficiency in the 
allocation of health care  resources [43]. In the Swedish healthcare system, characterized by 
provider-purchaser split and devolvement of financial responsibility to the county level, 
provider payment at primary care level follows patient’s choice of provider and a system of 
fixed payment for registered patients is implemented [44].  Consistent with other countries, 
the main objective for introducing capitation payment in Ghana is to contain cost while 
ensuring quality of care. It must, however, be noted that country specific context such as the 
gross national income per capita, the health expenditure per capita and the proportion of the 
gross domestic product de voted to health care as well as other payment systems that co-exist 
with the capitation payment and the source of individual practitioners remuneration influence 
the incentives the payment method creates. Ghana a lower-middle-income country has 
relatively low per income per capita (PPP Intl. $3) compared to Thailand in Asia (PPP Intl. 
$13), the Netherlands in Europe (PPP Intl. $ 43) and the United States in the Americas (PPP 
intl. $ 53). Ghana’s total expenditure on health per capita expressed in international dollars as 
of 2013 was $214 compared with Thailand ($658), the Netherlands (5, 601) and the United 
States ($9, 146) and the proportion of GDP devoted to health being 5.4% for Ghana, 4.6% for 
Thailand, 12.9% for the Netherlands and 17.1% for the United States. (Ref: 
http://www.who.int/countries. Accessed on 11/05/2016). Besides, many countries apply 
payment methods differently. In the Netherlands, general practitioners are paid through a mix 
of capitation (Euro 52 per patient) and fee-for-service for each additional contact (Euro 9 for 
consultation) [45]. These differences do not provide same conditions and motivation for the 
adoption of capitation payment method across countries and hence, in the case of Ghana, 
research is needed to ascertain whether capitation payment would achieve the purpose for 
which it was introduced. 
 
Effects of capitation payment on primary care  
One of the expected positive effects of capitation implementation in Ghana was slow growth 
in cost of health care services. Consistent with this expectation, evidence on cost of health 
care services under capitation payment shows some cost reduction in care delivery, especially 
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in the area of pharmaceutical products and use of diagnostic equipment [26]; [27]; [28]. 
However, NHIA pays for drugs on fee-for-service basis and therefore cannot benefit from the 
cost reduction experienced in countries that include drugs in the capitated basket of services. 
The issue of whether or not to include medicines in the basket of capitated services in Ghana 
was hotly debated among the key stakeholders. Whereas the NHIA had plans to include 
medicines in the capitated package of services, health care providers were not in favour of it, 
a stance that some analysts may construe on the one hand as defence mechanism on the part 
of the (Community) Pharmacist to protect their job considering that many health facilities, 
especially the public and mission facilities, have pharmacies or dispensaries attached to them;  
and a strategy on the part of managers of health facilities with dispensaries to reject the 
perceived financial risk that may be associated with medicines being part of the capitated 
package of services.  
With regard to quality of care, since evidence has shown that capitation payment encourages 
better standardization of care, improvement in clinical outcomes alongside cost reduction 
[28] is associated with increased adherence to policies and general guidelines [29], the 
Ministry of Health would have to invest time and efforts in the capitation implementation 
process to secure its utmost benefit for the population. The finding that capitation payment 
incentivized providers to give health education to their patients [32] and that there could be 
no decrease in the quality of care provided under capitation payment [29];[28]  and the fact 
that providers worked better under capitation payment regime [31] brings hope for Ghana, if 
the capitation payment policy is well implemented. This brings into focus the issue of 
managed competition that the Thai capitation payment introduced among public and private 
providers [26]. In the same way, providers in Ghana have to compete among themselves to 
catch the attention and win the trust of insured-patients in order to enlist and retain them in 
their service in order maximize their income. The NHIA envisaged that capitation payment 
would help its credentialed providers with their financial planning and improve their income. 
Consistent with this expectation, evidence from the review shows that capitation payment 
serves as critical source of  income to providers and had the ability to provide between 20% 
and 30% profit margin for private hospitals in Thailand [26]. However, the evidence further 
indicates that Thai private providers had initially responded negatively to the introduction of 
capitation on the basis of perceived low rate of the capitated amount. In some cases, the 
perceived extra cost is shifted to the consumer through un-authorized co-payment. This 
finding has implication for Ghana. Many of NHIA’s accredited providers are private 
providers who earn their personnel emoluments from income that they generate from 
providing services to (insured) clients. There are also the mission health care providers whose 
salaries of their professional staff are paid from government budget but bear their capital, 
service and administrative expenditures on their own. These expenditures are paid from the 
income they generate from the services they provide to (insured) clients. With respect to 
government operated health facilities, although their salaries and capital expenditures are 
fully borne by government, they are required to generate adequate income from the services 
they provide to (insured) clients either through direct out-of-pocket payment or insurance to 
cover their service and administrative expenditures. A switch from fee-for-service and DRG 
to capitation payment without realistic capitated rate may be viewed as negatively affecting 
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their income flow, a situation which could incentivize them to “game” the system to make up 
for perceived income loss. Providers in Ghana complain about low rate of the capitated 
amount but this concern is not supported by evidence since neither the NHIA nor the provider 
group has done actual costing of services to determine the adequacy or otherwise of the 
capitated rate. It would, therefore, be in the interest of Ghana for both the NHIA and provider 
groups to support the Ministry of Health to undertake costing studies in order to determine 
the real cost of service provision to inform the calculation of the capitated rate. 
Notwithstanding the positive effects of capitation, our review identified some negative effects 
of capitation in relation to quantity and quality of care as well as patients-provider 
relationship. A study of effects of compensation methods on physicians perceived incentives 
to alter services to patients concluded that “the way physicians are compensated affect their 
incentives to increase or decrease services to patients”, with capitation being associated with 
incentive to reduce the quantity of service to patients [46]. This is corroborated by evidence 
from our review which points to a decline in quantity of service provided [47]; [48]. 
Countries have tried to address the tendency of care providers shifting potentially primary 
care cases to other levels of care by  providing additional incentives to encourage low 
utilization at the secondary level, but evidence shows that such interventions fail to achieve 
the desired effect [49].  
On quality of care evidence shows that capitation provides incentive for care providers to 
skim on inputs by using less expensive health personnel to provide care beyond their 
competence in order to maximize their income to compensate for perceived income loss; and  
referring potentially primary care cases to higher levels [50]; [51]; [52]. This behaviour 
undermines the cost-containment objective of capitation because potential low cost that 
would have been borne at the primary care level is pushed to higher levels to attract higher 
cost thereby increasing the overall cost burden on the entire health system.  It could also 
provide basis for stakeholders who are opposed to capitation payment in Ghana for its 
perceived negative effects on care delivery. It may, however, be argued that resorting to the 
use of less expensive health personnel without any discrimination could be understood as 
task-shifting which is acknowledged to be “the vanguard for the renaissance of primary 
health care” [53]. Studies on task shifting [54]; [55] report its usefulness in addressing human 
resource shortages in resource-constrained economies, including Ghana. In China, one way 
of preventing providers from engaging in excessive cost reduction in response to payment 
reform and to assure quality of service was for the Social Insurance Bureau (the NHIA in the 
case of Ghana) to require that the number of patients treated by providers be at least 90% of 
the previous year’s while their total spending should not be below 90% of budget [27]. Such 
an intervention in Ghana will, however, require a robust monitoring and evaluation system to 
track performance in order not to create incentives for providers to duplicate utilization to 
benefit from un-earned claims. At the onset of capitation implementation in Ghana, the NHIA 
had to accept providers demand to take off maternal care services from the capitated basket 
of service since capitation was perceived to have potential to compromise the quality of 
maternal care. Contrary to this opinion however, evidence from Portugal showed that there 
was no decrease in the quality of care provided after capitation payment was introduced [56]. 
Besides, patients accessing services from capitated primary care providers were found to be 
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more likely to receive health education if their primary care providers were paid primarily by 
capitation method [57].These findings provide inspiration for Ghana to re-consider including 
maternal health care package in the capitated basket of services in the future.  
On patient-provider relationship, though some evidence showed that patients were not 
comfortable with their physicians being reimbursed on capitation basis and expressed lower 
level of trust in their physicians [35] a situation that systematically affected the doctor-patient 
relationship and patients who were expected to be loyal to their PCPs were found to be more 
likely to switch their PCPs if the latter was paid by capitation [36] other evidence 
contradicted it [37]. Besides,  it must be noted that although  patients’ satisfaction surveys are 
acceptable mechanism for measuring quality from patients’ perspectives and good to explore 
views of patients on care they receive; and help providers to reflect on their services and 
adjust to meet clients’ needs and expectations, patients’ perception of quality may not 
necessarily reflect clinical quality. Some of this negative perception about the perceived 
quality of care received from providers may be caused by the asymmetry of knowledge 
between care providers and their clients. In the case of China, the negative perception 
expressed by respondents in the studies reviewed may have been influenced by the negative 
media reportage on the provider payment reform [58]. It would, therefore, be commendable 
for policy makers and health insurance agencies in low and middle-income countries to 
collaborate with the media to promote such reforms while encouraging them to expose 
negative practices that could derail the reform agenda. The media should, however, not be a 
substitute for monitoring and evaluation which is required to track performance and identify 
un-intended consequences for early redress. In LMICs like Ghana where demand for 
providers is higher than supply, it could be difficult for patients to switch providers in protest 
against perceived poor quality of care received. 
Lessons learned 
Apart from the evidence alluded to above, the review has brought to the fore issues that 
Ghana and other low and middle-income countries may consider as part of the adaptable 
lessons from the pioneering countries implementing capitation payment system. 
 
Firstly, it must be acknowledged that there are lots of constraints when it comes to the 
development of an efficient and effective provider payment mechanism, the most important 
constraint being availability of data on actual cost of services provided, volume of services 
produced and characteristics of the consumers of services. This is extremely so in low and 
middle-income countries, including Ghana where costing of health care services has been 
constrained by lack of credible data for better analysis. This calls for commitment and 
support of the Ministries of Health towards targeted studies on costing of health care services 
in order to provide realistic and evidence-based information for the development of system-
wide provider payment systems. Such an intervention could help address the issue of whether 
or not the capitated rate is adequate. 
 
Secondly, evidence from the study of patients’ attitude towards their physicians financial 
incentives [58] shows that more respondents with higher level of income and exposure to 
higher education expressed higher discomfort with their providers being paid by capitation 
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and that their discomfort may have been influenced by their exposure to negative media 
reportage  on reimbursement system for providers and the effect that such system has on their 
service provision. In Thailand, evidence shows that the media drew policy makers and the 
general public’s attention to the negative practices that hospitals used to maximize their 
income from the capitated amount on the social security workers [26]. The vibrant media 
landscape in Ghana provides opportunity for the NHIA to collaborate with the media to 
promote the positive attributes of capitation payment while at the same time encouraging the 
media to expose negative practices that may have the potential to derail the implementation 
process.  
 
Thirdly, the NHIA may learn from the managed competition that came along with the 
introduction of capitation in Thailand. Evidence shows that the Social Security Scheme’s 
capitation payment system introduced in Thailand brought awareness to the public hospitals 
that they were in competition with the private sector and this encouraged them to improve the 
quality of service they provided to keep them in the competition [26]. They were incentivized 
to attract more clients to maximize their income since the quantum of their income did not 
depend any longer on the volume of services provided but rather the number of enrolees that 
stayed on their list. Such a healthy competition is needed in Ghana to enhance quality of 
service especially in the public sector and capitation offers an opportunity in that direction. 
Finally, the NHIA may want to note that a switch to capitation payment requires intense 
involvement of all stakeholders, both in the preparation of the capitation package and in the 
organization and implementation of the reform. Besides, the NHIA would have to come to 
terms with the persistent tension that is expected between the technical accuracy of the 
formulae for calculating capitated rates and the desire for simplicity. While the former 
promotes efficiency and equity the latter promotes political accountability. Evidence from 
Hungary [43] shows that such tension slowed down the formula development process and 
therefore the NHIA should not expect results from the policy reforms overnight but rather 
look up to a medium to long term period of 5 to 10 years for a successful completion of the 
process of defining a funding formula that meets the desired resource allocation goals and 
which successfully comprises risk adjustment, risk sharing and other complementary policies.  
 
CONCLUSION:  
From the preceding discussion, one cannot but agree with Rosen [14] that there is no perfect 
payment method in health care delivery. Each payment method has its strengths and 
weaknesses and different payment methods and incentives produce different effects that may 
be deployed to improve quality of care, contain cost and redistribute human resource for 
health but could also lead to perverse incentives [60]. Policy makers in Ghana and other 
low/middle-income countries would have to consider adapting the positive experiences noted 
in this review to their country specific context while being cautioned by the negative 
experiences and coveting them into opportunities for improvement. They may also want to 
appreciate the need for a mix of payment methods to leverage the positive incentives of each 
of them and mitigate their negative incentives since there is no provider payment method that 
is a panacea to the rising health care cost.  
 
42 
 
REFERENCES    
 
1.  Park M, Braun T, Carrin G, Evans D. Provider Payments and Cost-Containment: Lessons from 
OECD Countries. Organization. 2007;1–7.  
 
2.  Jegers M, Kesteloot K, De Graeve D, Gilles W. A typology for provider payment systems in 
health care. Health Policy (New York) 2002, 60(3):255–73.  
 
3.  Duckett SJ. Hospital payment arrangements to encourage efficiency: the case of Victoria, 
Australia. Health Policy (New York). 1995, 34(2):113–34.  
 
4.  The International Bank for Reconstruction/World. Spending wisely. Buying health services for 
the poor [Internet]. Alexander S. Preker ; Jonh C. Langenbrunner, editor. Wash: The World 
Bank; 2005. Available from: www.worldbank.org 
 
5.  Petersen LA, Woodard LD, Urech T, Daw C, Sookanan S. Does Pay-for-Performance Improve 
the Quality of Health Care ? Ann Intern Med. 2006;145(4):265–72.  
 
6.  Barnum H.; Kutzin J.; Saxeniam. Incentives and Provider Payment Methods. Int J Heal Policy 
Manag. 1995;10:23–45.  
 
7.  Rudmik L, Wranik D, Rudisill-Michaelsen C. Physician payment methods: a focus on quality 
and cost control. J Otolaryngol - Head Neck Surg [Internet]. 2014;43(1):34.  
 
8.  Emery JCH, Auld C, Lu M. Paying for physician services in Canada: The institutional, historical 
and policy contexts [Internet]. 1999. Report No.: 99-6. Available from: 
http://portal.publicpolicy.utoronto.ca/... Physician Behaviour%2... 
 
9.  Abe T, Toyabe SI, Cao P, Kurashima S, Akazawa K. Development of a simulation program for 
estimating hospital incomes under the prospective payment system. Comput Methods Programs 
Biomed. 2005, 80(3):271–6.  
 
10.  Agyei-Baffour P, Oppong R, Boateng D. Knowledge, perceptions and expectations of capitation 
payment system in a health insurance setting: a repeated survey of clients and health providers in 
Kumasi, Ghana. BMC Public Health. 2013;13(13):1220.  
 
11.  Maceira D. Provider payment mechanisms in health care: Incentives, outcomes, and 
organizational impact in developing countries. Major Applied Research. Bethesda, MD: 
Partnersship for Health Reform Project; 1998. [Internet]. Available from: 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar. Accessed 26 May 2015. 
 
12.  De Jaegher K, Jegers M. A model of physician behaviour with demand inducement. J Health 
Econ. 2000, 19(2):231–58. 
 
13.  He D, Mellor JM. Hospital volume response to medicare’e outpatient prospective payment 
system: Evidence from Florida. J Health Econ. 2012, 31(2):730–43. 
 
43 
 
14.  Rosen B. Professional reimbursement and professional behavior: emerging issues and research 
challenges. Soc Sci Med. 1989;29(3):455–62.  
 
15.  Econex. Provider payment systems [Internet]. South Africa; 2010. Report No.: 6. Available from: 
www.econex.co.za 
 
16.  Mathauer I, Wittenbecher F. Hospital payment systems based on diagnosis-related groups: 
experiences in low- and middle-income countries. Bull World Health Organ. 2013;91(10):746–
56A. 
 
17.  Averill RF, Goldfield N, Hughes JS, Bonazelli J, McCullough EC, Steinbeck B et al. All patient 
refined diagnosis related rroups (APR-DRGs): methodology overview. 2003;1–81. Available 
from: http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/.../APR-DRGsV20MethodologyOverview. Accessed 25 May 
2015. 
 
18.  Grabowski DC, Afendulis CC, McGuire TG. Medicare prospective payment and the volume and 
intensity of skilled nursing facility services. J Health Econ. 2011;30(4):675–84.  
 
19.  Busse R, Stahl J. Integrated care expperiences and outcomes in Germany, the Natherlands and 
England. Health Aff. 2014;33(9):1549–58.  
 
20.  Randall PE, McGuire TG. Provider behaviour under prospective reimbursement: cost sharing and 
supply. J Health Econ. 1986;5:129–51.  
 
21.  Scott A, Sivey P, Ait OD, Willenberg L, Naccarella L, Furler J, et al. The effect of financial 
incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians ( Review ). 
Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2011;9(9):CD008451.  
 
22.  Waters HR, Hussey P. Pricing health services for purchasers-a review of methods and 
experiences. Health Policy (New York). 2004, 70(2):175–84.  
 
23.  Szende A, Mogyorosy Z. Health care provider payment mechanisms in the new EU members of 
Central Europe and the Baltic states. Current reforms, incentives, and challenges. Eur J Heal 
Econ. 2004;5(3):259–62.  
 
24.  Green BN, Johnson CD, Adams A. Writing narrative literature reviews for peer-reviewed 
journals: secrets of the trade. J Chiropr Med 2006, 5(3):101–17.  
 
25.  Dijkers Marcel PJM. The value of “traditional” reviews in the era of systematic reviewing. Am J 
Phys Med Rehabil. 2009, 88(5):423–30.  
 
26.  Mills A, Bennett S, Siriwanarangsun P, Tangcharoensathien V. The response of providers to 
capitation payment: a case-study from Thailand. Health Policy (New York). 2000, 51(3):163–80.  
 
27.  Yip W, Eggleston K. Addressing government and market failures with payment incentives: 
Hospital reimbursement reform in Hainan, China. Soc Sci Med. 2004, 58(2):267–77.  
 
28.  Ponce P, Marcelli D, Guerreiro A, Grassmann A, Gonçalves C, Scatizzi L. Converting to a 
44 
 
capitation system for dialysis payment-the portuguese experience. Blood Purif. 2013;34(3-
4):313–24.  
 
29.  van Dijk CE, Verheij RA, Spreeuwenberg P, van den Berg MJ, Groenewegen PP, Braspenning J, 
de Bakker HD. Impact of remuneration on guideline adherence: empirical evidence in general 
practice. Scand J Prim Health Care. 2013;31(1):56–63.  
 
30.  Glazier RH, Klein-Geltink J, Kopp A, Sibley LM. Capitation and enhanced fee-for-service 
models for primary care reform: a population-based evaluation. Can Med Assoc J. 2009, 
180(11):E72–81.  
 
31.  Cykert S, Hansen C, Layson R, Joines J. Primary care physicians and capitated reimbursement: 
Experience, attitudes, and predictors. J Gen Intern Med. 1997;12(3):192–4.  
 
32.  Pearson WS, King DE, Richards C. Capitated payments to primary care providers and the 
delivery of patient education. J Am Board Fam Med. 2013, 26(4):350–5.  
 
33.  Hennig-Schmidt H, Selten R, Wiesen D. How payment systems affect physicians’ provision 
behaviour-An experimental investigation. J Health Econ. 2011 J, 30(4):637–46.  
 
34.  Yip W, Eggleston K. Addressing government and market failures with payment incentives: 
Hospital reimbursement reform in Hainan, China. Soc Sci Med. 2004;58(2):267–77.  
 
35.  Pereira  AG, Pearson SD. Patient attitudes toward physician financial incentives. Arch Intern 
Med. 2001;161(10):1313–7.  
 
36.  Sorbero MES, Dick AW, Zwanziger J, Mukamel D, Weyl N. The effect of capitation on 
switching primary care physicians. Health Serv Res. 2003;38(1 Pt 1):191–209.  
 
37.  Hall MA, Dugan E, Balkrishnan R, Bradley D. How disclosing HMO physician incentives 
affects trust. Health Aff. 2002;21(2):197–206.  
 
38.  Tang S, Tao J, Bekedam HB. Controlling cost escalation of healthcare: making universal health 
coverage sustainable in China. BMC Public Health. 2012;12(58):1–13.  
 
39.  Ellis RP. Reimbursement Systems and the Behavior of Mental Health Providers. 1991;14:347–
62.  
 
40.  Bautista MCG, Babin SM. A handbook for the capitation payment mechanism for the outpatient 
benefit package of PhilHealth [Internet]. 2001. Available from: 
thhp://www.scribd.com/doc/72531636/Doc01-CapitationHnBk 
 
41.  Randall PE, McGuire TG. Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, 
and practice-style effects. J Health Econ. 1996, 15(3):257–77. 
 
42.  Randall PE, McGuire TG. Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement. J Health Econ. 
1986 , 5(2):129–51.  
 
45 
 
43.  Nagy B, Brandtmuller A. Implementing Risk Adjusted Capitation Payments with Healthcare 
Reforms in Hungary. Journal Econ Lit. 2008; 147-60  
 
44.  Anell A, Glenngard AH, Merkur SM. Sweden: health system review. World Health 
Organization, on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; 2012; 
Available from: http://www.euro.who.int/en/who-we-are/partners/observatory 
 
45. Paris V, Devaux M, Wei L. Health systems institu- tional characteristics: a survey of 29 OECD 
countries. 2010. Report No.: 50. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmfxfq9qbnr-
en.Accessed 26 May 2015 
 
46.  Reschovsky JD, Hadley J, Landon BE. Effects of compensation methods and physician group 
structure on physicians’ perceived incentives to alter services to patients. Health Serv Res. 
2006;41(4 I):1200–20.  
 
47.  Ransom SB, McNeeley SG, Kruger ML, Doot G, Cotton DB. The effect of capitated and fee-for-
service remuneration on physician decision making in gynecology. Obstet Gynecol. 1996;87(5 
I):707–10.  
 
48.  Vahidi R et al. A systematic review of the effect of payment mechanism on family physicians 
service provision and referral rate behaviour. JPMS. 2013;3(1):54–60.  
 
49.  Hutchison B, Birch S, Hurley J, Lomas J, Stratford-Devai F. Do physician-payment mechanisms 
affect hospital utilization? A study of health service organizations in Ontario. CMAJ. 
1996;154(5):653–61.  
 
50.  Stearns SC, Wolfe BL, Kindig DA. Physician responses to fee-for-service and capitation 
payment. Inquiry. 1992;29(4):416–25.  
 
51.  Allard M, Jelovac I, Léger PT. Treatment and referral decisions under different physician 
payment mechanisms. J Health Econ. 2011 , 30(5):880–93.  
 
52.  Mariñoso BG, Jelovac I. GPs’ payment contracts and their referral practice. J Health Econ. 
2003;22(4):617–35.  
 
53.  World Health Organisation. Treat, train,retain: Task Shifting Global reccomendations and 
guidelines. Organization. 2008;96.  
 
54.  Fulton BD, Scheffler RM, Sparkes SP, Auh EY, Vujicic M, Soucat A. Health workforce skill 
mix and task shifting in low income countries: a review of recent evidence. Hum Resour Health. 
2011, 9(1):1.  
 
55.  Callaghan M, Ford N, Schneider H. A systematic review of task- shifting for HIV treatment and 
care in Africa. Hum Resour Health. 2010, 8:8.  
 
56.  Ponce P et al. Converting to a Capitation System for Dialysis Payment – The Portuguese 
Experience. Blood Purif. 2012;34:313–24.  
 
46 
 
57.  Pearson WS, King DE, Richards C. Capitated payments to primary care providers and the 
delivery of patient education. J Am Board Fam Med 2013. 26(4):350–5.  
 
58.  Yip W, Eggleston K. Provider payment reform in China: The case of hospital reimbursement in 
Hainan Province. Health Econ. 2001;10(4):325–39.  
 
59.  Pereira AG, Pearson SD. Patient attitudes toward physician financial incentives. Arch Intern 
Med. 2001;161(10):1313–7.  
 
60.  Chaix-Couturier C, Durand-Zaleski I, Jolly D, Durieux P. Effects of financial incentives on 
medical practice: results from a systematic review of the literature and methodological issues. Int 
J Qual Heal Care. 2000;12(1):33–42.  
 
 
  
47 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of capitation payment on utilization 
and claims expenditure under National 
Health Insurance Scheme: a cross-
sectional study of three regions in Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
Francis-Xavier Andoh-Adjei 
Bronke Boudewijns 
Eric Nsiah-Boateng 
Felix Ankomah Asante 
Koos van der Velden 
Ernst Spaan 
 
Published in  
Health Economics Review (2018) 8:17  
 
 
  
48 
 
ABSTRACT 
Introduction: Ghana introduced capitation payment under National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS), beginning with pilot in the Ashanti region, in 2012 with a key objective of 
controlling utilization and related cost. This study sought to analyse utilization and claims 
expenditure data before and after introduction of capitation payment policy to understand 
whether the intended objective was achieved. 
 
Methods: The study was cross-sectional, using a non-equivalent pre-test and post-test control 
group design. We did trend analysis, comparing utilization and claims expenditure data from 
three administrative regions of Ghana, one being an intervention region and two being control 
regions, over a 5-year period, 2010-2014. We performed multivariate analysis to determine 
differences in utilization and claims expenditure between the intervention and control 
regions, and a difference-in-differences analysis to determine the effect of capitation payment 
on utilization and claims expenditure in the intervention region. 
 
Results: Findings indicate that growth in outpatient utilization and claims expenditure 
increased in the pre capitation period in all three regions but slowed in post capitation period 
in the intervention region. The linear regression analysis showed that there were significant 
differences in outpatient utilization (p=0.0029) and claims expenditure (p=0.0003) between 
the intervention and the control regions before implementation of the capitation payment. 
However, only claims expenditure showed significant difference (p=0.0361) between the 
intervention and control regions after the introduction of capitation payment. A difference-in-
differences analysis, however, showed that capitation payment had a significant negative 
effect on utilization only, in the Ashanti region (p<0.007). Factors including availability of 
district hospitals and clinics were significant predictors of outpatient health care utilization.  
 
Conclusion: We conclude that outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased 
in both pre and post capitation periods, but the increase in post capitation period was at 
slower rate, suggesting that implementation of capitation payment yielded some positive 
results. Health policy makers in Ghana may, therefore, want to consider capitation a key 
provider payment method for primary outpatient care in order to control cost in health care 
delivery.  
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BACKGROUND 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) [1] has noted that as many as 11% of the population 
in some countries incur catastrophic expenditures on health each year while about 5% are 
pushed into poverty; and only about 5%-10% of people living in Sub- Sahara Africa and 
southern Asia are covered by any type of formal social protection compared with 20%-60% 
in middle income countries. In response to this global challenge, Ghana introduced a national 
health insurance scheme (NHIS) in 2003 to provide financial risk protection for its population 
[2]. About 95% of the diseases in Ghana are covered by the health insurance scheme. The 
Scheme achieved 38% population coverage in 2013[3] and by end of year 2016, the 
population coverage stood at 39% of projected national population [NHIA Annual Report, 
2016. Unpublished]. The NHIS policy makes provision for several groups of people to be 
exempted from payment of premium. These include children under 18 years old, elderly 
above 70 years old, Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) pensioners, 
pregnant women, and those identified as indigent (extreme poor). Sources of funding for the 
NHIS include the National Health Insurance Levy of 2.5%, a 2.5% of formal sector workers’ 
contributions to the SSNIT Fund, return on investment, premium paid by non-SSNIT 
contributors and registration fees. In the years 2009-2011 the NHIS experienced increasing 
expenditure over income [4], confirming prediction by an actuarial team who cautioned in 
2005 that with an anticipated increase in membership enrolment and resultant utilization of 
health care services under the NHIS, if the funding level remained constant, expenditure 
would outstrip income by the year 2010 [5], a situation which has been partly attributed to 
both supply and demand side moral hazards[6]. The National Health Insurance Authority 
(NHIA) commits to address this challenge through provider payment reforms with the view 
to containing cost while asuring quality of care. This decision syncs with evidence in 
literature which indicates that one key motivation for provider payment reforms in countries’ 
health system is the need for countries to improve efficiency in the application of health care 
resource in order to contain cost escalation without compromising quality [7]; [8]; [9]. 
Economic theory, however, points to the fact that changes in provider payment methods 
elicits responses from health care providers that could negatively affect the quality and 
quantity of service they provide [10] [11].  
 
Key payment methods applied in countries’ health system include, but not limited to, fee-for-
service (FFS), diagnosis-related-groupings (DRG) and capitation payments. FFS payment is 
used to reimburse health care providers based on item of service they provide and it aligns 
provider income to quantity of service provided [12]. Associated with supplier-induced 
demand [13], FFS is described as reward for “volume and intensity rather than value”; and 
“inflationary and ineffective in containing cost” [14] as it create incentives to increase service 
provision and pushes the financial risk to the payer. According to Rosen, FFS helps generate 
valuable health information needed to guide clinical decisions and argues that when providers 
advise patients in their capacity as agents in care delivery, their influence on patients’ actions 
may only be described as “physician-initiated” demand and not necessarily supplier-induced 
demand [15]. FFS is widely used in countries such as Belgium, Germany and Japan [16] as 
well as in many low and middle-income countries. There are, however, moves by countries to 
adopt the DRG payment as part of measures to address the negative incentives that FFS 
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payment creates [17]. The DRG, on its part, relates diagnosis and treatment to cost and 
providers are paid a pre-determined rate for services rendered based on illness episode with 
the initial motivation to provide framework for monitoring quality of care and utilization 
[18]. It has strong incentive to induce efficiency and cost-containment but requires quality 
control and monitoring systems to avert any possible perverse incentives [16]. DRG was 
introduced by the United States Medicare programme to contain an observed increasing 
health care expenditure [19] and a number of low and middle-income countries, including 
Ghana, have adopted various forms of DRG methods to reimburse their health care providers 
[17]. The advantages of DRG notwithstanding, it offers incentives for providers to give 
patients a more severe diagnosis to attract a higher reimbursement [20]. Currently, many 
countries combine it with other forms of payment method including capitation payment. 
Under capitation payment, providers are paid agreed sum of money per listed patient for a 
period of time to provide pre-determined services for them, with the expectation that 
capitation payment will promote efficiency in the use of scarce health care resources by 
controlling volumes of services provided and related cost. Under capitation payment system, 
both payers and providers of health care services have the benefit of knowing their budgets in 
advance. The literature has it that, capitation payment helps to  eliminate supplier-induced 
demand associated with fee-for-service payment [12]; [15] but also cautions that unless the 
capitated rate is risk-adjusted, at least by age and sex, providers may provide less care for 
perceived risk groups on their list [16] [21]. 
 
Provider payment methods within the NHIS 
In 2005, the NHIA adopted FFS payment system to reimburse its credentialed providers but 
had to introduce a Ghana version of DRG which became known as Ghana-Diagnosis-Related 
Grouping (G-DRG) system in 2008 with the view to containing observed escalating cost that 
was being experienced under the FFS payment system. The G-DRG method was 
implemented nationwide and at all levels of care. It is used to pay for both outpatients (OPD) 
and inpatients (IPD) services while FFS continues to be used to pay for medicines. Under the 
G-DRG, related diagnoses are grouped together and the average price of care is determined. 
The switch from FFS to G-DRG was done without any study by the NHIA to understand the 
underlying causes of the effects of FFS. Likewise, the G-DRG was introduced without  any 
pilot, neither was it subjected to prospective evaluation to assess it’s likely outcome regarding 
the cost-containment objective for which it was being introduced. Consequently, the G-DRG 
was later observed to have rather contributed to cost escalation, more than tripling the cost of 
claims observed under the FFS. OPD attendance on account of health insurance increased 
from 597,859 in 2005 to 25,486,081 in 2011. This translates into claims expenditure of 
GHC7.6m ($3.53m) in 2005 and GHC548.7m ($255.2m) in 2011. Between 2007 and 2009, 
the average outpatient claims cost increased by nearly 50% from GHC6.93 (US$2.80) to 
GHC10.11 (US$4.21), and in 2010, outpatient claims accounted for 70% of total claims 
received by NHIA. This represented 30% of total costs of claims paid by NHIA.  Thus, 
growth in utilization translates into growth in claims cost and whereas one may acknowledge 
that the growth in service utilization may be due to the yearly growth in membership and the 
removal of financial barrier to accessing health care service, it is also not certain whether this 
phenomenon is a genuine one and that, it is not partly due to moral hazard which is associated 
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with social health insurance schemes world-wide. This concern stems from the observation 
made over the years during claims processing. It has been noticed with concern that 
overbilling of medicines, inappropriate application of tariff, duplication of claims, lack of 
diagnostic evidence to back claims, absence of linkage between treatment and diagnosis and 
treatment outside the defined benefits package are some of the provider-side moral hazards 
found with claims submitted by service providers for settlement by the NHIA. Further to that, 
clinical audit activities also revealed irrational prescription of medicines, inflation of 
quantities of medicine supplied to subscribers, provision of services above accreditation level 
and overbilling of medicines as some of the issues found with claims submitted by providers 
to the NHIA for payment. Between 2010 and 2012 an amount of GHC20.103, 976 
($9,307,396)) was found to have been paid as un-earned claims to providers, partly as a result 
of the afore-mentioned provider-side moral hazards [3]. The Ministry of Health Joint 
Assessment Team that conducted a holistic assessment of the Ghana Health Sector 
Programme of Work, 2012 also noted that since its introduction, the NHIS has led to increase 
in utilization of OPD services across all the regions.  The team, however, raised concern that 
“with the backdrop of doubling OPD per capita rate, 80% of total outpatients being NHIS-
insured members and 34% of the population being active NHIS members, the high proportion 
of OPD attendance could either be a reflection of frivolous use of services by NHIS members 
or a reflection of high NHIS membership among those in need of services” and concluded 
that “a positive answer to these questions poses a financial risk to NHIS, and that these issues 
should be further analysed and addressed” [22].   
 
Thinking through solutions to address these challenges, the NHIA decided to introduce 
capitation payment for primary outpatient services as part of its provider payment reforms, 
beginning with a pilot in the Ashanti region that bore the highest cost burden of claims (28% 
in 2010). Although capitation payment has been found in literature to encourage efficiency 
[23]: drive down cost [24];[25], serve as critical source of income for providers [26], promote 
adherence to guidelines and policies [27] and encourage providers to work better and give 
health education to  patients [28], it is also noted to induce reduction in the quantity and 
quality of care provided [26], encourage skimming on inputs,  “dumping” of high risk 
patients and negatively affect patient-provider relationship [29]. The NHIA was, however, 
convinced that notwithstanding any un-intended negative effect following the introduction of 
capitation payment policy, with a robust monitoring and evaluation system, its 
implementation could contribute to addressing the cost escalation challenge that is being 
experienced under the G-DRG and fee-for-service payment methods. A key objective for 
introducing capitation payment method was to control utilization and contain cost of claims 
paid by the NHIA. This study was, therefore, undertaken to determine whether capitation 
payment introduced in the Ashanti region of Ghana contributed in controlling utilization and 
claims expenditure under the NHIS. On the basis of a hypothesis that capitation payment will 
result in downward trend or slowed growth in utilization and claims expenditure of the 
NHIA, we developed the following research question to guide the study: Does capitation 
payment have effect on utilization of health care services and related cost at NHIS-
credentialed facilities in Ghana?  
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METHODS 
Study setting: Three regions, namely Ashanti, Volta and Central, were purposefully selected 
for the study. Capitation payment policy which is the subject of study was first introduced in 
the Ashanti region in 2012 and was, therefore, selected as the “intervention” region for the 
study. Per the NHIA’s implementation plan, the policy was to be implemented in the Volta 
region in 2016 and in the Central region in 2017. This study being part of a broader 
monitoring and evaluation system designed to follow the implementation to identify any un-
intended effects, we purposively selected the Volta and Central regions that were being 
prepared for the next implementation phase as “control” regions for this study to enable 
measurement of effect of the payment policy in Ashanti. Details of characteristics of the three 
regions are provided in Tables 1 and 2, page 12-13.  
 
Study design and data  
The study was cross-sectional using a non-equivalent pre-test and post-test control group 
design (before and after study) which according to Creswell [30] is a popular approach to 
quasi-experiments where both the intervention and control groups are selected without 
random assignment. Using multiple non-equivalent comparison groups rather than one also 
increases the ability to explore more threats to the causal inferences[31]. We used aggregated 
secondary data on utilization and claims expenditure from the NHIA database as validated by 
the NHIA Actuarial Directorate covering the years 2010-2014. The dataset contains district 
level information on health care utilization for OPD and IPD. Costs are also registered 
separately for OPD and IPD and are both further split into service and drugs costs. Data on 
the demographic and socio-economic factors were obtained from records of the Ghana 
Statistical Service (GSS) [32].  
 
Statistical data analysis 
In total, data from all the 52 districts in three regions were used for analysis: 24 in Ashanti 
region, 13 in Central region and 15 in Volta region. Descriptive analysis using Microsoft 
Excel 2007 was performed to examine trends in both OPD and IPD utilization and cost in the 
intervention region, Ashanti and the two control regions, Central and Volta over a 5-year 
period, 2010-2014. Utilization and claims expenditure per capita were also analysed by 
dividing total utilization and total claims expenditure for both OPD and IPD by the respective 
number of NHIS members in each region. A generalised linear regression model was 
performed to determine differences in OPD utilization and claims expenditure between the 
intervention region and the two control regions before and after implementation of the 
capitation payment system in the Ashanti region. This model was also used to identify 
predictors of OPD utilization. In addition difference-in-difference analysis (DID) was also 
conducted using the total district level OPD utilization and cost in all the three regions for 
each of the study period to estimate the effect of capitation payment system. In both 
multivariate analyses, the outcome variables were OPD utilization measured in number of 
visits per year, and OPD costs in Ghanaian Cedi (GHS). Costs were converted from GHS to 
US dollars (USD) using historical exchange rates to correct for inflation. The explanatory 
variables were region, and assigned a value of 1 if Ashanti, 2 if Central, and 3 if Volta; time 
when the intervention started, a binary variable with a value of 0 for years before 2012 and 1 
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for years after 2012; treated, a binary variable with value of 0 for total OPD health care 
utilization in the control regions, (Central and Volta) and 1 for total OPD health care 
utilization in the intervention region (Ashanti); and “did”, an interaction between time and 
treated variables (effect). The dependent variables, OPD health care utilization and OPD cost 
in the DID models were transformed into logarithmic variables to minimize the problem of 
skewness. In all the regression models, post-estimation diagnostic checks were also 
conducted using variance inflation factor (VIF) and co-efficient correlation matrix 
(Additional file, correlation matrix) to address the issue of multicollinearity. All covariates 
that showed VIF estimation of 3 or more were systematically excluded from the models. The 
analyses were carried out using Excel version 10 and Stata version 13 and a threshold of 
p<0.05 set for statistical significance. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Trends in utilization  
Utilization of OPD services at NHIS-credentialed facilities in Ashanti region (intervention) 
doubled from 3.74 million to 7.49 million visits between 2010-2011, the years before the start 
of implementation of capitation payment but reduced to 4.1 million (-44.9%) in 2012. 
Between the years 2013 and 2014 which follow that start date of capitation implementation, 
utilization increased from 4.29 million to 5.02 million (17.0%) (Table 1). The two control 
regions, however, exhibited contrasting patterns between them. Utilization in the Central 
region increased from 1.34 million to 2.42 million visits (80.3%) between 2010 and 2011, 
and also increased from 1.94 million to 2.54 million visits (30.7%) between 2013 and 2014. 
In the Volta region, utilization more than doubled from 903,379 to 1.99 million visits 
between 2010 and 2011 but declined from 2.8 million to 2.7 million visits (0.8%) between 
2013 and 2014. Results of the generalized linear regression model showed significant 
difference in utilization between the intervention region and the control regions, F (2, 49) 
=6.62, p=0.0029 before implementation of capitation in 2012. However, no significant 
difference in utilization was observed between the intervention and control regions two years 
after the introduction of capitation payment in the Ashanti region, 2013-2014: F (2.49) =0.13. 
p=0.8755. 
 
Trends in costs of utilization 
Table 2 showed trends in cost of utilization in all the three regions over the 5-year study 
period. Claims expenditure in relation to OPD utilization in Ashanti region increased from 
$49.54 million to $79.42 million (60.3%) before the introduction of the capitation payment 
policy, dropped by more than half to $38.7 million in 2012 which is the year capitation 
payment was introduced; and increased again in 2013 from $51.39 million to $63.85 million 
(24.2%) in 2014, the years after its introduction. In the Central region, claims expenditure 
related to utilization increased from $15.95 million to $22.93 million (43.7%) between 2010 
and 2011 and declined from $21.39 million to $19.53 million (8.7%) between 2013 and 2014. 
Claims expenditure in the Volta region increased from $11.08 million to $17.05 million 
(53.9%) between 2010 and 2011, and from 16.31million to 20.52million (25.8%) between 
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2013 and 2014. The generalized linear regression model showed significant difference in 
claims expenditure between the intervention region and control regions in the pre capitation 
period, 2010-2011, F(2, 49)=9.65, p=0.0003 and post capitation period, 2013-2013; F (2, 49) 
=3.56. p=0.0361. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Trends in utilization by region and service type, 2010-2014 
Region  Year OPD % Growth IPD % Growth Total % Growth 
Ashanti 2010 3,738,374 - 132,258 - 3,870,632 - 
2011 7,492,825 100.4 380,886 188.0 7,873,711 103.4 
2012 4,127,229* -44.9 334,508* -12.2 4,461,737 -43.3 
2013 4,288,590 3.9 305,893 -8.6 4,594,483 3.0 
2014 5,019,149 17.0 405,719 32.6 5,424,868 18.1 
        
Central 2010 1,344,301 - 49,490 - 1,393,791 - 
2011 2,424,202* 80.3 102,484* 107.1 2,526,686 81.3 
2012 1,990,644 -17.9 81,071 -20.9 2,071,715 -18.0 
2013 1,940,097 -2.5 131,093 61.7 2,071,190 0.0 
2014 2,535,207 30.7 125,215* -4.5 2,660,422 28.4 
        
Volta 2010 903,379 - 66,626 - 970,005 - 
2011 1,994,868 120.8 220,441* 230.9 2,215,309 128.4 
2012 1,696,435 -15.0 133,838 -39.3 1,830,273 -17.4 
2013 2,754,035 62.3 229,707 71.6 2,983,741 63.0 
2014 2,731,830 -0.8 173,871* -24.3 2,905,701 -2.6 
* Indicates that for these values inter- or extrapolation was used for one or more of the districts 
involved 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Trends in utilization cost by region and service type, 2010-2014 
  
Region  
 OPD cost (USD) IPD cost (USD)  
%  
Growth  
 Year  Service Drugs Total  % Growth Service  Drugs Total 
Ashanti 2010 23,599,737 25,935,899 49,535,636 - 4,982,751 9,435,406 14,418,157 - 
2011 37,256,361 42,166,756 79,423,117 60.3% 9,307,289 4,162,678 13,469,967 -6.6% 
2012 14,563,585 24,171,523 38,735,108 -51.2% 16,131,540 5,929,841 22,061,381 63.8% 
2013 17,712,047 33,680,387 51,392,434 32.7% 24,467,854* 14,967,877* 39,435,731 78.8% 
2014 29,917,456 33,932,201 63,849,657 24.2% 16,532,198* 8,028,462* 24,560,660 -37.7% 
          
Central 2010 6,784,825 9,169,123 15,953,948 - 3,192,779 2,025,999 5,218,778 - 
2011 9,547,133 13,380,507 22,927,640 43.7% 4,422,200 2,047,402 6,469,602 24.0% 
2012 12,570,262 13,473,381 26,043,643 13.6% 5,460,789 2,149,294 7,610,083 17.6% 
2013 11,035,477 10,352,074 21,387,551 -17.9% 5,907,059* 2,660,226* 8,567,285 12.6% 
2014 9,047,543 10,482,119 19,529,662 -8.7% 4,415,934* 1,677,136* 6,093,070 -28.9% 
          
Volta 2010 5,249,982 5,829,706 11,079,688  2,492,220 3,551,209 6,043,429 - 
2011 8,658,245 8,396,007 17,054,252 53.9% 3,843,255 2,422,278 6,265,533 3.7% 
2012 9,537,493 8,918,609 18,456,102 8.2% 6,671,738 2,617,453 9,289,191 48.3% 
2013 7,902,767 8,407,392 16,310,159 -11.6% 13,806,537* 5,862,988 19,669,525 111.7% 
2014 9,808,899 10,709,757 20,518,656 25.8% 11,159,415* 3,164,179* 14,323,594 -27.2% 
* Indicates that for these values inter- or extrapolation was used for one or more of the districts involved 
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Effect of capitation payment on utilization and cost 
Result of the difference-in-differences analysis showed that capitation payment had a 
negative effect on both out-patients utilization and related claims expenditure in the 
intervention region (Tables 3 and 4).  The effect was, however, significant on outpatient 
utilization only(p<0.007).  The multivariate regression model revealed that district hospital 
(p=0.022) and clinic (p=0.027) were significant predictors of health care utilization (Table 5). 
Other factors such as proportion of the population in poverty, percent of urban population and 
availability of health centre were also predictors of utilization but their effects were not 
significant.  
 
 
Table 3: Effect of capitation payment system on OPD utilization in Ashanti region 
OPD 
utilization  
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>t [95% C.I] VIF 1/VIF 
Lower  Upper   
time 0.46 0.13 3.58 0.000 0.20 0.71 1.87 0.53 
treated 0.6174967 0.15 4.09 0.000 0.32 0.92 2.00 0.50 
did -0.53 0.19 -2.71 0.007 -0.91 -0.14 2.87 0.35 
_cons 11.45 0.09 116.66 0.000 11.26 11.64   
Mean VIF       2.25  
Number of obs 206        
F(3, 202) 7.72        
Prob>F 0.0001        
R-squared 0.1121        
Root MSE 0.6928        
         
VIF: Variance Inflation Factor 
 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of capitation payment system on OPD cost in Ashanti region   
OPD cost Coef. Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
t P>t [95% C.I] VIF 1/VIF 
Lower  Upper  
time 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.753 -.024 0.33 1.87 0.53 
treated 0.77 0.14 5.34 0.000 0.48 1.05 2.00 0.50 
did -0.19 0.21 -0.92 0.356 -0.62 0.22 2.87 0.35 
_cons 13.77 0.09 147.31 0.000 13.57 13.96   
Mean VIF       2.25  
Number of obs 206        
F(3, 202) 13.89        
Prob>F 0.0000        
R-squared 0.1673        
Root MSE 0.76155        
VIF: Variance Inflation Factor  
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Table 5: Predictors of outpatient utilization of health care services, 2014    
Characteristic Coef. Std. 
Err. 
t P>t [95% C.I] VIF 1/VIF 
Lower Upper  
Poverty incidence -0.004 .004 -0.91 0.367 -0.013 0.005 1.37 0.73 
Population in poverty 0.000 0.000 1.41 0.166 -0.000 0.000 1.62 0.62 
% of urban 
population 
0.004 0.003 1.35 0.183 -0.002 .0108 1.92 0.52 
CHPS compound -0.013 0.013 -0.96 0.340 -0.041 0.015 1.26 0.79 
Health centre 0.013 0.016 0.81 0.425 -0.019 0.046 1.38 0.72 
Clinic  0.071 0.031 2.29 0.027 0.008 0.134 1.79 0.56 
Secondary hospital 0.612 0.257 2.38 0.022 0.093 1.132 1.29 0.78 
_cons 11.579 0.230 50.14 0.000 11.113 12.045   
Mean VIF       1.52  
Number of obs 51        
F(7, 43) 7.28        
Prob>F 0.0000        
R-squared 0.5452        
Adj R-squared 0.4680        
Root MSE 0.43532        
CHPS: Community Health-Based Planning Services; VIF: Variance Inflation Factor 
 
DISCUSSION  
Utilization and costs 
The main purpose of this study was to assess the effect of capitation payment on the health 
service utilization and related claims expenditure under Ghana’s National Health Insurance 
Scheme. A key objective for the introduction of capitation payment was to hold down growth 
in total health care expenditure by controlling outpatients’ utilization and related expenditure. 
Our study revealed that outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased in both 
pre and post capitation periods. However, the growth in utilization in the intervention region 
after the introduction of capitation payment was slower than that of pre-capitation period, 
suggesting that implementation of capitation payment to control utilization yielded some 
positive results for the NHIA. This is because in 2012 when the policy was introduced, a 
negative growth of 44.9% was experienced and thereafter, though there was positive growth 
of 3.9% in 2013 and 17% in 2014, the trend in growth was slow compared to the period 
before the introduction of capitation payment. It must, however, be noted that the trend in the 
control regions were a bit different. While the Central region experienced negative growth of 
2.5% in 2013, the Volta region experienced a positive growth of 62.3%; and in 2014 Central 
region recorded a positive growth of 30.7% while the Volta region recorded a negative 
growth of 0.8% in utilization. With regard to OPD claims expenditure, Ashanti region 
showed slowed growth of 32.7% and 24.2% in 2013 and 2014, respectively but the control 
regions exhibited different patterns. Central region experienced negative growth of 17.9% 
and 8.7% in both 2013 and 2014, respectively but the Volta region experienced negative 
growth of 11.6% in 2013 and a positive growth of 25.8% in 2014. This phenomenon suggest 
that factors other than capitation payment policy may have contributed to the trend observed 
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in the Ashanti region. Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with findings in other studies 
that showed that capitation payment is associated with slower growth of health care 
expenditures on services that seem profitable under fee-for-service, could contain cost of 
services and also serve as critical source of income for providers [26], [24] ,[25]. Our 
findings also corroborate those of a study on capitation payment for primary outpatient 
services in Zhuhai, China which found a positive effect in controlling costs of health care 
services [33]. In the China study, the OPD cost increased rapidly over two years before the 
implementation of the capitation payment system but increased at a much lower rate after the 
implementation, just as our study found that capitation payment had some positive effect in 
2012 which was the first year of implementation after which utilization and costs started to 
increase again but at a slower rate; except that the capitation system in Zhuhai-China was 
implemented alongside pay-for-performance with a robust monitoring system. This 
monitoring system which sought to regularly check the behaviours of providers might have 
contributed to the slowed growth observed in the Chinese study. Similarly in Ghana, clinical 
audit activities by the NHIA which exposes fraudulent claims by some health care providers 
and the consequential court action taken against them may have contributed to the observed 
slowed growth in utilization and claims expenditures. It must, however, be noted that a better 
effect of the capitation payment could have been achieved but for some design defects of the 
policy, one being the implementation of the G-DRG alongside the capitation payment at the 
OPD. The NHIA designed two baskets of services for outpatient care under the capitation 
payment policy; namely primary outpatients services and “none-primary outpatients 
services”. With the combination of DRG and capitation payment at the general OPD, it is 
plausible that potentially primary outpatient services are shifted to the “none-primary 
outpatients” services and claims made on the latter which cost the NHIA more than the actual 
cost of the real services rendered. This plausible explanation is based on a study that showed 
that capitation is associated with the shifting of potentially primary care services to other 
areas of care [34]. Another possible reason for the increasing outpatient services utilization 
cost in the post intervention period may be the upward revision of the per capita rate in 
February 2013 from $0.35 for public facilities, $0.46 for faith-based facilities and $0.65 for 
private facilities per month to $0.58, $0.79 and $0.84, respectively [4]. During the revision 
antenatal and post-delivery care were taken out from the basket of services under the 
capitation payment while payment for medication, which hitherto was part of the capitated 
fees, was reverted to FFS method. Thus, both ante-natal and post-delivery services were paid 
by G-DRG method and medicines paid by FFS method, thereby increasing the total cost of 
OPD services. Other plausible reason for the upward trend in claims expenditure is that 
providers could be discontent with the new system and try to manipulate their income 
upwards. This is because studies have found that although health care providers in Ashanti 
region were aware of the potential advantages and positive attributes of capitation, they 
perceived the capitation payment and the choice of the region for the pilot to be a politically 
motivated rather than an intervention aimed at improving efficiency in health care delivery 
and ensuring quality of care [35], [8]. Consequently, although providers might know the 
advantages of capitation payment, the negative perceptions they held about it could pose a 
threat to the policy as observed by Atuoye et al [36]. The increase in OPD drugs cost for 
example suggests that providers may have increased their drug prescription to their patients 
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in order to make more money from sale of drugs to the insured. Furthermore, the increase in 
IPD utilization could be an indication that more patients are referred to a higher level of care 
under the capitation payment system. In both cases reimbursement for the treatment is by 
DRG and FFS methods, a situation that suggests that providers receive double 
reimbursement. Besides the reasons that might have contributed to the OPD utilization and 
cost in the post capitation period, this study found that availability of district hospitals is a 
significant contributory factor. This finding is expected because of the general perception that 
higher level hospitals are better equipped and tend to have more qualified personnel, and 
therefore, become the preferred choice of majority of insured clients as noted by Andoh-
Adjei et al in a related study [35]. Apart from provider payment method, utilization of health 
care may also be influenced by demographic, socio-economic and other health system factors 
[37]. With regard to demographic factors, the literature shows that there is no difference in 
utilization in Ghana based on gender [38]. A difference was, however, found in utilization for 
residents in urban areas compared to those in rural areas. For socio-economic factors, there is 
a difference in utilization of health care service for income groups. Studies [38], [39] have 
found that in general, the poor benefit less from the NHIS, because they are less often insured 
but another study  also found that the poor who are members of the NHIS utilise services the 
more [40]. In our study, we noted that factors such as urban population and availability of 
district hospitals tend to contribute to increasing utilization and cost of outpatient services in 
the intervention region. One other finding from our study, however, was that  higher poverty 
was correlated with lower OPD service costs, a result that differs from one found in literature 
[38]. Further studies into this phenomenon will be helpful to policy makers in designing 
interventions to address the situation.  
 
Limitations 
One major limitation of our study is that individual level data was not available and therefore 
the use of the aggregate level data led to a smaller sample size and larger standard errors in 
the regression model. Another limitation is that in the NHIS dataset, some values for 
utilization and costs were missing but this was only one type and of one or two years per 
district. In order to reduce the effect, however, a scatter plot was made for that particular 
district and type of utilization or costs over the entire time period. A linear regression line 
with intercept and slope was used to estimate the missing value. Another limitation is that the 
capitation pilot was started in 2012 and thus, the time period of analysis after capitation is no 
more than three years. This limitation might have contributed to the multicollinearity and 
inflated standard errors in the models. To see real long term effects, more years of analysis 
would be needed. These limitations notwithstanding, since the dataset is derived from all the 
districts in both the intervention and control regions, the results, as presented, provide a 
reasonably rapid appraisal of the capitation payment policy in the pilot region and, therefore, 
could serve as prospective evaluation results to guide policy makers on the way forward. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The study revealed that outpatient utilization and cost increased in both pre and post 
capitation periods in the intervention region, but the increment in the post capitation period 
occurred at slower rate, thereby meeting the expectation of the NHIA that capitation would 
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reduce or slow down utilization and related claims expenditures. However, the observed trend 
in the control regions suggest that factors other than capitation payment policy may have 
contributed to the slowed growth in utilization and cost in the intervention region. Health 
policy makers in Ghana may, therefore, want to consider capitation a key provider payment 
method for primary out-patient care in order to control cost in health care delivery. The 
current design, however, needs to be reviewed whilst education on the potential benefits of 
capitation should be intensified among stakeholders and the general public before 
consideration is given to a nationwide roll-out. 
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Additional file : Correlation matrix of coefficients of regression model for outpatient 
utilization, 2014 
e(V) Poverty 
incidence 
Population 
in poverty 
% of 
urban 
population  
CHPS 
compound 
Health 
centre 
Clinic  Secondary 
hospital 
_cons  
Poverty 
incidence 
1.0000                  
Population in 
poverty  
0.2376 1.0000                 
% of urban 
population 
0.1671 -0.2821 1.0000                
CHPS 
compound 
-0.0821 -0.3360 0.0314 1.0000               
Health centre -0.1219 -0.4472 0.3019 0.0802 1.0000              
Clinic  0.1438 -0.1075 -0.4271 0.2500 0.0586 1.0000             
Secondary 
hospital 
0.1258 0.2377 -0.1432 -0.2978 -
0.2483 
-
0.2354 
1.0000            
_cons -0.6408 -0.2216 -0.5038 -0.1613 -
0.3511 
-
0.0755 
0.0596 1.0000 
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ABSTRACT 
Background: Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 
applying fee-for-service method for paying NHIS-credentialed health care providers. The 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) later introduced diagnosis-related-grouping 
(DRG) payment to contain cost without much success. The NHIA then introduced capitation 
payment, a decision that attracted complaints of falling enrolment and renewal rates from 
stakeholders. This study was done to provide evidence on this trend to guide policy debate on 
the issue. 
 
Methods: We applied mixed method design to the study. We did a trend analysis of NHIS 
membership data in Ashanti, Volta and Central regions to assess growth rate; performed 
independent-sample t-test to compare sample means of the three regions and analyzed data 
from individual in-depth interviews to determine any relationship between capitation 
payment and subscribers’ renewal decision. 
 
Results: Results of new enrolment data analysis showed differences in mean growth rates 
between Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) and Volta (M = 40.72, SE 3.10), p = 0.041; r = 0. 15; 
and between Ashanti and Central (M = 47.38, SE6.49) p = 0.043; r = 0. 42. Analysis of 
membership renewal data, however, showed no significant differences in mean growth rates 
between Ashanti (M = 65.47, SE 6.67) and Volta (M = 69.29, SE 5.04), p = 0.660; r = 0.03; 
and between Ashanti and Central (M = 50.51, SE 9.49), p = 0.233. Analysis of both new 
enrolment and renewal data also showed no significant differences in mean growth rates 
between Ashanti (M = − 13.76, SE 17.68) and Volta (M = 5.48, SE 5.50), p = 0.329; and 
between Ashanti and Central (M = − 6.47, SE 12.68), p = 0.746. However, capitation 
payment had some effect in Ashanti compared with Volta (r = 0. 12) and Central (r = 0. 14); 
but could not be sustained beyond 2012. Responses from the in-depth interviews did not also 
show that capitation payment is a key factor in subscribers’ renewal decision. 
 
Conclusion: Capitation payment had a small but unsustainable effect on membership growth 
rate in the Ashanti region. Factors other than capitation payment may have played a more 
significant role in subscribers’ enrolment and renewal decisions in the Ashanti region of 
Ghana. 
  
67 
 
BACKGROUND 
Countries all over the world face challenges with funding their health care systems [1] and as 
they strive to attain universal health coverage a two-pronged approach to addressing the 
funding challenge  may be adopted: income side and expenditure side interventions. On the 
income-side, many low and middle-income countries are experimenting with new and 
innovative approaches, with health insurance becoming the new paradigm [2]. However, 
since no country in the world has unlimited funds for their health sector, policy-makers 
complement the income-side interventions with expenditure side interventions while being 
conscious of quality care delivery [3]. One such expenditure-side intervention is reform of the 
provider payment systems [4] which is intended to influence efficient application of resources 
in health care delivery [5]. Provider payment reform is well-documented as crucial for 
determining performance of health care systems and institutions in terms of cost containment, 
efficiency and quality of care [6] [7]. Since provider payment methods have their strengths 
and weaknesses, a growing number of developed and developing countries are grappling with 
a range of mixed payment methods by leveraging their strengths to ensure cost-efficiency and 
quality improvement in their health systems [8], [6], [9]. Over the last decade, countries have 
been reforming their provider payment systems to improve access to health services and 
control increasing cost of health care [10], [7]. Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) in 2003. Initially, the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) paid its 
credentialed providers by fee-for-service (FFS) method for both clinical services and 
medicine costs but had to switch to diagnosis-related-grouping (DRG) payment due to abuse 
of the system [11]. The DRG is used to pay for clinical services while the FFS payment is 
used to pay for medicines. Four years into the implementation of the DRG payment, studies 
show that high rate of health services utilization and escalating cost of claims still persist 
[11].  After careful consideration of these challenges facing the NHIS, the NHIA decided to 
pilot capitation payment as an alternative payment method for primary out-patients’ care in 
2012 beginning with a pilot in the Ashanti region of Ghana. The objectives for the capitation 
payment were to contain cost by sharing financial risk among schemes, providers and 
subscribers; introduce managed competition among providers provide patients with the 
opportunity to choose their preferred primary care provider (PPP), improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of health service delivery through more rational resource use, correct the 
adverse effects of the G-DRG and to address difficulties in forecasting and budgeting.  
 
Membership registration and renewal 
In theory, the law makes it mandatory for residents of Ghana to belong to the NHIS but in 
practice, membership is optional because there is no penalty for opting out of the Scheme.  
As at the end of 2014, active card-bearing membership of the NHIS was 38%, despite the fact 
that about 80% of Ghana’s population has ever registered with the Scheme. The gap between 
“ever registered” and “active membership” is seen as inefficiency that threatens Ghana’s 
march towards the attainment of universal health coverage and which raises concern among 
policy makers. Of particular concern is the case of Ashanti region where the NHIA is piloting 
capitation payment. At the onset of the pilot implementation, the NHIA indicated that the 
capitation payment was being piloted for one year, after which it would be rolled out in all 
regions. Three years into the implementation, the pilot continues in the region, a situation that 
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has engendered various reactions from residents of the region, including providers, politicians 
and civil society groups (The Ghanaian Times newspaper dated 02/01/2012; The Daily Guide 
newspaper of 23/01/2012; The Daily Guide newspaper of 25/01/2012; Ghana News Agency: 
In the Daily Guide newspaper of 01/12/2012). Some of the issues they raised about the 
capitation payment policy include among others, falling NHIS-membership and enrolment 
renewal rates in the region.  
Previous studies on Ghana’s NHIS and capitation payment 
A review of background literature on capitation experience revealed that studies on capitation 
payment and its effect on health care delivery are scanty in low and middle-income countries 
[12]. A study of provider payment method in a community-based health insurance scheme in 
Burkina Faso [13] revealed that capitation payment resulted in lower health worker 
motivation and negatively affected service quality and retention of enrollees. In Ghana there 
are studies on the association between health worker motivation and health care quality 
efforts [14] but these studies were  not specific to the NHIS and its provider payment 
methods. Other studies on the Ghana NHIS have focused on perceptions and health seeking 
behaviour under the NHIS [15], reasons for people’s refusal to enroll with the NHIS [16], 
household perceptions and their implications on enrollment in the NHIS[17] and an 
evaluation of insured members perception and factors influencing their membership renewal 
decision [18]. A study of provider payments methods within the NHIS [19] did not address 
capitation payment because it was being implemented in only one region at the time of the 
study. The only studies on Ghana’s capitation payment method sighted in literature focused 
on knowledge, perception and expectations of insured clients under capitation payment [20] 
and the implementation challenges [21]. To our current knowledge, there is no study on the 
capitation implementation in Ghana that seeks to understand whether capitation payment 
influences insurance members’ renewal decision. The objective of this study was, therefore, 
to understand whether capitation payment influenced members’ decision to renew their 
membership with the NHIS. Findings from this study could provide guidance in shaping the 
policy debate as the NHIA plans to roll out capitation payment nationwide. It will equally 
provide guidance to other low/middle-income countries that are contemplating the adoption 
of capitation payment as a provider payment method in their health insurance scheme and 
also contribute to existing body of knowledge on factors that influence people’s decision to 
renew their membership with a health insurance scheme.  .   
 
METHODS 
Study design: We applied a mixed method design for the study. We initially did a database 
review by analysing the NHIA central administrative data on NHIS membership for the 
period 2010 to 2014 from the Ashanti region where capitation payment is being implemented 
(intervention) and compared with those from Volta and Central (control) regions that have 
been selected by the NHIA as the next set of regions for capitation payment roll out. We also 
did a review of the literature to identify factors that could influence people's decision to 
renew their insurance policy in order to inform the development of our interview guide. We 
then conducted individual in-depth interviews with residents in two districts of the Ashanti 
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region, purposively selected for being the study districts of similar study, to understand 
whether capitation payment is a major factor in their membership renewal decision. Fifty (50) 
subjects were selected from the two NHIS district offices and the surrounding areas for the 
in-depth interviews. In each district, twenty-five interviews were conducted.  Ten respondents 
were selected from each of the two district offices. We selected the first person seated on the 
front row as first respondents and subsequently, every fifth person, counting from the first, 
was selected until we got the ten respondents in each of the two district offices for the 
interview.  In the surrounding areas, we selected every fifth house, moving towards the east 
from the district office; and residents aged 18 years and above were interviewed until we got 
the 15 respondents from the surrounding areas of each of the two scheme offices. Many of 
the respondents were NHIS card-bearing members. An interview guide addressing factors 
that could influence enrolment or membership renewal based on the literature review was 
administered. Respondents were asked for their opinion on the NHIS in general, including the 
capitation payment policy and factors that influence their enrolment and renewal decision. 
The decision to ask general questions, instead of capitation-specific questions was 
deliberately made to determine whether the capitation payment would come up strongly and 
spontaneously as a key factor influencing members’ decision to renew their membership.  
 
Study setting: Study of the administrative data on membership covered three regions of 
Ghana: Ashanti, Volta and Central regions. Capitation payment policy which is the subject of 
study was first introduced in the Ashanti region in 2012 and was therefore selected as the 
“intervention” region for the study. Per the NHIA’s implementation plan, the policy will be 
implemented in the Volta region in 2016 and in the Central region in 2017 and were, 
therefore, selected as control regions. The Ashanti region is centrally located in the middle 
belt of Ghana and has a total population of 4,780,380, accounting for 19.4 % of the total 
population of Ghana of which 60.6% is urban (Ghana statistical Service, 2010). The region 
has 25 districts offices of the NHIA with 1,585,098 active NHIS-card-bearing members 
representing 34% of the regional population in 2014. The Volta region has a population size 
of 2,118,252, representing 8.6% of national population of which 33.7% is urban. It has 15 
districts offices of the NHIA and insured membership of 581,305 representing 28% of the 
regional population as of 2014. The Central region has a population of 2,201,863 representing 
8.9% of the national population.  It has 13 districts offices of the NHIA and insured 
membership of 492,715 representing 23% of the regional population in 2014. The individual 
in-depth interviews covered two districts in the region namely, Subin sub-metro with a 
population of 174,004 and Ejisu-Juaben municipal with a population of 143,762. Subin is 
located in the central business area of Kumasi, the capital city of Ashanti while Ejisu-Juaben, 
with rural characteristics, is located at the outskirt of Kumasi. Both Subin and Ejisu-Juaben 
districts have NHIS office and membership coverage of 145,482 and 75,747, respectively, as 
of December, 2014. 
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Data analysis:  
We did a trend analysis within and among the three regions to determine trends in new 
enrolment, renewal and overall growth rates over a 5-year period.  Using SPSS (v. 20.0.0.1) 
we performed independent-samples t-test to compare the sample means of growth rates 
between Ashanti (intervention) and Volta and Central (control) regions. We subsequently 
performed the independent-samples t-test to compute and compare the sample means 
between Ashanti (intervention) and Volta and Central (control) regions. We did between 
subjects/group analysis to compare growth rates between Ashanti and Volta and Central 
regions as follows: (a) Ashanti versus Volta, (b) Ashanti versus Central and (c) Volta versus 
Central. Having determined differences between the sample means of the intervention and 
control regions to assess the significance level we then calculated the effect size to determine 
how substantive our findings were. Data from the individual in-depth interviews were 
analysed using Atlas.ti. First, all the interview transcripts were read thoroughly and codes 
were assigned to quotes. The codes were based on factors identified in the literature research 
that could influence renewal decision. Subsequently, the codes were matched and generated 
into common themes that were used to categorize the factors as either being personal, 
scheme, provider, or capitation-related factors.   
 
RESULTS  
Basic socio-demographic characteristics of respondents 
A set of 50 individual subjects participated in the in-depth interviews (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Background characteristics of in-depth interview respondents (n=50) 
Characteristic  Frequency Percent (%) 
Age (yrs)   
     <30 19 38.0 
     30-39 12 24.0 
     40-49 9 18.0 
     50-59 6 12.0 
     60-69 4 8.0 
Mean age, y (SD) 37 (13)  
Sex    
    male  22 44.0 
    female 28 56.0 
Insurance status   
    insured 45 90.0 
    uninsured 5 10.0 
Source: In-depth interviews, 2014 
Trends in growth of membership enrollment and renewal  
 
New enrollment: The trend in new enrollment from 2009 to 2014 indicate that in the year 
2010, all three regions recorded positive growth rates, with the Volta region recording 
138.9% followed by the Central region with 94.9% and the Ashanti region with 8.5% (Figure 
1). In 2011, there was a drop in growth rate across all three regions. Ashanti dropped from 
8.5% in 2010 to 1.1% in 2011. Volta also dropped steeply from 138.9% in 2010 to 0.4% in 
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2011 while Central dropped from 94.9% in 2010 to a negative growth of -1.1% in 2011.  In 
2012, the year of capitation implementation in the Ashanti, the Ashanti region recorded a 
negative growth of -37.3% while Volta and Central regions recorded positive growth rates of 
8.9% and 1.5%, respectively. In 2013 all three regions recorded positive growth, with Ashanti 
moving from its negative growth of -37.3% the previous year to a positive growth of 23%.  
Volta region moved slightly upwards from 8.9% to 13.5 and Central moved substantially 
from 1.5% the previous year to 25.5%. In 2014, Ashanti region maintained its positive 
growth with a slight increase from 23% in 2013 to 23.6% but Volta and Central regions went 
into the negative from 13.5% and 25.5% in 2013 to -14.2% and -26.3%, respectively. The 
trend as reported shows that growth in new enrollment across the three regions has not been 
stable over the years and among the regions. However, a t-test statistic result showed 
differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) and Volta (M = 
40.72, SE 3.10), the difference being -10.56, CI [-20.57, -0.56] t (8) = -2.435, p =0.041; r = 0. 
15; and Central (M=47.38, SE6.49) the difference being -17.22, CI [-33.74, -0.70], t (8) = -
2.404, p = 0.043; r=0. 42.  
 
 
Figure 1: Trends in new enrollment growth rates: 2010-2014 
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Renewal: All the three regions started on a negative growth rate in 2010 with Ashanti           
(-44.9%) performing better than Volta (-48.3% and Central (-77.3%) regions (Figure 2). In 
2011, all three regions recorded positive growth rates. However in 2012, the year of 
capitation payment in Ashanti, the Ashanti region recorded a negative growth rate of -3.4% 
while Volta (27.6%) and Central (54.9%) regions continued in their positive growth rates. In 
2013, Ashanti recovered from its negative growth to a positive growth of 7.8%. Central 
region dropped from 54.9% in 2012 to 29.7% but the Volta region continued its positive 
growth and moved slightly from 27.6% in 2012 to 30.7%. In 2014, whereas Ashanti (-9.5%) 
and Central (-21.2%) regions experienced another negative growth rates, the Volta region 
remained in the positive although it dropped from 30.7% in 2013 to 23.3%. A t-test statistic 
result indicated that on the average, there were no significant differences in mean growth 
rates between Ashanti (M = 65.47, SE 6.67) and Volta (M = 69.29, SE 5.04), the difference 
being -3.82, CI [-23.1, 15.5] t (8) = -0.456, p =0.660; r = 0.03; and between Ashanti and 
Central (M=50.51, SE 9.49) the difference being -14.96, CI  [-11.8, 41.7], t (8) = 1.289, p = 
0.233; r=0.17.  
 
Figure 2: Trend in renewal growth rate: 2010-2014 
 
 
Total active membership: When we pooled the new members and the renewals together into 
total active card-bearing membership, we found that the pooled data show a similar trend as 
those of the new enrollment and renewal (Figure 3). A t-test statistic result indicated that on 
the average, there were no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 
-13.76, SE 17.68) and Volta (M = 5.48, SE 5.50), the difference was -19.25, CI [-61.95, 
23.45] t (8) = -1.04, p =0.329; r = 0.12; and between Ashanti and Central (M= -6.47, SE 
12.68) the difference being -7.29, CI  [-57.47, 42.88], t (8) =  -0.335, p = 0.746; r=0.14.  
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Figure 3: Trends in total active membership growth rates, 2010-2014 
 
 
People’s perceptions and membership retention 
The individual in-depth interviews in the two districts revealed that personal, scheme and 
provider factors were the most important factors that influence one’s decision to enrol or 
renew their membership as noted in literature with capitation payment not coming up as a 
strong factor. We begin our presentation of findings with capitation factors which is the main 
focus of our study. 
 
Capitation payment factors 
Our individual in-depth interviews with the 50 respondents in the two districts on factors that 
influence one’s decision to enrol of renew their membership indicate that capitation payment 
is not a key factor in membership retention decision-making. Respondents, however, 
expressed their opinions, both positive and negative, about the capitation payment policy and 
the implementation process. 
 
On the positive side, some respondents mentioned that the choice of one preferred primary 
care provider (PPP) is a good innovation to improve quality of care in the health delivery 
system as may be inferred from the following statement: “It is okay to choose one hospital 
because they will know your medical history. The quality of care is okay, there is no change.” 
Other corroborative statements include the following: Capitation is okay because sometimes 
someone would go to the hospital and receive a drug, sometimes in the form of injection. If it 
is not working they would go to a second hospital and receive another drug or injection. Not 
noticing it is the same, they will take it and receive overdose, illiteracy is a big problem 
here,”; “Due to capitation the competition between hospitals has grown and therefore 
customer care at the hospital has improved”. Commenting on provider shopping, a 
respondent had this to say: “Capitation is good. People were moving from hospital to 
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hospital, 3 times a week. Now with capitation, they go to the same hospital where they 
(providers) encourage them (patients) to finish the treatment”.  
 
On the negative side, some respondents who had a negative perception about the PPP concept 
noted that “Capitation is very bad. That you can go to the only one facility you choose is bad. 
When you are dying and you have to go to the hospital quickly, it is very inconvenient”. One 
other respondent who was not satisfied with capitation payment and the PPP concept stated 
that “Capitation is not good, it should stop. You can only choose one hospital, and when you 
travel to Eastern or Western (regions in Ghana); you cannot go to the hospital over there. 
You have to travel back to your local hospital to get care. Another respondent also lamented 
that “Capitation is a problem. They (policy makers/NHIA) have to relook it. Sometimes you 
go to the hospital and your name is not in the file and then you don’t get help. Quality of care 
has also changed. At the facilities you don’t get all the medication you need and you have to 
go to the drugstore due to capitation.” Others corroborated as follows: “It (capitation) is 
becoming a problem. It is on trial, only in the Ashanti region and I would not recommend it 
for the whole country. When there was no capitation, there was no co-payment, now there 
is”; I am not satisfied with the quality of care, it is bad. I am not satisfied with the treatments. 
With capitation the quality of care should be good, but it isn’t. When the quality of care is 
bad, there is no need to renew membership”. 
 
Others with balanced opinion about capitation payment indicated that “capitation is good. 
The way it is managed is the problem. The problem seems to be that providers are not well 
briefed on how it works. I don’t blame them. Education should be a lot. They (NHIA) need to 
get down to the very last person on the ground to inform, as well as service providers as the 
subscribers”. 
 
Personal factors 
As indicated earlier, personal, scheme and provider factors were key determinants of people’s 
decision to enrol or renew their membership with the NHIS. With regard to personal factors, 
the key dimensions were affordability of membership renewal fee, expressed need for health 
insurance, peer influence, subscriber expectations, and the concept of solidarity each of 
which could either positively or negatively influence one’s decision to enrol or renew their 
membership with the NHIS. 
Regarding affordability, some respondents found the renewal fee of GHS14.00 ($3.50) per 
annum to be affordable for the reason that it offered insured persons free access to health care 
services for a whole year, as noted by one respondent in the following statement: “indirectly 
you only pay around GHS1.00 a month and if you would not have insurance, fall ill and visit 
a hospital, you would pay more money than the amount you pay for insurance”. They were 
therefore of the view that the renewal fee could not be a major factor to deter someone from 
renewing his/her membership. Other respondents also mentioned that health insurance 
protects them against the costs of health care as expressed in the statement: “Insurance gives 
me peace of mind. When you are sick you don’t have to worry about financial constraints 
when you go to the hospital”. However, few respondents did not feel in need of health 
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insurance mentioned because (i) they do not fall sick often; (ii) they do not benefit by way of 
service utilization from the premium contribution they pay to the scheme, and (iii) that 
although they pay higher premium than others, they receive the same benefit as everyone 
else, as has been noted in other studies [22], [23], [24], [25], [26].  
 
Peer influence was another dimension to the personal factors. It had a positive effect on 
membership renewal as some respondents mentioned that they were influenced by peers to 
enrol into the NHIS and renew their membership on regular basis. Other people who had 
insurance cover also influenced the uninsured to enrol and retain their membership with the 
Scheme. However, other respondents mentioned that they experienced negative influence on 
their enrolment and renewal decision from health care providers who had negative perception 
of the NHIS due to delays in their claims settlements.  
 
People’s expectations also played a significant role in their renewal decision.  Some 
respondents said their expectations were fulfilled while others experienced disappointment 
upon realization at the health facility that the NHIS did not cover every health condition: 
“You would go to the hospital and they will tell you that these drugs are not covered by 
health insurance while I thought they were covered”. Another respondent also had this to 
say: “Two weeks ago, I had malaria, went to the hospital and had to pay for the blood test 
myself. At the moment you have to make a lot of co-payments, first it wasn’t like that, but now 
it is”. With regard to the solidarity, some respondents were of the view that “it is not fair to 
ask the rich to pay higher contribution” while receiving the same benefit package 
rationalizing that rich people have the money to visit private hospitals where they would 
receive better services.  
 
Scheme factors 
Under scheme factors, the benefit package was a major issue that influences people’s 
decision to enrol or renew their membership with the NHIS. Few people, however, said that 
the benefit package is extensive enough. They reasoned that expanding the benefit package 
could add to the sustainability challenges for the NHIS. However, many respondents 
perceived the benefit package as too limited in scope, as expressed in the following 
statement: “It is not exhaustive enough; the number of drugs that is covered is limited. You 
would go to the hospital and they’ll tell you: these drugs are not covered by health 
insurance”. Thus, respondents felt that there was no benefit of having health insurance when 
they have to pay for what they perceive to be better medication. Hence, they would rather pay 
for “good medication” than to pay insurance contribution. Many respondents were, however, 
positive about the attitude of the scheme staff, contrary to findings in other studies on the 
NHIS [25], [26], [27], [28].  Respondents were also positive about the renewal process since: 
“it is instant, clear, and orderly”. However, consistent with findings from a study of factors 
influencing renewal decision [18], some respondents who were unhappy about the renewal 
process mentioned long queues and waiting hours and rampant system downtime as factors 
that affect the attractiveness of scheme to most people. As noted in earlier studies [29], [25], 
[28], as barriers to enrolment and renewals, some respondents were also not satisfied with 
provision of information on membership renewals lamenting  in order to receive good 
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information; one has to go to the district office, which could be inconvenient for people who 
do not live close to the Scheme office.  
 
Provider factors 
Quality of care was a key dimension of provider factors that influence renewal decision 
among respondents. Many respondents were satisfied with the quality of care they received 
from health care providers and as one respondent puts it “the doctors and nurses take enough 
time for you and do what they can to help you get well quickly”. They also mentioned the 
friendliness of the hospital staff towards them (insured clients) as some of the good qualities 
they found with the service provision. One respondent pointed out that “if you have insurance 
the staff attend to you quickly”. Some other respondents, however, mentioned that the quality 
of treatment depends on how promptly the NHIS settles health care providers’ claims. They 
mentioned that delays in settling providers’ claims affect the service they received, and as 
one puts it “they will not treat you well, will not accept your card and will not even look at 
you”. They further mentioned that the hospital staff pay more attention to clients who have 
money and are ready to pay-out-pocket than they pay to the insured. Others, however, said 
the service provision depends on whether the facility is a government or a private one. They 
observed that government facilities are overwhelmed with large number of patients and this 
affects the quality of service provided as evidenced in this statement by a respondent: "in the 
private hospitals, there are less people so the doctors and nurses have more time for the 
insured. Sometimes they will ask for co-payments, but people are happy with that because of 
the quality of service”.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Database review:  
The trend analysis revealed that all the three regions experienced negative growth in both the 
new enrolment and renewal categories at one point or the other within the period 2010-2014, 
corroborating findings of a study in Senegal of a community-based health insurance scheme 
and membership retention [30]. But looking at the data from the overall effect, there is an 
indication that capitation payment had some effect in Ashanti region compared with the Volta 
region. However, since the effect is small and could not be sustained beyond 2012, it could 
be argued that other factors as have been noted in literature [15], [17], [24], [31], [32], might 
have contributed significantly to the drop in membership growth rates in the Ashanti region. 
This argument is supported by an earlier study that found that notwithstanding people’s 
negative attitude towards the capitation payment, a majority of survey respondents expressed 
their willingness to renew their membership card when it expires [33] and by our individual 
in-depth interviews which indicate that apart from the discomfort that respondents expressed 
with the capitation and its PPP arrangement, which is also consistent with findings by Pereira 
et at [34], capitation per se was not an important factor in their decision to enrol or renew 
their membership with the NHIS.  
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Individual in-depth interviews 
Capitation factors: Judging from the responses from respondents, one may say that a few 
respondents were positive about capitation. Their appreciation of the fact that capitation is a 
good innovation is good for the debate on the capitation payment policy. Their analytical 
thinking that capitation payment offers opportunity for continuity of care speaks to the fact 
that the communication messages about the positive attributes of capitation is making 
positive impact. It is however worth noting the reasons for seeing capitation as a bad policy 
by many of the respondents. The reason that subscribers who fall sick and attend facilities 
other than their PPP are refused treatment; co-payments demanded by some health care 
providers and the dispensing of perceived poor quality medication on the grounds of 
inadequate capitated rate and, or delayed reimbursement to providers are some of the issues 
that have the potential to erode subscribers’ confidence in the Scheme. The bad perceptions 
expressed by respondents are also noted by Owusu-Sekyere et al [35], indicating how urgent 
the need is for the NHIA to address the issues to improve peoples’ confidence in the Scheme. 
This is importantly so because the issue of co-payment which, hitherto, has been treated as 
anecdotal, has been admitted by the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG) in their 
2015 Annual Report as real in the following statement: “Providers are compelled to do 
balanced billing to make up for the difference between what the NHIA pays and what it costs 
them (the providers) to provide the care, thereby perpetrating out of pocket payments (co-
payment) and pushing poor clients into catastrophic health expenditure” (Christian Health 
Association of Ghana. Annual Report 2015, p57). It is also important for the NHIA to address 
itself to this concern because some respondents perceive the capitation payment policy as a 
good innovation and by addressing their concerns; the NHIA could move those who may be 
opposed to the capitation payment policy from their negative position to the positive position 
of those who are sympathetic to the policy. It is also noteworthy that most of the reasons 
underlying negative perceptions on capitation are borne out of inadequate information, 
education and communication to the public, especially the subscribers. The NHIA would 
therefore have to step up its information, education and communication programme to 
educate the public on the NHIS and the capitation payment policy. 
 
Personal factors: Affordability as a dimension of personal factors inhibiting enrolment onto, 
or renewal of NHIS membership is consistent with findings in the literature which show that 
lack of money is the main reason for non-renewal of insurance [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], 
[28], [36]. The literature has noted that in instances where membership is obtained while in 
employment, when people lost their jobs or retired, the barrier to renewal became bigger [22].  
While this may be the case for non-retirees who may lose their jobs, it may not be so for 
retirees since they are covered under the exemption category of the NHIS. Inadequate 
information may therefore account for any such situation. It is also encouraging to note that 
people admit that they need health insurance, perhaps, more than health insurance needs 
them. This may be because, no matter how bad one may perceive the NHIS, one admits that it 
provides for them financial risk protection against the cost of health care services in times of 
need. These reasons, good as they may be from the perspectives of public health, could also 
become perverse incentives from the perspectives of the NHIS since most of those who may 
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express the need for insurance and therefore enrol onto it, may also be those who will need 
health care services the more; and since every encounter with the health care system brings 
cost to the NHIS, their exclusive enrolment could add to the financial sustainability threats to 
the Scheme. While providers may be commended for the good testimonies from respondents 
who perceived them to provide good quality care, the reported negative influence from some 
healthcare providers coupled with the unauthorized co-payment in some health facilities also 
has the tendency to discourage people from enrolling and, or renewing their memberships as 
shown in other studies [17], [18], [24]. It must, however, be admitted that some respondents 
also had too high expectations of health insurance which led to disappointment and 
dissatisfaction with the NHIS. That notwithstanding, these unmet expectations of quality of 
service could contribute to non-renewal of insurance cover [18], especially for those who 
may not be in dire need of the NHIS. 
Scheme factors: The issue about the adequacy or otherwise of the benefit package has 
remained a debate not only among subscribers but also among policy makers in Ghana. The 
dilemma has been how the quest for expansion of the benefit package could be aligned with 
the reported inadequate funding for the NHIS. Besides, the benefit package seem to have 
been loosely defined in the NHIS legislative instrument 2014, LI 1809 as “inclusion” and 
“exclusions”. This loose definition of the benefit package puts subscribers at the mercy of 
providers who define what is covered and what is not covered at the point of service delivery. 
Responses from respondents indicate that subscribers are not getting the full range of services 
they expect when they visit health care providers. These could also mean that subscribers do 
not have adequate knowledge of benefit package; hence, the reported co-payments at some 
facilities. As noted in other studies [18],[22], [24], [25], [27], [28], these are potential barriers 
to enrolment and renewals.   
Provider factors: The key issues surrounding provider factors are the perceived poor quality 
of care and reported co-payment at some health facilities. But the issue of co-payment, since 
it is not formalized, could pose legal and ethical challenges as more and more people become 
enlightened on their rights and responsibilities under the NIHIS. It raises ethical issue if co-
payment is taken for the reason that the NHIA does not pay health care providers on time as 
stated by a respondent. This is because, no matter how long it takes for providers to be paid, 
they still get paid but patients will not be called back to collect the payments they would have 
made. Tariffs are also negotiated and agreed upon between the NHIA and providers under the 
direction of the Ministry of Health. Agreed tariffs are duly approved by the Minister of 
Health and handed to the NHIA and its credentialed providers for compliance. It therefore 
becomes a challenge if subscribers, who are not party to the negotiations, are made to suffer 
the un-intended consequences of such negotiations. Co-payments are noted in literature [18], 
[26] to have negative influence on subscribers’ renewal decision and since the issue goes 
beyond the NHIA, the Ministry of Health may want to step up its stewardship role and put in 
place measures to address it.  
Limitations of the study include the relatively short period that the administrative data was 
used for of the trend analysis (2010-2014); the convenience selection of the two districts and 
relatively small sample for the in-depth interviews which may be deemed not to adequately 
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represent the views of residents in the entire region. Having acknowledged this limitation 
however, we are of the view that findings from the study provide a quick overview of 
important insights into motivations for enrolment and renewal decisions; and the diverse 
perceptions of the public could provide guidance to the NHIA to improve on the 
implementation process, having decided to implement the policy across the country.  
 
Conclusion and recommendation 
We conclude that capitation payment had a small effect on membership growth rate in the 
Ashanti region compared with Volta and Central regions but that the effect was not 
sustainable since it was largely felt in year 2012 when the capitation payment was introduced. 
We also conclude that although many respondents have negative perception about the 
capitation payment policy, capitation payment is not a significant factor in their renewal 
decision and that, other factors may have played a much more significant role in peoples’ 
decision to enrol or renew their membership with the NHIS. Therefore, if membership 
retention is the only factor for deciding whether to scale up capitation across the country or to 
withdraw it, then results of the study present prospects for the scaling up of capitation 
payment in Ghana. The NHIA would, however, have to address itself to strategies that will 
enable members of the Scheme and also potential members to overcome the real barriers to 
enrolment and renewal of membership. 
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ABSTRACT 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with 
resistance for its perceived poor quality of care. This paper assesses National Health 
Insurance Scheme subscribers and care providers’ perception of quality of care under the 
capitation payment method.  
 
Methods: This is a cross-sectional survey of subscribers and care providers perception of 
quality of care in three administrative regions of Ghana using a 5-point Likert scale for the 
assessment based on a set of quality of care measures. We performed descriptive analysis to 
determine average perception of quality of care scores for each of the measures used. 
Bivariate and multivariate analyses were also performed to examine relationships between 
respondent’s characteristics and their perception of quality of care.  
 
Results: In general, subscribers expressed positive perception about the quality of care 
though subscribers in Ashanti were less positive compared to those in the Central region. A 
chi-square analysis, however, showed significant differences in subscribers’ perception of 
quality of care by occupation (p=0.002), region (p=0.007) length of NHIS membership 
(p=0.006), and age (p=0.014). Multivariate logistic regression analysis also showed that 
different factors, other than region of residence, were significantly associated with perceived 
good quality of care. Analysis of health care providers’ responses also showed significant 
differences in their perception of quality of care by region (p=0.001). Multivariate logistic 
model showed that health care providers in the Volta region (OR=0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.58) 
were significantly less likely to perceive quality of care as good compared to those in the 
Ashanti region.  
 
Conclusion: Subscribers and care providers across the three regions have relatively good 
perception of the quality of health care in general though subscribers in Ashanti were less 
positive than those in the Central region. It is, therefore, plausible that capitation payment 
may have influenced the relatively low perception of quality of care in the Ashanti region. 
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BACKGROUND 
Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 to provide financial 
health protection against the cost of health care services for the population. Initially, the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) applied fee-for-service (FFS) method for the 
payment of its credentialed providers but had to introduce diagnosis-related-grouping (DRG) 
payment with the view to addressing observed increases in utilization and claims 
expenditures[1]. Years into the implementation, the DRG was found to have further 
contributed to cost escalation, almost tripling the claims expenditure made under the fee-for-
service dispensation. After careful consideration of the issue, the NHIA decided to introduce 
capitation payment for primary out-patients’ services beginning with a pilot in the Ashanti 
region of Ghana. The decision to pilot capitation payment in the Ashanti region of Ghana, 
however, engendered various reactions from providers as well as politicians and civil society 
groups. In a press release carried by the Ghanaian Times newspaper of 02/01/2012, the 
Chairman of the Association of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners was quoted to have 
stated that “the system (capitation payment) is detrimental to quality health care provision 
and a major threat to the survival of private health facilities”. This was followed by a 
publication in the Daily Guide newspaper of 25/01/2012 which quoted the President of the 
Ashanti Development Union (ADU), a civil society group, as saying “information reaching 
my office indicates that since the implementation of the (capitation) policy in the region three 
weeks ago hospital attendance has gone down considerably” a situation that suggests 
perceived poor quality of care on the part of health insurance subscribers in the region 
following the introduction of the capitation payment policy[2]. With the on-going debate on 
capitation payment and its perceived negative effects on care provision, it is instructive to 
assess the perception of both users and providers of health care services about the quality of 
care provision. Haddad et al note that assessment of quality of primary care could be 
enhanced by including patients’ perceptions as well as professional judgment of quality [3].  
Patients’ perception of service quality, in particular, has become a vital aspect of quality 
assessment of health care because of the relationship between health care utilization and user 
perception of quality [4], [5]. Mack et al are of the view that “without a direct assessment of 
patients’ values”, policy makers “may create standards of care that meet physicians’ values 
better than those of patients” [6]; and even though patients’ perception of quality may not 
necessarily be in conformity with professional standards of quality an exploration of patients’ 
perception could yield useful information for improving quality care delivery [3]. Studies on 
Ghana’s capitation payment sighted in literature focused on knowledge, perception and 
expectations of insured clients [7], subscriber-provider trust relationship [8], the challenges 
associated with the implementation of the capitation payment in the Ashanti region [9] and 
capitation payment and membership retention [10] . We are yet to find any specific study on 
NHIS’ provider payment method and how that influence subscribers and providers’ 
perception of quality of care. The objective of this study was, therefore, to assess NHIS 
subscribers and credentialed providers’ perception of quality care under the capitation 
payment regime in the Ashanti region alongside those of two other regions that are yet to 
implement capitation payment in order to establish whether capitation payment influences 
subscribers and health care providers’ perception of quality care in the Ashanti region. A 
better understanding of both subscribers and providers perspectives having real-world 
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experience of capitation payment in primary care delivery will contribute to the on-going 
debate and provide guidance for the NHIA as they plan to scale up capitation payment 
countrywide. It will equally provide guidance to other low/middle-income countries 
considering capitation payment as a provider payment method in their health insurance 
scheme and also add to existing literature on factors that influence quality of care perception 
of both healthcare providers and users of healthcare services.   
 
METHODS  
Study design: We adopted a survey design for the study. Since no baseline study was done 
prior to the implementation of the policy in the Ashanti region to enable comparison in order 
to determine the effect of the capitation payment on subscribers and providers’ perception of 
quality care in the Ashanti region, we adopted the post-test-only with non-equivalent group 
design [11]  and purposively selected Volta and Central regions that were being prepared for 
the next implementation phase as “control” regions to enable the establishment of any 
relationship between capitation payment and clients/providers’ perceived quality of care in 
the Ashanti region. We adopted perceived quality of care frameworks, several of which have 
been developed to help assess users and providers of health care services’ perception of 
quality care delivery [5]; [12]; [13]; [14], [15], to guide our study. In their description and  
development of a 16-item scale to measure perceived  quality in India, Rao et al [4] identified 
five distinct dimensions of perceived quality, namely (i) medicine availability, (ii) medical 
information given to patients by their physician (iii) staff behavior towards patients, (iv) 
doctors’ interpersonal behavior such as their responsiveness to the patients’ concerns, and (v) 
the hospitals’ infrastructure such as cleanliness and availability of other amenities). Amala de 
Silva [16]  also identified dimensions of quality as dignity, autonomy, confidentiality, prompt 
attention, quality of basic amenities, access to social support networks during care and choice 
of care provider. Drawing on these and other existing frameworks we developed an 18-item 
scale and 12-item scale to assess the perception of subscribers and providers, respectively, on 
quality of care under capitation payment regime. The item scales were clustered around six 
key dimensions: (i) staff availability and prompt attention; (ii) dignity and respect; (iii) 
confidentiality; (iv) service quality; (v) communication; and (vi) accommodation/cleanliness.  
 
Research setting   
The study took place in three regions of Ghana: Ashanti, Volta and Central regions in 2014. 
The Ashanti region is the first among the 10 regions in Ghana to begin the implementation of 
the capitation payment policy in 2012, and was therefore selected as the “intervention” region 
for the study. The policy will be implemented in the Volta region from 2016 and in the 
Central region in 2017 in line with NHIA’s implementation plan. The two control regions 
have about the same socio-demographic characteristics, about the same level of NHIS active 
card-bearing members and about the same number of credentialed health care providers. 
Table 1 below presents detailed information on the basic socio-demographic characteristics 
of the three regions. 
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Table 1: Basic socio-demographic and health service/NHIS indicators   
Indicator Ashanti Volta Central National  
a. Socio-demographics (GSS 2013)     
Percentage population (2010 PHC) 19.4 8.6 8.9 24,658,823 
Economically active population (2010) 19.1 8.4 8.6 43.9 
Percentage population employed (2010) 18.6 8.6 8.5  
Percentage self-employed of the employed 65.5 75.3 69.2 64.9 
Population density (km
2
) (2010) 196 103 224.1 103 
Percentage urban population (2010) 60.6 33.7 47.1 50.9 
Sex ratio (males/100 females) (2010) 94 92.8 91 95.2 
Households (2010) (N=) 1,126,216 495,603 526,764 5,467,136 
Average household size (2010) 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.4 
Percentage population literate (2010) 82.6 73.5 78.2 74.1 
b. NHIS service availability (NHIA, 
2013) 
    
NHIA District Offices  25 15 13 166 
Active NHIS card-bearing members 1,715,174  910,559  866,831  10,145,196  
Percentage active to regional population 34 28 23  
NHIS-credentialed service providers (2013) 619 321 334 3,832 
c. Health personnel availability (GHS 
2013) 
    
Percentage share of health professionals 18.2 8.5 8.6  
Percentage share of nurses (Professional) 45.5 53.4 39.3  
Percentage share of nurses (Enrolled) 54.5 46.6 60.7  
Number of Doctors  96 36 26 n/a 
Number of Community Health Nurses 157 264 130 n/a 
Sources: GSS 2010 Population and Housing Census, 2013. Available at www.statsghana.gov.gh  
NHIA Annual Report, 2013. Available at www.nhia.gov.gh ; GHS Annual Report 2013. Available at 
www.ghanahealthservice.org    
 
Population and sampling 
Subscriber sampling: Multi-stage sampling was applied to recruit subjects for the survey. 
The list of Enumeration Areas (EAs) used for the 6
th
 round of the Ghana Living Standard 
Survey (GLSS6) was used as the sample frame. We adopted the sample design used by the 
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) for post enumeration survey (PES) to determine the number 
of EAs (clusters) in the region. In the said design, each of the ten regions in Ghana was 
treated as domain for selection and analysis, and was based on probability sample of 250 EAs 
of which 45 were in Ashanti, 23 in Volta and 19 in Central regions.  Thus, a total of 87 
clusters in the three regions were randomly selected at the first stage of the sampling process.   
We then used the WHO revised Expanded Programme of Immunization (EPI) survey 
reference manual [17] as guide for determining the sample size per  EA.  We opted for the 
desired precision level of ±3% and expected coverage of 95% to determine the number of 
subjects for the survey. On the basis of the WHO immunization coverage cluster survey 
reference manual, we arrived at 10 subjects per cluster (EA) for Ashanti giving a 
representative sample of 450 households (subjects), 18 subjects for Volta giving a sample of 
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414 households and 21 clusters for the central region giving a sample of 399 household. We 
therefore selected a total of 1, 263 samples for the study. We then sought the assistance of 
personnel of the Ghana Statistical Service to draw a list of the households and their 
replacements which was given to the interviewers for each of the 3 regions for the field 
interviews. In each household an adult card-bearing member aged 18 years and above was 
randomly selected and interviewed.  
 
Provider sampling:  We used the G-power analysis programme (G* Power 3.1) [18], [19] to 
determine the appropriate sample size of credentialed providers.  We assumed an effect size 
of 0.4, an alpha (α) of 0.05 and beta (1-β) of 0.80; and allocation ratio (N2/N1) of 1.1.  The 
outputs were 200 samples:  95 for group one (intervention region) and 105 for group two (the 
control regions). Based on the total number of NHIS-credentialed providers in the two control 
regions as at the end of year 2013, we proportionally allocated 48% of the samples for the 
control regions to Volta and 52% to Central, respectively.  
 
Data collection method  
We administered closed-ended questionnaires on 200 credentialed providers and 1,263 
subscribers in the three regions using face-to-face interview. The questionnaire focused on 
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and their perception of quality of care 
under capitation payment regime. We asked both subscribers and healthcare providers to 
score the quality of care statements on a 5-point Likert scale of don’t know (0); strongly 
disagree (1); disagree (2); agree (3); and strongly agree (4).  
 
Data analysis 
First, we  performed a principal component analysis (PCA) to transform the set of statements 
for assessing quality of care into five uncorrelated components of dignity and respect, 
confidentiality, service quality, communication, and accommodation/cleanliness [4]; [5]; 
[12]; [13]; [14]; [15]; [16]. The factor scores obtained from this analysis were used to 
estimate mean perception score for each respondent. Respondents who obtained positive 
mean perception score were assigned to “perceived good quality of care” group and those 
who obtained negative mean score were assigned to a “perceived poor quality of care” group. 
Subsequently, we performed a Chi-square test to determine relationship between 
respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and the binary outcome variable “perception 
of quality of care” (perceived good quality of care=1; perceived poor quality of care=0). The 
bivariate analysis was conducted to test independent associations between each independent 
variable and the outcome variable, and to only advance those that show statistical 
significance at p<0.10 to a multivariate logistic regression model for further analysis 
(www.populationsurveyanalysis.com). In the first multivariate logistic regression model to 
determine associations between the independent variables and subscribers “perceived good 
quality of care”, gender, education level, and card used in past 2 years were included in the 
model despite the set statistical significant threshold for inclusion. In the second model to 
examine association between the independent variables and healthcare providers “perceived 
good quality of care”, age, gender, primary status at health facility, years in practice, health 
facility ownership and health facility were included in model. We decided to include all the 
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eight independent variables in the healthcare providers’ model, having noted in literature 
[20];[21] that all the variables listed had some relationship with quality of care.  We also 
examined the total variance in respondents’ perception of quality of care delivery explained 
by the components extracted. As a criterion, only components with eigenvalue of one or more 
were retained. That is, we dropped any component that accounted for less variance than did a 
single question or variable. Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization was then employed 
to minimize the complexity of the components by making the large loadings larger and small 
loadings smaller within each component. The PCA produced a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy of 0.813 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity of p<0.001 for the 18 
statements for assessing subscribers perception of care and 0.770 and p<0.001 for the 12 
statements for healthcare providers’ perception of quality of care delivery. The proportion of 
variance explained by each component for subscribers’ and healthcare providers’ perception 
of quality of care are attached as additional files 2 and 3, respectively. The analyses were 
performed using Stata version 13 and SPSS version 20 softwares and the results summarized 
in tables. 
 
RESULTS 
Relationship between subscribers’ characteristics and perceived good quality of care 
One thousand and ninety-nine (1,099) subscriber respondents participated in the survey, 
representing 87% response rate. About 56% of respondents were above the average age of 
44.31 years (SD=17.68), 78% were females, and 35% were in the Ashanti region. Fifty-five 
per cent of the respondents resided in the rural areas, 63% were married, 40% had middle or 
junior high school education, and 62% were self-employed. About 38% of the respondents 
had been members of the NHIS for less than one year while 23% had been with the scheme 
for four years or more; 90% had used the card for the past two years prior to the survey, and 
43% had attended health care facility between one and three months before. Table 2 
summarized relationship between socio-demographic characteristics of subscribers and 
perceived good quality of care.  
 
Table 2: Association between subscribers’ characteristics and perceived good quality of care  
Characteristic  N  % X
2
 p-value 
Age 
<44 
44+ 
 
332 
278  
 
52.3 
59.8 
5.9785 0.014 
Gender 
Male  
Female  
 
144  
466  
 
59.0 
54.5 
1.5658 0.211 
Region 
Ashanti 
Volta 
Central  
 
201 
181  
228 
 
52.5 
51.2 
62.1 
9.8067 0.007 
Setting 
Urban 
Rural 
 
261 
349 
 
52.3 
58.2 
3.7906 0.052 
Marital status   4.6840 0.456 
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Married  
Separated  
Divorced  
Widowed  
Cohabitation    
Never married 
380  
21 
20 
91 
14 
84 
55.3 
56.8 
42.6 
58.0 
66.7 
56.0 
Education level 
Primary  
Middle/JHS 
Secondary/SSS 
Higher/Tertiary 
Never attended school 
 
114  
240  
78 
31  
147  
 
59.1 
54.7 
57.0 
47.8 
55.5 
2.8357 0.586 
Occupation  
Senior officer/manager  
Professional  
Technician 
Services/sales worker 
Agriculture 
Plant/machine  
Elementary worker 
Other    
 
11 
19  
6 
92  
141  
1  
91 
249  
 
73.3 
42.2 
40.0 
51.1 
60.5 
25.0 
46.4 
60.6 
22.7185 0.002 
Length of NHIS 
membership (yrs) 
<1 
1 
2 
3 
>=4 
 
 
259 
45 
79 
103 
124 
 
 
62.1 
54.9 
54.1 
53.1 
47.7 
14.3779 0.006 
 
Card used in past  
2 years 
No  
Yes 
 
66  
544  
 
62.3 
54.5 
 
2.1702 0.141 
Total  610  55.5   
 
In general, 55.5% (610) of subscribers expressed positive perception about the quality of 
care. In terms of individual regions, 53% of subscribers in Ashanti region perceived quality 
of care as good compared to 51% and 62% in the Volta and Central regions, respectively. 
There were significant differences in subscribers’ perception of quality of care by occupation 
(p=0.002), length of NHIS membership (p=0.006), region (p=0.007) and age (p=0.014). 
Results of the multivariate regression analysis showed that subscribers aged 44 years and 
above were significantly more likely to rate their perception of quality of care as good 
compared to those below 44 years (OR=1.45, 95% CI: 1.06-1.99) (Table 3). However, 
elementary workers (OR=0.27, 95% CI: 0.04-0.98) and Technicians (OR=0.20, 95% CI: 
0.04-0.98) were significantly less likely to rate their perception of quality of care as good 
relative to a senior officer/manager. Similarly, subscribers with four or more years of 
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enrolment in the scheme were less likely to rate their perception of quality of care as good 
compared to those with less than a year of enrolment (OR=0.68, 95% CI: 0.46-0.99).  
 
Table 3: Multivariate logistic regression model for subscribers perceived good quality of 
care 
Characteristic  OR Std. Err. z P>z [95% C.I] 
Age (yrs)      
<44 1.00     
44+ 1.45 0.23 2.33 0.020 1.06-1.99 
Gender       
Male  1.00     
Female 0.85 0.14 -0.89 0.371 0.60-1.20 
Region      
Ashanti 1.00     
Volta  0.82 0.13 -1.17 0.243 0.59-1.14 
Central  1.36 0.22 1.84 0.065 0.98-1.89 
Setting      
Urban  1.00     
Rural 1.19 0.15 1.36 0.175 0.92-1.55 
Marital status      
Married  1.00     
Separated  0.96 0.33 -0.10 0.917 0.48-1.92 
Divorced  0.53 0.17 -1.94 0.052 0.28-1.00 
Widowed  0.85 0.18 -0.70 0.484 0.56-1.31 
Cohabitation  1.29 0.62 0.53 0.599 0.49-3.34 
Never married  1.03 0.20 0.17 0.868 0.69-1.52 
Highest level of education      
Primary  1.00     
Middle/JHS 0.80 0.14 -1.18 0.237 0.56-1.15 
Secondary/SHS 0.85 0.21 -0.62 0.534 0.52-1.38 
Higher/Tertiary  0.55 0.18 -1.78 0.074 0.28-1.06 
Never attended school 0.73 0.15 -1.51 0.132 0.49-1.09 
Occupation      
Snr officer/manager 1.00     
Professional  0.27 0.18 -1.92 0.055 0.07-1.03 
Technician  0.20 0.16 -1.98 0.048 0.04-0.98 
Services/Sales 0.33 0.20 -1.76 0.078 0.09-1.13 
Agriculture 0.40 0.25 -1.45 0.148 0.12-1.37 
Plant/Machine 0.12 0.16 -1.59 0.111 0.01-1.62 
Elementary worker 0.27 0.17 -2.08 0.037 0.08-0.92 
Other  0.40 0.24 -1.47 0.143 0.12-1.35 
Length of NHIS  
membership (yrs) 
     
<1 1.00     
1 0.72 0.19 -1.20 0.230 0.43-1.22 
2 0.79 0.17 -1.07 0.283 0.52-121 
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3 0.78 0.15 -1.23 0.218 0.53-1.15 
>=4 0.68 0.13 -2.00 0.046 0.46-0.99 
Card used in  
past two years 
     
No  1.00     
Yes  0.80 0.17 -0.97 0.331 0.52-1.24 
      
No. of obs 1099     
LR chi2 (15) 55.17     
Prob > chi2 0.0007     
Log likelihood -727.51048     
Pseudo R2 0.03665     
   
 
Relationship between healthcare providers’ characteristics and perceived good quality 
of care 
One hundred and seventy-three (173) health care providers participated in the survey, and a 
response rate of 86% was achieved. Half of the respondents were females; average age was 
44.30 years (SD=11.33); 42% were in Ashanti region; and 70% were in the urban setting. 
Respondents’ average years in practice was 11.18 years (SD=9.62). Forty per cent (40%) 
occupied positions other than medical officer, medical assistant, and nurse-in-charge; 65% 
worked in quasi-government health care facilities; and 78% worked at the hospital level. 
Results of the Chi-square analysis showed that 80% (139) of healthcare providers perceived 
quality of care delivery as good (Table 4). There was significant difference in their perception 
of quality of care by region (p=0.001). Eighty-six percent of healthcare providers in Ashanti 
region perceived quality of care as good compared to 63% and 89% in Volta and Central 
regions, respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Association between care providers’ characteristics and perceived good quality of 
care  
Characteristic  N  % X
2
 p-value 
Age 
<44 
44+ 
  
67  
72 
 
8072 
80.0 
0.0143 0.905 
Gender 
Male  
Female  
  
73  
66 
 
84.9 
75.9 
2.2292 0.135 
Region 
Ashanti 
Volta 
Central  
  
62  
30 
47  
 
86.1 
62.5 
88.7 
13.5273 0.001 
Setting 
Urban 
  
95  
 
78.5 
0.8579 0.354 
93 
 
Rural 44  84.6 
Primary status  
at facility 
Medical officer 
Medical assistant 
Nurse-in-charge 
Other 
  
 
26  
14  
42  
57  
 
 
78.8 
66.7 
85.7 
81.2 
3.7071 0.447 
Years in practice 
<11 
11+ 
  
88  
51  
 
77.9 
85.0 
1.2596 0.262 
Facility ownership     1.8567 0.395 
Quasi-government  50 76.9   
Mission  44 78.6   
Private   45 86.5   
Facility type 
Health centre 
Clinic  
Maternity home 
Hospital  
CHPS 
  
4 
17  
3  
111 
4  
 
66.7 
80.9 
60.0 
82.8 
57.1 
 
4.9394 0.294 
Total   139  80.4   
 
The multivariate logistic regression revealed that being a health care provider in the Volta 
region OR=0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.58) significantly decreases the likelihood of rating 
perception of quality of care as good compared to being in the Ashanti in region (Table 5). 
Likewise, healthcare providers at the hospital level (OR=8.11, 95% CI: 1.05- 62.07) were 
significantly more likely to perceive quality of care as good compared to those at the health 
centre level.   
 
Table 5: Multivariate logistic regression model for care providers perceived good quality of 
care 
Characteristic  OR Std. 
Err. 
z P>z [95% C.I 
Age (yrs)      
<44 1.00     
44+ 0.90 0.48 -0.19 0.846 0.31-2.56 
Gender       
Male 1.00     
Female  0.46 0.24 -1.48 0.138 0.16-1027 
Region      
Ashanti 1.00     
Volta  0.14 0.10 -2.70 0.007 0.03-0.58 
Central  1.27 0.82 0.37 0.709 0.35-4.55 
Setting      
Urban 1.00     
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Rural  2.90 1.61 1.91 0.057 0.97-8.66 
Primary Status at facility      
Medical Officer 1.00     
Medical Assistant 1.01 0.81 0.02 0.987 0.20-4.92 
Nurse in-charge 2.53 1.95 1.21 0.228 0.55-11.4 
Other  0.65 0.49 -0.55 0.579 0.15-2.88 
Years in practice       
<11 1.00     
11+ 1.40 0.75 0.62 0.534 0.48-4.04 
Facility ownership       
Quasi-government 1.00     
Mission  0.61 0.33 -0.88 0.378 0.21-1.80 
Private  1.90 1.17 1.05 0.294 0.57-6.36 
Facility type      
Health centre 1.00     
Clinic  2.69 3.13 0.85 0.394 0.27-26.33 
Maternity home  0.82 1.27 -0.13 0.899 0.03-17.13 
Hospital  8.11 8.42 2.02 0.044 1.05-62.07 
CHPS .59 .87 -0.35 0.725 0.03-10.48 
      
No. of obs 172     
LR chi2 (15) 32.71     
Prob > chi2 0.0052     
Log likelihood -69.158398     
Pseudo R2 0.1912     
 
 
Perception of quality of care components and factor loadings 
Findings of the PCA showed that five components namely; communication, dignity and 
respect, service quality, accommodation and cleanliness, and confidentiality were extracted 
from the 18 statements for assessing subscribers’ perception of quality of care delivery (Table 
6) whilst three components (communication, availability and promptness, accommodation 
and cleanliness) were extracted from the 12 statements for assessing healthcare providers’ 
perception of quality of care (Table 7).  
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Table 6: Subscribers perception component matrix and factor loadings  
Item 
no. 
Statement Component 
Communi- 
cation  
Dignity and 
respect  
Service 
quality 
Accom- 
modation and 
cleanliness 
Confident
iality  
1 He/she spent time to advise me on 
preventive care 
.870     
2 Prescriber made time to discuss 
my health condition and treatment 
.853     
3 He/she explained everything about 
treatment 
.797     
4 Medicines prescribed were very 
good 
.776     
5 He/she opened up to me for 
statements about treatment 
.757     
6 Nurses treated me with dignity  .943    
7 Prescriber gave me option to 
accept or refuse treatment 
 .933    
 8 Nurses were cautious towards me  .907    
9 Prescriber made a good diagnosis   .812   
10 Treatment was effective for 
recovery and cure 
  .777   
11 I was able to see prescriber within 
30 minutes 
  .586   
12 There was a prescriber available to 
attend to me 
  .551   
13 No congestion at facility during 
last visit 
   .738  
14 Seats were enough at facility 
during last visit 
   .606  
15 During last visit at facility, 
environment was clean 
   .594  
16 During last visit, waiting area was 
well ventilated 
   .559  
17 Confidentiality in consulting room     .848 
18 Health information is kept secret 
and confidential 
    .729 
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Table 7: Providers perception component matrix and factor loadings  
Item 
no  
Statement Component 
Communication  Availability and 
promptness 
Accommodation 
and cleanliness 
1 We explain to clients how to take their 
medication 
.855   
2 We do proper diagnosis .812 .345  
3 We make time to advise clients on disease 
prevention 
.805   
4 Clients can ask statements about treatment .726   
5 Consulting rooms good enough to give 
privacy 
.677   
6 Environment at facility is neat .675 .350 .396 
7 Nurses show interest in clients and makes 
them feel comfortable 
.549   
8 Enough prescribers to look at clients  .877  
9 There is always a  prescriber at post  .845  
10 Doctors show interest in clients and makes 
them feel comfortable 
.342 .353  
11 Waiting area is well ventilated   .912 
12 Facility has enough seats in waiting area .454  .632 
  
 
Together, the five out of the 18 components accounted for about 65% of the total variance in 
subscribers’ perception of quality of care delivery (additional file 2). Similarly, the three out 
of the 12 components extracted from the healthcare providers statements accounted for 65% 
of the total variance in their perception of quality of care delivery (additional file 3). In both 
subscriber and provider perception of quality components, communication accounted for 
much of the perception of quality, 26% and 44.2% respectively. Thus, communication had 
heavier factor loadings compared to other components. Whilst “dignity and respect” was the 
second highest component that accounted for 16% variance in the subscribers’ perception of 
quality, “availability and promptness” was the second highest component, which accounted 
for 11.6% of variance in healthcare providers’ perception of quality of care delivery. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Perception of quality of care by subscribers and care providers 
In general, our study findings show that both users of health care services and their providers 
have relatively good perception of the quality of health care delivered given that slightly over 
50% of subscribers expressed positive perception of quality; plausible reasons being courtesy 
bias on the part of those respondents towards their care providers [8]. It is also plausible to 
attribute the positive ratings by users of the health care services to their limited knowledge of 
what constitutes quality healthcare [22]. Notwithstanding the relatively positive perception of 
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quality among our study subjects across all three regions, we found that subscribers in the 
Central region were more positive about the quality of care than those in the Ashanti region 
whilst those in the Volta region were slightly less positive than those in the Ashanti region, 
suggesting that region of residence is a factor that influences peoples’ perception of quality 
care. The higher quality perception rate by respondents in Central region over that of Ashanti 
region supports findings of a study by Amo-Adjei et al [2] in which subscribers in the 
Western region (that shares border with Central region) of Ghana were more positive about 
service quality than those in the Ashanti region and suggested that the implementation of 
capitation payment in the Ashanti region may have influenced the perceived quality of care 
delivery in that region. Our finding, furthermore , is consistent with findings from similar 
studies in Ghana [23], [24] and  Iraq [25] but also at variance with those of others studies 
from Tanzania [26], Korea [27] and Ghana [2]. The differences in quality perception between 
Ghana and Korea may be attributed to the level of development in these two countries, 
considering that Korea’s health care system is much more advanced than that of Ghana and 
that the level of health care expectations of Korean citizens may be higher than that of 
Ghanaians. The differences in perception among different studies from Ghana and between 
those of Ghana and Tanzania may also be attributed to the respective study settings.  
 
Association between subscriber characteristics and perception of quality of healthcare 
 It was significant to note that ssubscribers with lower occupational class were less likely to 
perceive quality of care as good compared to those in senior or managerial positions, a 
finding that contradicts those of Dixon et al [23] and Amo-Adjei et al [2]. It was also 
instructive to find that subscribers with more years of enrolment in the scheme were less 
likely to rate their perception of quality of care as good compared to those newly enrolled 
onto the Scheme. A plausible explanation may be that the longer one stays as an insured 
member, the less additional satisfaction s/he gains from utilizing the services and this may 
also partially explain why NHIA reports low rate of renewals among the insured population. 
These findings also go to support findings from other studies [28][29][30][31][32][33][34] 
that show that perceptions of clients on quality healthcare are often influenced by attributes 
such as gender, age, cultural orientation, religion, geographic location (rural or urban) and 
income levels. Therefore, our findings, supported by findings from others studies, 
demonstrate that region of residence is another factor that influences subscribers perception 
of quality of care under the capitation payment policy in the Ashanti region.  
 
Association between care provider characteristics and quality of health care 
With regard to provider characteristics and quality of health care, a substantial proportion of 
NHIS-credentialed providers expressed good perception of quality of care they deliver to 
patients, but unlike the subscribers, their perception differ significantly by region. Care 
providers in the Volta region were less likely to rate their perception of quality of care as 
good compared to those in the Ashanti region. This trend, however, is contrary to expectation 
that providers in the Ashanti would express relatively lower perception of quality considering 
the health care providers associations’ agitations that heralded the introduction of capitation 
payment in the Ashanti region. One variable that shows significant difference among 
providers, however, was type of health care facility they operate. Health care providers 
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working in hospital level facilities were significantly more likely to perceive the quality of 
care as good compared to those working at the health centre levels. A plausible explanation 
may be the fact that hospital level facilities are better equipped with personnel and equipment 
that guarantee good quality service provision than the lower level facilities. Other low level 
facilities such as clinics were also more positive about the quality of care, compared with 
health centres, although not significant. This is not surprising because in the classification of 
facilities for credentialing by the NHIA, clinics come next to hospital level facilities and are 
mostly owned by private medical practitioners and have facilities that may compare 
favourably with personnel and equipment in hospital level facilities. Health Centres, on the 
other hand, are largely manned by Medical/Physician Assistants whose expectation of care 
delivery may not be met because of practice guidelines that limit the level of service they can 
provide in their facilities and therefore their low perception of quality may be influenced by 
the restrictions on their practice.   
Important components that influence people’s perception of quality of care  
Results of our principal component analysis (CPA) showed that users of health care services 
placed more importance on communication, dignity and respect, accommodation and 
cleanliness and confidentiality instead of measures that reflect technical quality. This syncs 
with findings of a study in Nigeria in which “dignity” emerged as one of the important 
dimensions of perceived quality [35].  It is however, instructive to note that these five 
components accounted for about 65% of the total variance in both subscribers’ and providers’ 
perception of quality of care delivery, with communication obtaining the highest factor 
loadings in the case of providers and “dignity and respect” in the case of subscribers. Our 
analysis of the perception of quality components reveals that communication explains much 
of the perceived good quality of care expressed by both subscribers and healthcare providers; 
and this is not surprising as it corroborate findings in existing literature. Among the 
dimensions proposed by Lehtinen et al [36] in their three-tier approach to service quality 
dimensions was inter-customer communication. Williams and Calnan [37]  also reported in 
their study that patient satisfaction with care, among others, is strongly correlated with 
appropriate adequate communication with patients. Cohen [38] on his part, observed that 
among the main sources of patient dissatisfaction with quality of care is lack of opportunity 
on the part of the patients to ask questions about their ailment. Abramovitz et al [39] also 
reported that explanation offered by nurses to patients was important determinant of patients’ 
satisfaction with quality of care. Atinga et al [31]  also found that among the three 
independent variables that were statistically significant in explaining patient overall 
satisfaction with quality services was communication. The high level of importance users of 
health care services give to non-technical quality dimension such as communication and 
provider-client inter-personal relationship point to their limited knowledge of what 
constitutes quality healthcare as suggested by Alhassan et al [22]. A study in Burkina Faso 
[40] reported that even though insured clients rated quality healthcare dimensions high, these 
clients actually received lesser technical quality care. Alhassan et al [22] on their part 
observed that the tendency for clients to respond favorably to questions on quality healthcare 
dimensions could be high but not necessarily reflect their experiences and judgment of the 
quality situation. Thus, the quality of patient-provider communication has a very strong 
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significant influence on the patient’s overall perception of quality care delivery [32] and as 
(Fottler et al[41] suggested,  good quality of patient-provider communication offers a healing 
environment where the former is more likely to continue utilizing services provided by the 
latter. These are summed up in the assertion that proper communication offers some form of 
medicine to the patient since effective communication reduces anxiety[42]. This finding 
suggests that healthcare  providers have good interactions with their clients during healthcare 
delivery and as noted by Alhassan et al [22] this should encourage the NHIA to integrate non-
technical quality care indicators into its mainstream post credentialing monitoring tools used 
for their routine monitoring of health care providers in order to promote client-centered 
quality care improvement alongside the technical quality care standards. It also becomes 
important for healthcare managers to constantly determine the factors associated with the 
satisfaction of patients with the quality of care provided so as to understand what is valued by 
the patient, how the quality of care is construed by the patient and to determine where, when 
and how service change and improvement may be made [43]. 
 
One limitation of our study is that it missed out on the strengths of qualitative study which 
would have allowed for further probing into the responses of respondents to better understand 
the reasons for respondents’ responses to the questionnaires administered for enhanced 
discussion of findings. Another limitation may be seen from the study design which is cross-
sectional instead of a true step-wedged design before-after study as originally envisaged. We 
also acknowledge the difficulty in making comparison between the three regions, considering 
some differences in their demographic and socio-economic characteristic. However, the two 
control regions have similar demographic and socio-economic characteristics and the 
differences between them and the intervention region are not too significant. These 
limitations notwithstanding, since the subject under study is a policy that is intended to be 
rolled out across the country, with a roll out plan already determined, what this study seeks to 
do is to identify issues that need attention of policy makers to improve on the implementation 
process. Hence, findings from the study provide valuable insight that can aid the debate 
surrounding the capitation payment policy in Ghana.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study assessed the perception of quality of care provision among subscribers of the 
NHIS and NHIS-credentialed providers in the Ashanti region where capitation payment is 
being implemented and two other regions where capitation payment is yet to be implemented 
with the objective to determine whether capitation payment influenced the quality of care 
perception of respondents in the Ashanti region. Findings from the study show that 
respondents’ background characteristics influenced their perception of quality of care but we 
also found that although both subscribers and care providers across the three regions have 
relatively good perception of the quality of health care in general, the quality perception 
among subscribers in the Ashanti region was relatively lower, compared to that in the Central 
region. We, therefore, conclude that in addition to their background characteristics, capitation 
payment may have influenced people’s perception of quality of care in the Ashanti region. 
The NHIA may, therefore, want to address itself to the negative issues raised by the public 
about the capitation implementation, as well as other factors that influence people’s 
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perception of quality of care that are documented in existing literature in order to improve the 
perception of quality care delivery in the Ashanti region in particular; and under the NHIS in 
general. 
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Additional file 2: Proportion of variance explained by each component in subscribers’ perception of quality of care 
Componen
t 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.728 26.269 26.269 4.728 26.269 26.269 3.415 18.973 18.973 
2 2.808 15.599 41.868 2.808 15.599 41.868 2.803 15.572 34.545 
3 1.550 8.609 50.477 1.550 8.609 50.477 2.194 12.189 46.734 
4 1.401 7.785 58.262 1.401 7.785 58.262 1.721 9.561 56.295 
5 1.143 6.353 64.614 1.143 6.353 64.614 1.497 8.319 64.614 
6 .919 5.104 69.719       
7 .786 4.367 74.086       
8 .745 4.138 78.224       
9 .671 3.729 81.954       
10 .656 3.646 85.600       
11 .551 3.058 88.658       
12 .503 2.795 91.454       
13 .470 2.608 94.062       
14 .342 1.903 95.965       
15 .276 1.534 97.499       
16 .257 1.428 98.927       
17 .175 .974 99.901       
18 .018 .099 100.000       
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Additional file 3: Proportion of variance explained by each component in healthcare providers’ perception of quality of care 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative 
% 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.310 44.250 44.250 5.310 44.250 44.250 4.163 34.695 34.695 
2 1.389 11.575 55.825 1.389 11.575 55.825 2.075 17.291 51.986 
3 1.144 9.531 65.356 1.144 9.531 65.356 1.604 13.370 65.356 
4 .941 7.840 73.196       
5 .806 6.718 79.915       
6 .647 5.388 85.303       
7 .505 4.212 89.515       
8 .430 3.580 93.095       
9 .319 2.660 95.755       
10 .228 1.904 97.659       
11 .172 1.435 99.094       
12 .109 .906 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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ABSTRACT 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment for primary care in 2012 with the view 
to containing escalating claims expenditure. This shift in provider payment method raised 
issues about its potential impact on patient-provider trust relationship and insured-patients’ 
trust in the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme. This paper presents findings of a study 
that explored insured-patients’ perception about, and attitude towards capitation payment in 
Ghana; and determined whether capitation payment affect insured-patients’ trust in their 
preferred primary care provider and the National Health Insurance Scheme in general.  
 
Methods We adopted a survey design for the study. We administered closed-ended 
questionnaires to collect data from insurance card-bearing members aged 18 years and above. 
We performed both descriptive statistics to determine proportions of observations relating to 
the variables of interest and chi-square test statistics to determine differences within gender 
and setting.  
 
Results: Sixty-nine per cent (69%) out of 344 of respondents selected hospital level of care 
as their primary care provider. The two most important motivations for the choice of a 
provider were proximity in terms of geographical access (40%) and perceived quality of care 
(38%). Eighty-eight per cent (88%) rated their trust in their provider as (very) high. Eighty-
two per cent (82%) actively selected their providers. Eighty-eight per cent (88%) had no 
intention to switch provider. A majority (91%) would renew their membership when it 
expires. Female respondents (91%; n=281) were more likely to renew their membership than 
males (87%; n=63). Notwithstanding capitation payment experience, 81% of respondents 
would recommend to their peers to enrol with the NHIS with rural dwellers (87%; n=156) 
being more likely to do so than urban dwellers (76%; n=188). Almost all respondents (92%) 
rated the NHIS as (very) good.  
 
Conclusion: Health Insurance subscribers in Ghana have high trust in their primary care 
provider giving them quality care under capitation payment despite their negative attitude 
towards capitation payment. They are guided by proximity and quality of care considerations 
in their choice of provider. The NHIA would, however, have to address itself to the negative 
perceptions about the capitation payment policy.  
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BACKGROUND 
As policy makers focus attention towards achieving health policy goals of quality, efficiency 
and access, they are faced with increasing cost of health care partly due to inefficiencies in 
the financing arrangements[1]. While reforms in provider payment systems may help address 
such inefficiencies, it could also affect quality of care and patients trust in health care 
providers. This paper presents findings of a study that sought to explore insured-patients’ 
perception about, and attitude towards capitation payment in Ghana; and  to determine 
whether capitation payment affect their trust in their preferred primary care providers (PPP) 
and the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in general.  
 
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
truster, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” Mayer et al (1995); In 
Hall et al [2]. Thom et al [3] describe patients’ trust as “necessary for an effective health care 
system”,  adding that the presence or absence of trust in patient-provider relationships in 
health care delivery can influence the provision and use of health care services. Various 
theories and measurement scales on patients’ trust in care delivery have been developed over 
the years to measure patient’s trust in their primary care physicians. These include the Trust 
in Physician Scale [4], the Primary Care Assessment Survey [5] and the Patient Trust Scale 
[6]. Hall et al [2], on the basis of existing theoretical models and other works, conceptualized 
patient trust as having potentially 5 domains: fidelity, competence, honesty,  confidentiality 
and global trust. Their model distinguishes itself from existing models by describing the 
association between physician trust and other constructs. They posit that physician trust is 
related to insurer trust in that patients who trust their care providers may worry less about 
their insurer; that trust is related to, but distinct from satisfaction; and that provider trust is 
related to potential determinants or outcome of trust. They identified the dimensions of trust 
as the patient’s general satisfaction with health care, satisfaction with the physician, length of 
time with the provider, patient’s willingness to recommend the provider to friends and their 
intent to switch provider. Thom et al [3] found trust to be a significant predictor of continuity 
with primary care provider, adherence to treatment recommendations and satisfaction of care. 
They concluded that “understanding patients’ trust (…) can lead to changes in health care 
delivery that protect doctor-patient relationship” and that it could help “identify physician and 
patient behaviour that tend to promote or block patient trust.” Patient-provider trust 
relationship is therefore very crucial to effective healthcare systems.  
 
But the growing demand for health care service within budgetary constraints in low and 
middle income countries and the increasing cost of health care services have necessitated  
reforms in the provider payment methods [7][8] [9][10][11] that may affect patient-provider 
relationship. Economic theory has it that changes in provider payment systems attract 
responses from providers[12], which could affect the quality and quantity of service they 
provide[13] and thereby affect patients trust in their care provider.  A provider payment 
method that can potentially contain cost is capitation payment that is currently being piloted 
in Ghana under the National Health Insurance system.  Evidence on potential impact of 
capitation on patient-provider relationships has been noted in studies conducted in high 
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income countries [14] and the evidence  is mixed:  Kao et al [14][15] found that patients 
whose primary care providers were paid by capitation method were less likely to trust their 
providers. Other  studies reported of patients accessing healthcare from capitated providers 
expressing discomfort with them being paid by capitation method [16], and were more likely 
to switch their primary care providers [17].  Hall et al [18], on the other hand, did not 
establish any negative effect of capitation payment on patients’ trust for their primary care 
providers. 
 
In 2003, Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to provide financial 
access to health care services. Initially, the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) paid 
its credentialed providers by Fee-For-Service (FFS) method but had to switch to Diagnosis-
Related-Grouping (DRG) payment due to abuse of the system [19][20]. Years into the 
implementation of DRG payment, the NHIA observed that the abuse in the system still 
persists. The NHIA decided to further reform its provider payment system with the 
introduction of capitation payment beginning with a pilot in the Ashanti region of Ghana, 
with all other regions continuing with the DRG payment.  The main objective for the 
capitation payment mechanism is to contain cost while ensuring quality of service provided 
to insured clients. However, this policy shift raised issues about the potential impact of 
capitation payment on patient-provider trust relationship in Ghana. The capitation policy was 
introduced amidst protest from service providers, civil society organizations and politicians 
for its perceived negative effects on primary care delivery [21]. In a press release, the Society 
of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners notified the public that “We suspend our services 
to NHIS subscribers indefinitely. The system is detrimental to quality of health care provision 
and a major threat to the survival of private health facilities” (The Ghanaian Times 
newspaper dated 02/01/2012). The Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana is reported to have sued 
the NHIA over capitation payment on the grounds that it “poses grave danger to patients 
given among other factors the recognition it (capitation payment) gives to persons outside the 
pharmacy profession” (The Daily Guide newspaper of 23/01/2012). Capitation payment 
continues to be a public discourse in Ghana, with proponents rationalizing its importance and 
usefulness for health care delivery in Ghana; and opponents calling for its withdrawal.  
Although studies have been done on Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme, to our 
current knowledge, only few of the studies focused on the capitation payment policy.  A 
study by Agyei-Baffour et al [10] focused on subscriber and health worker knowledge, 
perceptions  and expectations of the capitation payment while that of Aboagye [22] focused 
on determining the likelihood of the capitation payment achieving the intended benefits for 
Ghana. Neither of these studies covered the insured patient’s trust of providers in delivering 
quality care under the capitation payment.  Besides, studies relating to patients and provider 
relationship have focused on patient satisfaction [23][24][25][26][27] but as noted by Hall et 
al [2] although trust is related to satisfaction, the two are distinct constructs. This study could, 
thus, be one that focuses on patient trust in their primary care provider under capitation 
payment and helps fulfil the need for empirical evidence on the issue, in particular for 
low/middle-income countries. Understanding insured patients’ trust in their care providers 
will enable policy makers to implement effective and efficient strategies that will help 
improve the capitation implementation process and also help improve primary care delivery 
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in Ghana. Building on existing theory, we applied the conceptual model in figure 1 (attached) 
to our study. 
 
 
We adopted Hall et al [2] model in identifying indicators for measuring insured-patients’ trust 
in primary care delivery under capitation payment. In our model, we attempt to assess insured 
subscribers’ trust in primary care provision as well as in the National Health Insurance 
Scheme under the capitation payment system. Trust in primary care provider is measured by 
subscribers’ active selection of PPP, their use of health care services, their satisfaction with 
provider services, and their intent to switch primary care provider while trust in the NHIS is 
measured by general satisfaction with the scheme, willingness to renew membership upon 
expiry and willingness to recommend NHIS to friends. 
 
 
METHODS:  
Study design: We adopted a survey design for the study. We earlier did a review of the 
literature to understand the theoretical effects of capitation payment on patients’ trust in 
primary care and a newspaper review of the issues that heralded the introduction of capitation 
payment in Ghana to inform the survey questionnaires design.  
 
Study setting: The study took place in the Ashanti region of Ghana. The Ashanti region was 
the first region where the implementation of capitation payment started in 2012. It has a 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of effect of capitation payment on patients’ trust in primary care 
 
     Trust indicators 
 
 
 
                                                               
 
 
 
Model adapted from Hall et al, 2002. 
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population of 4,780,380 and accounts for 19.4 % of the total population of Ghana of which 
about 61% is urban (Ghana Statistical Service. Population and Housing Census, 2010). There 
are 1,126,216 households in the region with an average household size of 4.1. As of 2013 
when this study was being designed, there were 619 NHIS-accredited health facilities. The 
region had 24 district offices of the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) and 
1,585,098 active card-bearing members representing about 34% of the regional population.  
 
Sampling: Multi-stage sampling was applied to recruit subjects for the survey. The list of 
Enumeration Areas (EAs) used for the 6
th
 round of the Ghana Living Standard Survey 
(GLSS6) was used as the sample frame. We adopted the sample design used by the Ghana 
Statistical Service (GSS) for post enumeration survey (PES) to determine the number of EAs 
(clusters) in the region. Each of the ten regions in Ghana was treated as domain for selection 
and analysis, and was based on probability sample of 250 EAs of which 45 were in Ashanti.   
We used the World Health Organization (WHO) revised Expanded Programme of 
Immunization (EPI) survey reference manual as guide for determining the sample size per 
cluster. Using the WHO recommended table indicating number of subjects per cluster; we 
opted for the desired precision level of ±3% and expected coverage of 95% to determine the 
number of subjects for the survey. We arrived at 10 subjects per cluster (EA) giving a 
representative sample of 450 households (subjects) to be interviewed. Having determined the 
number of households for the interviews, we sought assistance from the GSS to select 30 EAs 
from the 250 with probability proportional to size. Fifteen households (and 15 replacements) 
were then randomly selected from each of the 30 EAs. A list of the households and their 
replacements were given to the interviewers for the field interviews. Apart from its strength 
in facilitating call back at any household where an interviewer may encounter challenges at 
the initial visit, this strategy also has the advantage of discouraging the interviewers from 
selecting households based on their subjective judgment while in the field and thereby 
potentially introducing bias into the study[28]. In each household an adult card-bearing 
member aged 18 years and above was interviewed.  
 
Data collection and analysis:  
We administered closed-ended questionnaires to collect data on respondents’ socio-
demographic characteristics, choice of PPP and rationale behind choice, their trust in the PPP, 
satisfaction with care delivery and the NHIS, as well as their perception about, and attitude 
towards capitation payment. The target population was active card bearing members of 18 
years and above. Data cleaning resulted in the removal of respondents whose health insurance 
ID card number was not indicated to authenticate their insurance membership.  This brought 
the total number of respondents included in the initial descriptive statistical analysis to 383. 
With the use of SPSS (v.20.0.0.1) software we performed descriptive statistics on the socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents based on the 383 respondents. Thereafter, we 
excluded 39 respondents who indicated they had no knowledge of capitation and had no PPP 
from the analysis of trust, perception and attitude. We performed descriptive statistics of 
respondents’ choice of provider and rationale behind their choice based on gender and 
setting. In determining respondents’ trust in their primary care provider and in the NHIS, we 
performed both descriptive statistics to determine proportions based on gender and setting 
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relating to the variables of interest and chi-square test statistics to determine differences in 
observations within gender and setting.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents  
 
Variables (N=383) 
Frequency 
(%) Urban (%) Rural (%) 
Gender 
  
  
Male 66 (17) 40 (60) 26 (40) 
Female 317 (83) 162 (51) 155 (49) 
Age 
  
  
18-31 121 (32) 61 (50) 60 (50) 
32-45 119 (31) 65 (55) 54 (45) 
46-59 66 (17) 31 (47) 35 (53) 
60-74 42 (11) 28 (67) 14 (33) 
75+ 35 (9) 17 (49) 18 (51) 
Marital status 
  
  
Married 230 (60) 119 (52) 111 (48) 
Never married 61 (16) 34 (56) 27 (44) 
Divorced 20 (5) 13 (65) 7 (35) 
Widowed 60 (16) 29 (48) 31 (52) 
Other 12 (3) 7 (58) 5 (42) 
Education 
  
  
Tertiary 27 (7) 21 (78) 6 (22) 
Secondary/SHS 57 (15) 42 (74) 15 (26) 
Middle/JSS 157 (41) 74 (47) 83 (53) 
Primary 54 (14) 27 (50) 27 (50) 
Never attended school 88 (23) 38 (43) 50 (57) 
Employment status 
  
  
Formal 50 (13) 28 (56) 22 (44) 
Self-employed 209 (55) 98 (47) 111 (53) 
Retired 34 (9) 22 (65) 12 (35) 
Unemployed 90 (23) 54 (60) 36 (40) 
Length of NHIS membership 
  
  
≤ 2 years 30 (8) 16 (53) 14 (47) 
2-3 year 24 (6) 9 (38) 15 (62) 
3-5 years 57 (15) 25 (44) 32 (56) 
> 5 years 167 (44) 88 (53) 79 (47) 
No response 105 (27) 64 (61) 41 (39) 
Used NHIS card past 2 years 
  
  
Yes 360 (94) 193 (54) 167 (46) 
No 23 (6) 9 (39) 14 (61) 
Source: Authors’ household survey, 2014. 
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RESULTS 
Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents 
Three hundred and eighty-three (383) out of 450 sampled subjects participated in the survey 
and this represent 85% response rate (table 1). About 53% were resident in an urban setting, 
83% were females, 23% had no formal education and 23% were unemployed. A majority of 
respondents (65%) had been active members of the NHIS for two years or more at the time of 
the survey. Almost all respondents (94%) had used their NHIS card to access health services 
in the two years prior to the survey.  
 
Choice of preferred primary care provider  
Table 2 presents details about the choice of provider and rationale behind choice. Sixty-nine 
per cent (69%) out of 344 of respondents selected hospital level of care as their PPP. The two 
most important motivations for the choice of a PPP were proximity in terms of geographical 
access (40%) and perceived quality of care (38%).  
 
Table 2: Subscriber preferred choice of provider and rationale behind choice 
Parameter 
All (%) 
Gender Setting 
Male (%) Female (%) Urban (%) Rural (%) 
N=344 n=63 n=281 n=188 n=156 
 Level of care 
 Hospital level 238 (69) 51 (81) 187 (66) 137 (73) 101 (65) 
Clinic level 51 (15) 4 (6) 47 (17) 21 (11) 30 (19) 
Lower levels 12 (4) 3 (5) 9 (3) 5 (3) 7 (5) 
Not indicated 43 (12) 5 (8) 38 (14) 25 (13) 18 (11) 
 Reason behind choice 
 Proximity 139 (40) 25 (40) 114 (41) 137 (73) 101 (65) 
Perceived quality 129 (38) 25 (40) 104 (37) 21 (11) 30 (19) 
Staff attitude 27 (8) 7 (11) 20 (7) 5 (3) 7 (5) 
Indifferent 49 (14) 6 (9) 43 (15) 25 (13) 18 (11) 
Source: Authors’ household survey, 2014. 
 
 
Subscriber trust in primary care provider under capitation payment  
We asked the 344 respondents to rate their trust in their PPP as well as in the NHIS bearing in 
mind their experiences with the health care system under the capitation payment (table 3). 
Eighty-eight per cent (88%) of them rated their trust in their primary care provider as (very) 
high. There was no difference in the level of trust between male and female respondents [χ2 = 
2.010; p= 0.570] nor between urban and rural dwellers [χ2 = 3.799; p= 0.150]. Eighty-two per 
cent (82%) actively selected their primary care providers. Eighty-eight per cent (88%) had no 
intention to switch PPP. There was no significant difference in intention to switch provider 
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between male and female [χ2 =3.799; p= 0.150]; nor between urban and rural settings [χ2 
=2.839; p= 0.242]. However, the minority that intend to switch provider would do so for 
perceived poor service quality, non-availability of skilled staff, and perceived poor 
medication.  With regard to respondents’ trust in the NHIS, the study found that a majority 
(91%) would renew their membership when it expires. Female respondents (91%; n=281) 
were more likely to renew their membership than males (87%; n=63) though the difference 
was not significant [χ2 =1.486; p= 0.476]. Notwithstanding capitation payment experience, 
81% of respondents would recommend to their peers to enroll with the NHIS with rural 
dwellers (87%; n=156) being more likely to do so than urban dwellers (76%; n=188); [χ2 
=6.874; p= 0.009]. Almost all respondents (92%) rated the NHIS as (very) good. However, 
only about 22% of respondents agreed to rate capitation payment.  
 
 
Subscriber perception about the positive attributes of capitation payment. 
Exploration of respondents’ perception about the positive attributes of capitation payment as 
contained in the information, education and communication (IEC)  messages of the NHIA 
revealed that between 69% and 81% (strongly) agree with the statements that captured the 
positive attributes of capitation payment (table  4). There were only two attributes on which 
respondents differed significantly in opinion. Among respondents who (strongly) dis-agreed 
with some of the positive attributes of capitation payment, residents in urban areas (26%; 
n=188) expressed significantly higher dis-agreement on the notion that capitation encourages 
better diagnosis and treatment than residents in rural areas (9%; n= 156) [p=0.000] and on the 
notion that capitation makes treatment easy and effective (25% and 13%, respectively) [p= 
0.035].  
 
 
 
 
1
1
4
 
Table 3:  Subscriber trust of primary care provider 
 Variable (N=344) All (%)  Male (%) Female (%) Chi; p-value Urban (%) Rural (%) Chi; p-value 
Trust in Provider N=344  n=63  n=281    n=188  n=156    
Actively selected provider 
      
  
Yes 281 (82) 57 (90) 224 (80)
4.543; 0.103 
154 (82) 127 (81)
3.790; 0.580 
No 63 (18) 6 (10) 57 (20) 34 (18) 29 (19) 
Rate trust of provider 
      
  
(Very) high 304 (88) 55 (87) 249 (87)
2.010; 0.570 
157 (84) 147 (94)
3.799; 0.150 Low 38 (11) 7 (11) 31(11) 29 (15) 9 (6) 
Null 2 (1) 1 (1) 1 (2) 2 (1) 0 
Intention to switch provider 
      
  
Yes 41 (12) 3 (5) 37 (14)
3.799; 0.150 
26 (14) 14 (9)
2.839; 0.242 
No 303 (88) 60 (95) 243 (86) 161 (86) 142 (91) 
Trust in NHIS 
   
 
  
  
Would renew card upon expiry 
      
  
Yes 312 (91) 55 (87) 257(91)
1.486; 0.476 
165 (88) 147 (94)
4.553; 0.103 
No 32 (9) 8 (13) 23 (9) 22 (12) 9 (6) 
Would recommend NHIS to 
peer 
      
  
Yes 279 (81) 47(75) 232 (82)
2.127; 0.145 
143 (76) 136 (87)
6.874; 0.009 
No 65 (19) 16 (25) 49 (18) 45 (24) 20 (13) 
Rate satisfaction with NHIS 
      
  
(very) high 315 (92) 60 (95)  255 (91)
2.890; 0.576 
170 (90) 145 (93)
2.891; 0.576 (very) low 29 (8) 3 (5) 26 (9) 18 (10) 10 (7) 
Null 
 
0 1 0 1 
Rate capitation payment 
      
  
(very) good 75 (22) 10 (16) 65 (23)
1.711; 0.425 
38 (20) 37 (24)
2.891; 0.576 
Null 269 (78) 53 (84) 216 (77) 150 (80) 119 (76) 
Source: Authors’ household survey, 2014 
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Table 4: Subscriber perception about the positive attributes of capitation payment  
Statement category (N=344) 
Answer categories 
(Strongly) agree (Strongly) dis-agree Don't Know ᵡ; P-value 
  Frequency (%) 
 Capitation will drive down cost 239 (69) 75 (22) 30 (9) 
 Male (n=63) 37 (59) 18 (29) 8 (12) 4.687; 
0.196 Female (n=281) 202 (72) 57 (20) 22 (8) 
Urban (n=188) 126 (67) 47 (25) 15 (8) 3.645; 
0.302 Rural (n=156) 113 (72) 28 (18) 15 (10) 
Capitation will improve quality of care 203 (59) 118 (34) 23 (7) 
 
Male 29 (46) 27 (43) 7 (11) 7.190; 
0.066 Female 174 (62) 91 (32) 16 (5) 
Urban 110 (59) 68 (36) 10 (5) 4.583; 
0.205 Rural 93 (60) 50 (32) 13 (8) 
Capitation stops provider shopping 248 (72) 51 (15) 45 (13) 
 
Male 37 (58) 15 (24( 11 (18) 7.602; 
0.055 Female 211 (75) 36 (13) 34 (12) 
Urban 131 (70) 28 (15) 29 (15) 2.077; 
0.557 Rural 117 (75) 23 (15) 16 (10) 
Capitation encourages better diagnosis & 
treatment 278 (81) 63 (18) 3 (1) 
 Male 48 (76) 14 (22) 1 (2) 1.919; 
0.589 Female 230 (82) 49 (17) 2 (1) 
Urban 138 (73) 49 (26) 1 (1) 17.935; 
0.000 Rural 140 (90) 14 (9) 2 (1) 
Capitation makes treatment easy and 
effective 273 (79) 67 (19) 4 (2) 
 Male 47 (75) 15 (24) 1 (1) 2.171; 
0.538 Female 226 (80) 52 (19) 3 (1) 
Urban 139 (74) 47 (25) 2 (1) 8.636; 
0.035 Rural 134 (86) 20 (13) 2 (1) 
     
Source: Authors’ household survey, 2014. 
 
Subscriber attitude towards capitation payment  
Notwithstanding the high trust in their PPP and in the NHIS under the capitation payment; 
and their positive perception about the attributes of capitation, respondents in general, 
exhibited negative attitude towards capitation payment (table 5). About 58% have a feeling 
that implementation of capitation payment in the Ashanti region was politically motivated 
while 65% perceive capitation payment as causing frustration to the insured patients at the 
health facilities with another 49% indicating that capitation contributes to deaths in the 
implementing region. There were no significant differences in attitude towards capitation 
between male and female, nor between urban and rural dwellers. 
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Table 5: Subscriber attitude towards capitation payment 
  
Statement category (N=344) 
Answer categories 
(Strongly) agree 
(Strongly) dis-
agree 
Don't Know ᵡ; P-value 
  Frequency (%) 
 Capitation is meant to punish the people in 
Ashanti 199 (58) 80 (23) 65 (19) 
 Male (n=63) 38 (60) 16 (25) 9 (15) 
1.200; 0.753 
Female (n=281) 161 (57) 64 (23) 56 (20) 
Urban (n=188) 112 (60) 45 (24) 31 (16) 
1.811; 0.613 
Rural (n=156) 87 (56) 35 (22) 34 (29) 
Capitation was brought to Ashanti 
because of politics 199 (58) 80 (23) 65 (19)  
Male 38 (60) 16 (25) 9 (15) 
1.200; 0.753 
Female 161 (57) 64 (23) 56 (20) 
Urban 112 (60) 45 (24) 31 (16) 
1.811; 0.613 
Rural 87 (56) 35 (22) 34 (22) 
Capitation contributes to the death of the 
people 169 (49) 103 (30) 72 (21)  
Male 33 (52) 15 (24) 15 (24) 
2.160; 0.540 
Female 138 (49) 88 (31) 57 (20) 
Urban 102 (54) 49 (26) 37 (20) 
4.679; 0.197 
Rural 67 (43) 54 (35) 35 (22) 
Capitation causes frustration at the health 
facilities 223 (65) 84 (24) 37 (11) 
 Male 46 (73) 14 (22) 3 (5) 
3.973; 0.264 
Female 177 (63) 70 (25) 34 (15) 
Urban 131 (70) 39 (21) 18 (9) 
5.053; 0.168 
Rural 92 (59) 45 (29) 19 (12) 
Source: Authors’ household survey, 2014 
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DISCUSSION 
Choice of preferred primary care provider 
We found in our study that health insurance subscribers are guided by proximity and quality 
of care considerations in their selection of preferred primary care provider under the 
capitation payment policy. This is consistent with findings from Yeboah et al [29], Uchendu 
et al [30], Muriithi [31]  and Buor[32].  The economic and quality of care consideration that 
guided subscribers’ choice of provider suggests that they intuitively understand that the cost 
of health care services is not only the amount of money that they pay at the health facilities or 
the premium they pay to the insurance scheme but also the incidental and opportunity costs 
that come with attending facilities that are too distant from one’s place of residence and 
seeking care from providers who may fall short of providing quality care. It is also significant 
to note that urban dwellers were more critical on the effect of capitation on quality of care, a 
plausible reason being the level of education of the urban dwellers which is higher than that 
of rural dwellers and the possible exposure of the former over the latter to media discussions 
and agitations about the capitation payment policy. 
 
One emerging trend that seem disturbing to the district health delivery system in Ghana under 
capitation payment is the threat of crowding out lower level facilities by those of district 
hospital level. A majority of respondents selected facilities that are of district hospital status 
and clinics where they perceive to have access to better qualified health personnel to manage 
their health conditions leaving only a few for the lower levels of care that serve as the first 
point of entry in the health delivery system. If the trend is not addressed the smaller facilities 
in rural communities may risk being thrown out of business since enrolees may want to enroll 
with higher level provider facilities thereby making health care more expensive. Another 
consequential effect would be that if the smaller facilities are not able to survive the 
competition and fold up, there will be lack of geographical access to residents in deprived 
areas where such smaller facilities may be located to serve the unmet health needs of 
subscribers and the general public. Lack of access to health care services may lead to lack of 
confidence in the NHIS and plausibly de-motivate subscribers from renewing their 
membership upon expiry. Potential subscribers may also not enroll since their membership 
cards will be meaningless to them without health facilities where they may attend for quality 
care in times of need. 
This situation may, however, be addressed by introducing the “list patient” and “geographic” 
capitation payment models [8]; [33] whereby the reimbursement of providers with capacity to 
attract enrollees is tied to the number that enroll with the facility; and that of smaller facilities 
tied to the insured population living within a particular geographical area. In the case of 
Ghana and other comparable low/middle-income countries, the “list patient” capitation model 
may be applied to hospitals and clinics that have the capacity to attract more enrollees while 
“geographic capitation” model is applied to the community-based health planning and 
services (CHPS) compounds with their capitated rates tied to the number of active card 
bearing members of the NHIS within their catchment area. As capitation is being scaled up 
nationwide, one way to address this emerging trend would be for policy makers to consider 
introducing these models into the scheme design to support the lower level facilities to 
remain relevant in the health delivery system. This will strengthen the gatekeeper system by 
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encouraging the use of first level facilities for cases that may not necessarily require the 
specialist attention of the district hospitals.  
 
Subscriber trust in primary care provider 
With regard to patient-provider trust relationship, our study did not establish significant 
negative findings on subscriber trust in their primary care providers, a finding that is 
consistent with those of  Hall et al [18] and Pereira et al [16].   The high level of trust in the 
care provider as reflected in the level of satisfaction that respondents exhibited by rating their 
health providers highly and showing little intention to switch provider (table 3) is evident 
from the majority that rated the NHIS highly, would renew their membership card and 
recommend the NHIS to others (table 5). These findings may however  be interpreted with 
some caution since contextual factors in Ghana may not compare favourably with those in 
Hall’s study setting, which was conducted among members of a Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) in North Carolina-USA. Many subscribers in Ghana may not have the 
financial ability to opt out of the NHIS for private insurance as the case could be in high-
income countries; and may, therefore, have to accept what is available to them despite 
challenges that they may be faced with. It is also worth noting that with only a fifth of 
respondents rating capitation payment, one may wonder whether the poor response to the 
rating of capitation payment could not mean a silent protest against it, considering that many 
Ghanaians have a culture of not willing to openly speak to issues about which they have 
reservations or those with which they are not comfortable.  
 
Subscriber perception about the positive attributes of, and attitude towards capitation 
payment 
One interesting thing that may be of interest to stakeholders in the debate around the 
capitation payment policy in Ghana is the seeming conflict between subscriber perception 
about the positive attributes of capitation on the one hand, which is generally affirmative as 
expressed in the results presented in table 4; and, on the other hand, respondents’ attitude 
towards the capitation payment policy which point to the negative as may be deduced from 
the results presented in table 5. Attributes such as capitation potential to drive down cost, 
improve quality of care, including better diagnosis and treatment, are perceived positively, 
while many respondents showed agreement with statements such as that capitation is 
politically motivated and causes frustration at the health facilities (table 5). This gives the 
impression that the communication messages on the positive attributes of capitation payment 
may have gone down well with the public and that their negative attitude towards the policy 
may have been influenced by the negative media reportage on the policy and the frustrations 
subscribers may have experienced at the health facilities at the initial stages of the 
introduction of the payment policy. A more qualitative study to explore and understand this 
phenomenon would be required. 
 
Some limitations may identify with the study. The first is the disproportionate balance in 
representation between male and female respondents. It is, however, common in Ghana for 
more females than males to access health care services and that their opinion about the 
capitation payment could provide a reasonable reflection of the situation. A second limitation 
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may be the relatively low sample size which was used for the chi-square statistical analysis, a 
result from data cleaning and excluding respondents without care provider and lack of 
knowledge on capitation. That notwithstanding, results from the analysis provides a 
reasonable approximation of the perception of insured clients about the capitation payment 
policy in the Ashanti region of Ghana. The study may also be limited by courtesy bias. This 
is because, although respondents expressed misgivings about the capitation payment policy, 
they expressed high trust in the NHIS and in their primary care providers in providing quality 
care for them. This is however not surprising because of the traditional respect patients, and 
Ghanaians in general, have for their care providers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that respondents have a high trust in their primary care provider giving them 
quality care under capitation payment despite their negative attitude towards capitation 
payment. This finding provides useful reflection of subscriber side of the issue to the public 
debate that characterized the introduction of capitation payment in Ashanti. Hitherto, the 
debate had been dominated by politicians, providers and civil society groups leaving out the 
subscribers who had no access to the radio and television to express their opinion on the 
subject matter.  
 
We also conclude that health insurance subscribers are guided by proximity and quality of 
care considerations in their choice of provider. This provides useful insight for policy-makers 
in their determination to enforce quality of care standards in the health delivery system. 
Whereas findings, especially those relating to subscriber trust in their primary care provider 
provide potential support for the scaling up of capitation payment in Ghana, the NHIA would, 
none the less, have to address itself to the negative perceptions of subscribers about the 
capitation payment policy. This would require the NHIA to invest in IEC to sensitize the 
public on the positive effects of capitation payment and to address the negative perception 
about it. 
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ABSTRACT 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with 
resistance from provider groups and civil society organizations for its perceived negative 
effects on quality care delivery. The leadership of the faith-based provider groups was, 
however, supportive of the capitation payment method. Evidence shows that tension between 
providers and reformers of the payment system slow down the reform process and that such 
reforms require the intense involvement of all stakeholders, both in the preparation, and 
implementation of the reform in order to achieve the intended objective. This study, 
therefore, seeks to explore the views of providers to understand their preferred payment 
method for the various types of services they provide in order to inform the discussion and 
negotiations during this period of reform. Findings will not only aid the NHIA to improve the 
implementation arrangements but also provide useful inputs for other low/middle countries in 
their quest to reform their provider payment systems.   
 
Materials and methods:  A cross-sectional survey of 200 credentialed health care providers’ 
in the three regions of Ghana on providers’ preference for payment method. We administered 
closed-ended questionnaires during face-to-face interviews employing 5-point Likert scales 
for measurement of payment method preference. We performed descriptive analysis of 
healthcare providers’ background characteristics and chi-square test to determine relationship 
between their background characteristics and their preferred payment method for primary 
care.  
 
Results: Findings from our analysis suggest that, in general, health care providers prefer the 
G-DRG that was introduced in 2008 to fee-for-service and more recently, capitation payment 
method. However, results of the individual level analysis suggest that whereas providers in 
the Volta region strongly reject capitation as payment method, those in the Ashanti and 
Central regions seem indifferent with their preference for payment method.  
 
Conclusion: We conclude that the initial resistance exhibited by providers in the Ashanti 
region may have been influenced by the negative perception they held about the capitation 
payment method and that with more education on the positive attributes of capitation 
payment method and active involvement of healthcare providers in the design and 
implementation of the policy, capitation payment could be an acceptable payment method for 
primary care services in Ghana’s health delivery system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As demand for health care increases within the context of budgetary constraints, governments 
are forced to implement cost-efficiency measures to ensure continuous delivery of quality 
health care to their populace [1]. At point of service, two efficiency-gains incentives may be 
applied to contain cost: demand-side incentives to reduce moral hazard and supply-side 
incentives to induce efficient application of resources [2];[3]. Supply-side, as opposed to 
demand-side incentives, are deemed a better option because while the demand side 
incentives, such as co-payments, could impose financial hardship on care seekers, supply-side 
incentives could induce providers to be cost-conscious in order to control expenditure [2]. 
One such supply-side incentive is reform of the provider payment system. Ghana introduced 
a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 after initial pilot in 45 districts between 
2002 and 2003. On realizing that the fee-for-service and the diagnosis-related-grouping 
(DRG) payments could not help control the observed escalating growth in utilization and 
claims expenditures, the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) decided to introduce 
capitation payment for primary care services [3];[4]. Capitation payment has been found to 
encourage efficiency [4]: drives down cost [5];[6], serves as critical source of income for 
providers [7], promotes adherence to guidelines and policies [8] and encourages providers to 
work better and give health education to  patients [9]. On the other hand, it is noted to induce 
reduction in the quantity and quality of care provided [7], encourage skimming on inputs,  
“dumping” of high risk patients and negatively affect patient-provider relationship [10]. The 
NHIA was, however, convinced that notwithstanding any un-intended negative effect, with a 
robust monitoring and evaluation system, the implementation of capitation payment could 
contribute to addressing the cost escalation challenge that was being experienced under the 
G-DRG and fee-for-service payment methods. Capitation payment was, therefore, introduced 
as a pilot project in January 2012 in the Ashanti region of Ghana in order to identify un-
intended implementation challenges to inform its re-design for step-wise implementation 
across the country. The introduction of capitation payment in the Ashanti region was, 
however, met with resistance from provider groups led by the leadership of their professional 
associations; and civil society organizations [11]. The leadership of the faith-based provider 
groups was, however, supportive of the capitation payment method as the Executive Director 
of Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG) was reported to have stated that “our 
pledged support (for capitation payment) is premised on the belief that the pilot has the 
vibrant objective to promote efficiency of health facilities, introduce managed competition, 
ensure continuity of care, and also ensure cost containment for payers as well as ensuring 
financial sustainability of the health facilities without compromising quality of care” ( The 
Ghanaian Times Newspaper of 27/01.2012). Evidence from literature shows that tension 
between providers and reformers of the payment system tend to slow down the reform 
process and that such reforms require the intense involvement of all stakeholders, both in the 
preparation,  and implementation of the reform in order to achieve the intended objective [4]; 
[12]. In the midst of a divided opinion of provider groups on the capitation implementation, 
and the desire of the NHIA to reform its payments methods; and the need to accommodate 
genuine concerns of provider groups to ensure success of the reform agenda, it would be 
useful to explore the views of providers to understand their preferred payment method for the 
various types of services they provide in order to inform the discussion and negotiations 
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during this period of reform. This study, therefore, seeks to explore the views of providers to 
understand their preferred payment method for the various types of services they provide in 
order to inform the discussion and negotiations during this period of reform. Findings will not 
only aid the NHIA to improve the implementation arrangements but also provide useful 
inputs for other low/middle countries in their quest to reform their provider payment systems.   
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Study design: We adopted a survey design for the study. We administered closed-ended 
questionnaires on 200 credentialed providers in the three regions using face-to-face interview. 
Data on the main subject of study centered on provider preference for payment method and 
their attitude towards the capitation payment policy. We also collected data on the socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents.  
 
Research setting: The study took place in three regions of Ghana: Ashanti, Volta and 
Central regions. Capitation payment policy which is the subject of study was first introduced 
in the Ashanti region in 2012 and was therefore selected as the “intervention” region for the 
study. Table 1 below provides the basic socio-demographic and health service/NHIS data on 
the three regions. 
 
Population and sampling: The NHIS-credentialed providers constituted the study 
population from which a sample was drawn for interviews. The sample size was calculated 
based on number of providers credentialed in 2013, the year when the study was designed; 
and we used the G-power analysis programme (G* Power 3.1) [13], [14] to determine the 
appropriate sample size.  We assumed an effect size of 0.4, an alpha (α) of 0.05 and beta (1-
β) of 0.80; and allocation ratio (N2/N1) of 1.1.  The outputs were 200 samples:  95 for group 
one (Ashanti region) and 105 for group two (Central and Volta regions). Based on the 
number of NHIS-credentialed providers as at the end of year 2013, we then, proportionally, 
allocated 48% of samples for group two to Volta and 52% to Central regions, respectively. 
 
Data analysis: We performed descriptive analysis of healthcare providers’ socio-
demographic characteristics, region of residence, primary status at their healthcare facility, 
years in practice, their facility ownership, and facility type.  We then performed chi-square 
test to determine relationship between providers’ region of residence and their preferred 
payment method for the various types of services provided under the NHIS in order to 
understand whether capitation payment would emerge as a preferred payment method for 
primary out-patients services across all three regions. We also performed a bivariate analysis 
to examine the relationship between the characteristics of respondents and their payment 
preference, also to determine any differences in providers’ preference for payment method in, 
and between the three regions. Our outcome of interest was “acceptance of capitation 
payment as provider payment method across all three regions by NHIS-credentialed 
providers’. Healthcare providers in the Ashanti region only were, then, asked to rate their 
experiences with the capitation payment policy based on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 
“don’t know” (0) to “strongly agree” (4). This was done to estimate mean scores of 21 
performance related statements on the capitation policy to assess performance of the policy 
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from the view point of healthcare providers in the Ashanti region where capitation is being 
implemented. All the analyses were conducted using Stata version 13 and Excel 2010. 
 
Table 1: Basic socio-demographic and health service/NHIS indicators   
Indicator Ashanti Volta Central National  
a. Socio-demographics (GSS 2013)     
Percentage population (2010 PHC) 19.4 8.6 8.9 24,658,823 
Economically active population (2010) 19.1 8.4 8.6 43.9 
Percentage population employed (2010) 18.6 8.6 8.5  
Percentage self-employed of the employed 65.5 75.3 69.2 64.9 
Population density (km
2
) (2010) 196 103 224.1 103 
Percentage urban population (2010) 60.6 33.7 47.1 50.9 
Sex ratio (males/100 females) (2010) 94 92.8 91 95.2 
Households (2010) (N=) 1,126,216 495,603 526,764 5,467,136 
Average household size (2010) 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.4 
Percentage population literate (2010) 82.6 73.5 78.2 74.1 
b. NHIS service availability (NHIA, 
2013) 
    
NHIA District Offices  25 15 13 166 
Active NHIS card-bearing members 1,715,174  910,559  866,831  10,145,196  
Percentage active to regional population 34 28 23  
NHIS-credentialed service providers (2013) 619 321 334 3,832 
c. Health personnel availability (GHS 
2013) 
    
Percentage share of health professionals 18.2 8.5 8.6  
Percentage share of nurses (Professional) 45.5 53.4 39.3  
Percentage share of nurses (Enrolled) 54.5 46.6 60.7  
Number of Doctors  96 36 26 n/a 
Number of Community Health Nurses 157 264 130 n/a 
d. Health service utilization and cost 
(NHIA 2013) 
      
OPD utilization (per member) 2.62 2.63 2.18 2.64 
IPD Utilization (per member) 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.18 
OPD claims expenditure (GHC per member)  54.52 29.50 42.22 22.14 
IPD claims expenditure ( GHC per member  35.67 24.33 15.41 41.61 
Sources: GSS 2010 Population and Housing Census, 2013. Available at www.statsghana.gov.gh  
NHIA Annual Report, 2013. Available at www.nhia.gov.gh ; NHIA Statistical Bulletin, 2013; GHS 
Annual Report 2013. Available at www.ghanahealthservice.org    
 
 
Ethical considerations: We obtained ethical approval (certified protocol number: UG-ECH 
057/13-14) from the University of Ghana Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research (ISSER) Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH). We had earlier sought official 
permission from the office of the Director-General of the Ghana Health Service (approval 
letter dated 18/02/2014) to use the NHIS-credentialed health care providers for the study. We 
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informed respondents that their participation in the study was optional, and their right to 
privacy was guaranteed with the signing of informed consent by both respondents and 
interviewer. 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Background characteristics of respondents 
One hundred and seventy-three (173) healthcare providers participated in the survey 
(representing 86.5% response rate) of which 50% (87) were females (Table 2).  
 
The average age of respondents was 44 years (SD=11.33). About 42% (72) of the 
respondents were in Ashanti region, and 70% (121) were in the urban setting. Forty percent 
(69) of the respondents occupied positions other than medical officer, medical assistant, and 
Nurse-in-charge. Sixty-five percent (133) of the respondents worked in quasi-government 
healthcare facilities and 78% (134) were in the hospital level settings. Respondents’ average 
age in practice was 11.18 years (SD=9.62). 
 
Healthcare providers’ preference for mechanism of payment 
Among the different type of payment methods used by the NHIA, a majority of healthcare 
providers preferred to be paid by G-DRG method, followed by capitation for all type of 
services, except for diagnostics (Figure 1: Provider preference for payment method by type of 
service).  Results of the analysis showed that healthcare providers’ preferred payment 
mechanism differed significantly (p<0.001) across all the different types of services by their 
region of residence (Table 3).  
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Table 2: Background characteristics of respondents 
Variable  Frequency 
(%) 
Age (years) 
<44 
44+ 
Mean=44.30; SD=11.33 
 
83 (48.0) 
90 (52.0) 
Gender 
Male  
Female  
 
86 (49.7) 
87 (50.3) 
Region 
Ashanti 
Volta 
Central  
 
72 (41.6) 
48 (27.7) 
53 (30.6) 
Setting 
Urban 
Rural 
 
121 (69.9) 
52 (30.1) 
Primary status at facility 
Medical officer 
Medical assistant 
Nurse-in-charge 
Other 
 
 
33 (19.2) 
21 (12.2) 
49 (28.5) 
70 (40.1) 
Years in practice 
<11 
11+ 
Mean=11.18;SD=9.62 
 
113 (65.3) 
60 (34.7) 
Facility ownership 
Quasi-government 
Mission 
Private 
 
65 (37.6) 
56 (32.4) 
52 (30.1) 
Facility type 
CHPS 
Health centre 
Clinic  
Maternity home 
Hospital  
 
7 (4.0) 
6 (3.5) 
21 (12.1) 
5 (2.9) 
134 (77.5) 
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Table 3: Healthcare providers’ preferred payment mechanism by region  
Region Fee-for-service GDRG  Capitation Total  X
2
 p-value  
Primary outpatient 
services 
      
Ashanti 20 (28.2)   18 (25.4) 33 (46.5)   71 (100.0) 40.48 <0.001 
Volta  7 (14.6) 38 (79.2) 3 (6.2)  48 (100.0)   
Central   17 (32.1) 18 (34.0) 18 (34.0) 53 (100.0)   
Non primary 
outpatient services 
      
Ashanti 21 (30.4) 21 (30.4) 27 (39.1) 69 (100.0) 39.30 <0.001 
Volta  6 (12.5) 38 (79.2) 4 (8.3) 48 (100.0)   
Central   20 (37.7) 16 (30.2) 17 (32.1) 53 (100.0)   
Inpatient services       
Ashanti 20 (28.2) 25 (35.2) 26 (36.6) 71 (100.0) 30.94 <0.001 
Volta  6 (12.5) 38 (79.2) 4 (8.3) 48 (100.0)   
Central   17 (33.3)  17 (33.3) 17 (33.3) 51 (100.0)   
Medicines       
Ashanti 22 (31.0) 26 (36.6) 23 (32.4) 71 (100.0) 29.75 <0.001 
Volta  6 (12.5) 37 (77.1) 5 (10.4) 48 (100.0)   
Central   17 (32.1) 15 (28.3) 21 (39.6) 53 (100.0)   
Emergencies       
Ashanti 21 (30.0) 33 (47.1) 16 (22.9) 70 (100.0) 29.45 <0.001 
Volta  6 (12.5) 39 (81.2) 3 (6.2) 48 (100.0)   
Central   13 (24.5) 19 (35.8) 21 (39.6) 53 (100.0)   
Diagnostics       
Ashanti 24 (33.8) 29 (40.8) 18 (25.4) 71 (100.0) 38.52 <0.001 
Volta  5 (10.4) 41 (85.4) 2 (4.2) 48 (100.0)   
Central   20 (37.7) 15 (28.3) 18 (34.0) 53 (100.0)   
 
 
Referral cases 
      
Ashanti 21 (29.6) 32 (45.1) 18 (25.4) 71 (100.0) 26.18 <0.001 
Volta  6 (12.5) 39 (81.2) 3 (6.2) 48 (100.0)   
Central   13 (24.5) 20 (37.7) 20 (37.7) 53 (100.0)   
IPD=Inpatient Department; OPD=Outpatient Department; G-DRG=Ghana Diagnosis Related 
Groupings 
 
 
It is obvious from the results that capitation is preferred, though weakly, in Ashanti and 
Central regions only, but not a preference in the Volta region.  
 
Relationship between healthcare providers’ characteristics and preferred payment 
mechanism for primary outpatient services 
Result of the bivariate analysis showed that healthcare providers’ preference for payment 
method for primary outpatient services differed significantly by their region of residence  
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(p<0.001) while their preferred payment method for primary outpatient services also show 
some association with the setting of healthcare providers’ facilities (p<0.053) (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Healthcare providers’ characteristics and preferred payment mechanism for 
primary outpatient services 
Variable  Fee-for-
service (%) 
GDRG 
(%) 
Capitation 
(%)  
Total (%) X
2
 p-value  
Age (years) 
<44 
44+ 
Mean=44.30; SD=11.33 
 
26 (31.3) 
18 (20.0) 
 
33 (39.8) 
41 (45.6) 
 
24 (28.9) 
31 (34.4) 
 
83 (100.0) 
90 (100.0) 
 
3.71 
 
0.295 
Gender 
Male  
Female  
 
17 (19.8) 
27 (31.0) 
 
41 (47.7) 
33 (37.9) 
 
27 (31.4) 
27 (31.0) 
 
86 (100.0) 
87 (100.0) 
 
4.13 
 
0.248 
Region 
Ashanti 
Volta 
Central  
 
20 (28.2) 
7 (14.6) 
17 (32.1) 
 
18 (25.4) 
38 (79.2) 
18 (34.0) 
 
33 (46.5) 
3 (6.2) 
18 (34.0) 
 
71 (100.0) 
48 (100.0) 
53 (100.0) 
 
40.48 
 
 
<0.001 
Setting 
Urban 
Rural 
 
37 (30.6) 
7 (13.5) 
 
49 (40.5) 
25 (48.1) 
 
35 (28.9) 
19 (36.5) 
 
121 (100.0) 
51 (100.0) 
 
7.68 
 
0.053 
Primary status at facility 
Medical officer 
Medical assistant 
Nurse-in-charge 
Other 
 
 
7 (21.2) 
2 (9.5)) 
12(24.5) 
22 (31.9) 
 
 
19 (57.6) 
11 (52.4) 
23 (46.9) 
21 (30.4) 
 
 
6 (18.2) 
8 (38.1) 
14 (28.6) 
26 (37.7) 
 
 
33 (100.0) 
21 (100.0) 
49 (100.0) 
69 (100.0) 
 
 
18.58 
 
 
0.099 
Years in practice 
<11 
11+ 
Mean=11.18;SD=9.62 
 
31 (27.4) 
13 (21.8) 
 
52 (46.0) 
22 (36.7) 
 
 
30 (26.6) 
24 (40.0) 
 
113 (100.0) 
60 (100.0) 
 
5.47 
 
0.141 
 
Facility ownership 
Quasi-government 
Mission 
Private 
 
 
 
14 (21.54) 
14 (25.0) 
16 (30.8) 
 
 
 
29 (44.6) 
23 (41.1) 
22 (42.3) 
 
 
 
22 (33.9) 
19 (33.9) 
13 (25.0) 
 
 
 
65 (100.0) 
56 (100.0) 
51 (100.0) 
 
 
 
4.31 
 
 
 
0.634 
Facility type 
CHPS 
Health centre 
Clinic  
Maternity home 
Hospital  
 
1 (14.3) 
1 (16.7) 
6 (28.9) 
2 (40.0) 
34 (25.4) 
 
3 (42.9) 
2 (33.3) 
7 (33.3) 
2 (40.0) 
60 (44.8) 
 
3 (42.9) 
3 (50.0) 
8 (38.1) 
1 (20.0) 
39 (29.1) 
 
7 (100.0) 
6 (100.0) 
21 (100.0) 
5 (100.0) 
134 (100.0) 
 
3.70 
 
0.988 
 
All the other background characteristics of the healthcare providers, however, showed no 
significant association with their choice of payment mechanism for primary outpatient 
services. 
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Table 5: Mean scores of twenty-one items capitation payment system in Ashanti region 
(n=73) 
Item 
 no.  
Performance statement  Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Std.  
Err. 
[95% CI] 
1 Capitation is a good way of eliminating provider 
shopping 
2.83 0.62 0.07 2.69-2.98 
2 Capitation has helped to minimize multiple 
attendances by NHIS subscribers 
2.78 0.58 0.07 2.64-2.92 
3 Capitation helps to minimize overcrowding of 
patients at health facilities 
2.36 0.95 0.11 2.14-2.59 
4 Capitation can create incentives for providers to 
reduce quantity of service 
2.32 1.00 0.12 2.08-2.56 
5 Capitation can help improve the referral system in 
healthcare delivery 
2.74 0.73 0.09 2.56-2.91 
6 Capitation will lead to continuity of care 2.72 0.67 0.08 2.56-2.88 
7 Capitation will encourage referrals of potentially 
primary care cases to higher levels of care 
2.57 0.81 0.10 2.38-2.76 
8 Capitation can create incentives for the prescriber to 
reduce the quality of service provided to the insured 
2.51 0.71 0.08 2.35-2.68 
9 Capitation has relieved us of the burden of OPD 
claims processing and submission 
2.07 1.07 0.13 1.82-2.32 
10 Capitation has helped to reduce our workload at the 
OPD. 
2.32 0.74 0.09 2.14-2.50 
11 Capitation is contributing to efficiency in service 
delivery 
2.19 1.01 0.12 1.96-2.43 
12 Capitation provides incentives for us to manage our 
resources efficiently 
2.36 1.02 0.12 2.12-2.60 
3 Capitation enables us to do efficient purchasing of 
items 
2.33 0.99 0.12 2.10-2.57 
14 Capitation will slow down growth in service 
utilization 
2.72 0.99 0.12 2.49-2.96 
15 Capitation can reduce NHIA’s expenditure on 
primary out-patients claims 
2.71 1.27 0.15 2.41-3.01 
16 Capitation has helped to eliminate the delayed 
reimbursement that is experienced under the G- 
DRG 
2.43 0.81 0.10 2.24-2.62 
17 Capitation provides a stable income for the provider 
because of the advance payment. 
2.51 0.87 0.10 2.31-2.72 
18 Capitation helps us to plan our cash flow better than 
before 
2.39 0.97 0.11 2.16-2.62 
19 The capitated rate is enough to cover the primary 
OPD expenses on the insured clients 
1.82 1.09 0.13 1.56-2.08 
20 Capitation will reduce the income of the provider 2.51 0.87 0.10 2.31-2.72 
21 Capitation will create incentive for the provider to 
pass on the extra cost of providing care to the 
insured client 
2.36 0.98 0.12 2.13-2.59 
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Ashanti region providers’ attitude towards capitation payment policy 
Results of analysis on the 21 performance statements on the capitation payment policy in the 
Ashanti region are summarized in Table 5.  
 
 
Respondents scored most of the statements halfway between “disagree” and “agree” on the 5-
point Likert scale. The performance statement “Capitation is a good way of eliminating 
provider shopping” was scored the highest, halfway between “disagree” and “agree” while 
“The capitated rate is enough to cover the primary OPD expenses on the insured clients”, 
was scored the lowest, halfway between “strongly disagree” and “disagree”. Results of the 
descriptive statistics also showed that respondents acknowledge that capitation will ensure 
continuity of care through referral system, slows down growth in utilization and reduce 
NHIA expenditure.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Healthcare providers’ preference for mechanism of payment and their attitude towards 
capitation payment method 
Different payment methods attract difference responses from providers [4] and provider 
perception of a payment method could influence their preference for a particular payment 
method. Finding from our study shows that the G-DRG payment method is the most 
preferred method for providers across the three regions. The data, however, show that the 
Volta region exhibited high consistency in their preference for the G-DRG and their dislike 
for the capitation and fee-for-service payment methods. In the Ashanti region, looking at the 
absolute proportions, capitation payment seems to be a preferred payment method for both 
primary and non-primary out-patients services as well as in-patients services. However, 
considering that all three payment methods scored below 50%, it could be said that providers 
in the region are indifferent towards any of the payment methods that may be used by the 
NHIA for re-imbursing their credentialed providers. The same inference may be made of the 
central region which exhibited similar trend in the analysis. The situation is, however, 
different in the Volta region where providers reject capitation as a payment method. By 
implication, one could conjecture that providers in the Volta region are more likely to resist 
the implementation of capitation payment in the region while those in Ashanti and Central 
regions are likely to accommodate its implementation. The reasons adduced for the initial 
resistance to the introduction of capitation payment in the Ashanti region, which attracted 
widespread, and to some extent, negative media reportage, may have negatively influenced 
the perception of providers in the Volta region to reject capitation as a payment method under 
the NHIS. The trend in Ashanti, therefore, seem to suggest that after resisting its introduction 
at the initial stage, providers in the region  may have later recognized and, therefore, come to 
terms with the positive attributes of capitation payment method. This may be said to have a 
reflection in the performance statements 1, 2, 5, 6, 14 and 15 (Refer to table 5) that were 
scored between 2.72 and 2.83 by health care providers. Earlier studies on the capitation 
implementation in the Ashanti region [11];[15] and [16] reported of fierce resistance to the 
capitation policy by medical professionals, civil society organizations and politicians 
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especially during the pre-implementation and early stages of implementations for what they 
perceived as its potential negative effect on primary care delivery. The initial resistance may 
be attributed to the reported lack of clarity in the minds of providers between the capitation 
payment and the G-DRG [17] and as reported in one of Ghana’s national newspapers, the 
chairman of the Society of Private Medical and Dental Practitioners (SPMDP) admitted that 
“lack of education caused the controversy and misunderstanding between the Society of 
Private Medical and Dental Practitioners in the region and the National Health Insurance 
Authority” (Ghana News Agency in The Daily Guide Newspaper of 01/12/2012). This is also 
confirmed by Dodoo who noted that stakeholder understanding of the capitation payment 
policy was generally low during pre-implementation and implementation periods which 
negatively affected their interest and position on the policy [18]; leading to the perception 
that the policy was detrimental to health care providers’ capacity to provide quality 
healthcare. The same can be deduced from a study by Koduah et al [16] who pointed out that 
the numerous perceived and real bureaucratic power which characterized the pre-
implementation and implementation stages of the pilot pushed the providers to assert their 
own powers to “contest and resist various aspects of the policy and its implementation 
arrangements” without recourse to the technical arguments that may be in favour of the 
capitation payment method. Another key reason for the initial resistance was the perception 
that the introduction of capitation payment policy in the Ashanti was politically motivated 
[11]; [16]; [19];[20] to induce a reduction in the quality of care in the region and thereby 
cause untimely deaths of potential voters who are perceived to be sympathizers of the then 
opposition New Patriotic Party. One may also not rule out the fact that the providers’ 
perceived low capitated rates contributed to the initial resistance as reported by Dodoo [18] 
and Opoku et al [21]. Providers felt that the per capita rate was low [16], non- risk adjusted 
[22]; [16]  and lacked clarity on how the per capita rates were calculated [16];[20]. Another 
plausible reason for the initial resistance was that providers perceive capitation as exposing 
their facilities to financial risk [15]; [21]; [22] as may also be inferred from performance 
statement 19 (table 5) that was scored about the lowest (1.8) by the health care providers. It 
is, therefore, plausible to also attribute the change in attitude of providers to speculation 
among the public that providers may have identified weaknesses in the design and 
implementation arrangements and are, therefore, taking advantage to “game” the system. The 
latter calls for concern and the NHIA may have to critically study the system and improve on 
the implementation process to avert any such attitude of providers, if indeed the speculation 
holds water.  
 
Strengths and limitations 
Our study stakes its strength from its design as survey design is relatively suitable for the 
collection of substantial data on socio-demographics, perception, attitude and behaviour of 
large samples for analysis and widely used in areas such as health and social sciences. 
Although it falls short of the advantages that survey has in terms of versatility as well as 
technical, temporal and financial feasibility, considering the relatively large sample that was 
required for this study. We, however, acknowledge some limitations and one such limitation 
the lack of qualitative in-depth interviews which could have provide opportunity to probe 
further into respondents’ responses to better understand the reasons for their preference of 
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payment method. Another limitation is the comparison among the three regions with some 
background differences. We, however, also acknowledge the similarities in the demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics of the two control regions as well as the similarities in the 
NHIS/health service data across the three regions which allows for a reasonable level of 
comparison among the three regions. Findings of the study therefore provide valuable input 
to enrich the re-design of the capitation payment policy for a smooth implementation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to explore provider preference for payment method under a national health 
insurance scheme in Ghana with the view to contributing to the debate on whether or not to 
migrate from pilot to full-scale implementation of the capitation payment method that 
attracted resistance of providers through the leadership of their professional associations. 
Findings from our analysis suggest that, in general, health care providers prefer the G-DRG 
that was introduced in 2008 to capitation and fee-for-service payment methods. However, the 
individual level analysis suggests that whereas providers in the Volta region strongly reject 
capitation as payment method, those in the Ashanti and Central regions seem indifferent with 
their preference for payment method. We, therefore, conclude that with more education on 
the positive attributes of capitation payment method and active involvement of healthcare 
providers in the design, development and implementation of the policy, capitation payment 
could be an acceptable payment method for primary care services in Ghana’s health delivery 
system. 
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Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003. Initially, the National 
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) paid its credentialed providers by Fee-For-Service (FFS) 
method but had to switch to Diagnosis-Related-Grouping (DRG-based) payment due to abuse 
of the system such as supplier-induced demand for services. Years into the implementation of 
DRG payment, the NHIA observed that the abuse of the system still persists. The NHIA 
decided to further reform its provider payment system with the introduction of capitation 
payment beginning with a pilot in the Ashanti region of Ghana.  The main objective for the 
capitation payment mechanism is to contain cost while ensuring quality of service provided 
to insured clients, including prevention and continuity of care. However, following the 
decision to introduce capitation as provider payment for primary out-patient care, concerns 
were expressed about its negative effects on service provision. These concerns reflect the 
theoretical  effects of capitation on primary care delivery [1] [2].  
 
The NHIA, however, believes that notwithstanding the weaknesses of capitation payment, 
applying it to primary outpatient care will help address the cost escalation, especially from 
OPD services.  Learning from the experiences with the implementation of fee-for-service and 
G-DRG payment methods, the NHIA decided to implement capitation in a step-wise manner 
in order to learn lessons to guide strategies for countrywide scale up. This study was, 
therefore, designed to assess the implementation of the capitation payment to determine 
whether or not capitation payment achieved the objective for which it was introduced and to 
identify any un-intended effects it may have on primary care delivery. Findings of the study 
are intended to provide guidance for the NHIA should it roll out the implementation nation-
wide. This thesis is, thus, a collection of research articles, both published and unpublished, 
from the study conducted between 2013 and 2017 in three regions of Ghana: Ashanti as an 
intervention region and Central and Volta as control regions. This chapter provides a general 
discussion of the key issues at the centre of the study and presents general conclusions and 
recommendations for the attention of Ghana’s health policy makers in particular, and those of 
other low/middle-income countries, that may be considering implementing capitation 
payments in their health system. 
  
The chapter is organised along the key research questions presented in chapter one and ends 
with general limitations of the study, general conclusion and recommendations for policy and 
research.  
 
Chapter 2: International experience of capitation payment for primary care 
Chapter two of the thesis answers specific research question one: what international 
experience of capitation implementation exists in literature and what lessons can Ghana 
learn from such experience? It presents findings of a narrative review of the literature on 
effects of capitation payment for primary care by analyzing and synthesizing available 
international experiences and information on the motivation for, and effects of using 
capitation as provider payment method in country health systems. Health systems, 
irrespective of where they are located, should target at providing the right care at the right 
place by the right person to all users of health care services at the right time. This puts a lot of 
responsibility on health policy makers to ensure that their citizens enjoy the maximum benefit 
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from the right kind of health care services at all times. However, since no country has 
unlimited resources to invest in their health systems, health policy makers equally have the 
responsibility to ensure that the limited health care resources available to them are utilized in 
most efficient manner in order to obtain the maximum health outcomes from such 
investments. Efficient management of limited health care resources also implies that health 
policy makers pay attention to their purchasing arrangement with care providers while paying 
critical attention to quality.  Capitation payment for primary care has been found to be more 
efficient compared to other forms of payments and leads to more prevention. It is one way 
health care purchasers, especially those in low/middle-income countries, including Ghana, 
could reimburse health care providers within the health resource constraints in which they 
find themselves. In the review, we noted that reform of provider payment methods in 
countries health systems is driven by efficiency considerations and aimed at holding down 
cost of health care services without compromising quality of care [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. The 
review further revealed that a major area of focus in  provider payment reform is the 
introduction of capitation payment for primary care [8], [9].  The main objective for 
introducing capitation payment in Ghana, which is, among others, to improve efficiency in 
health care delivery and to drive down cost of health care delivery without compromising 
quality is, therefore, consistent with existing literature.  
One of NHIA’s expectations in relation to positive effects of capitation implementation in 
Ghana was slowed growth in utilization and cost of health care services while maintaining the 
quality of care provided. Consistent with this expectation, evidence on cost of health care 
services under capitation payment shows some cost reduction in care delivery. [10], [11]. 
With regard to quality of care, evidence from the review has shown that capitation payment 
encourages better standardization of care, improvement in clinical outcomes and increased 
adherence to policies and general guidelines. It further shows that there could be no decrease 
in the quality of care provided under capitation payment [12], and that capitation payment 
encourages the provision of health education to patients[13] in order to prevent disease and 
illness. It also encourages providers to work efficiently compared to other payment methods 
[14]; [11]. Notwithstanding these positive effects of capitation, the review, however, 
identified some negative effects in relation to quantity and quality of care as well as patients-
provider trust relationship [2], [15], [16]
,, 
[17]. Other negative effects of capitation payment 
relate to the behaviour of referring potentially primary care cases to higher levels [18], [19], 
[20]. Such behaviour undermines the cost-containment objective of capitation payment since 
potential low cost that would have been borne at the primary care level is pushed to higher 
levels at higher cost thereby increasing the overall cost burden on the entire health system. 
The NHIA would, therefore, have to strengthen its post-credentialing monitoring and clinical 
audit systems to minimize, if not eliminate, this behaviour. While the positive experiences of 
capitation payment should motivate health policy makers in Ghana to invest time and efforts 
in the capitation implementation process to secure its utmost benefit for the population, it 
should be noted that the cost reduction, for instance, found in literature was in the area of 
pharmaceutical products and diagnostics and, therefore, Ghana may want to consider 
including payments for pharmaceutical products in the capitated basket of services and 
products in order to obtain the utmost benefits from the capitation payment method. It must 
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also be noted that the review showed little experience of capitation payment in low and 
middle-income countries and therefore the capitation experience found in this narrative 
review can only serve as illustrative evidence for Ghana and other low/middle-income 
countries that may be considering capitation as payment method for primary care.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4: Effects of capitation payment on utilization and cost, and on 
membership enrolment and retention 
 
Utilization and cost (chapter 3) 
Chapter three deals with specific research question two: what effects does capitation payment 
method have on primary out-patients utilization and related claims expenditure in Ghana? 
After experiencing frivolous use of health care services by insured clients under the NHIS 
and the consequential increase in cost of health care services, the NHIA decided to introduce 
capitation payment for primary care. A major aim for the introduction of capitation payment 
for primary care services was to hold down growth in total health care expenditure by 
controlling outpatient’s utilization. Our study, thus, sought to determine whether the objective 
of controlling cost through the use of capitation payment could be achieved. Findings of the 
study revealed that although outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased in 
both pre and post capitation periods, the rate of increase after the introduction of capitation 
payment was slower than that of pre-capitation period, corroborating findings of other 
studies[15],[10], [11]; and suggesting that some positive results were experienced under the 
capitation payment method. It must, however, be acknowledged that unlike other country 
experiences, the basket of services under Ghana’s capitation payment method was split into 
“primary” and “non-primary” outpatients services and, therefore, with the combination of 
DRG and capitation payment at the general OPD in the Ghana situation, it is plausible that 
potentially primary outpatient services are shifted to the “none-primary outpatients” services 
and claims made on the latter, which cost the NHIA more than the actual cost of the real 
services rendered. NHIA may, therefore, want to consider a single capitated package at the 
primary care for outpatients’ services to avoid this trend and to minimize cost at the primary 
care level. 
   
Membership retention (chapter 4) 
Chapter four addresses specific research question three: does capitation payment affect 
membership enrolment and retention among members of the Ghana national health 
insurance scheme? This research question was borne out of an argument put forward by 
opponents of the capitation payment in Ghana that the payment method would lead to erosion 
of confidence in the NHIS. Consequently members of the Scheme will not be motivated to 
renew their membership when it expires while potential members will also not enroll onto the 
Scheme. In order to contribute to the debate, chapter four sought to examine the membership 
enrollment trend to determine whether capitation payment had a negative effect on 
membership enrollment and retention in the Scheme. Our analysis revealed that all the three 
regions experienced negative growth in both the new enrolment and renewal categories at one 
point or the other within the period 2010–2014, corroborating findings of a study in Senegal 
[21]. Looking at the data from the overall effect, however, there is an indication that 
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capitation payment had some negative effect on membership enrolment and retention in 
Ashanti region compared with the Volta region. However, the effect was small and could not 
be sustained beyond 2012. It could, therefore, be argued that other factors, as have been 
identified in literature [22], [23],[24],[25],[26], might have contributed significantly to the 
drop in membership growth rates in the Ashanti region. This argument is supported by results 
of individual in-depth interviews conducted as part of the study and which indicate that apart 
from the discomfort that respondents expressed with capitation payment and its preferred 
primary care provider (PPP) arrangement, which is also consistent with findings by Pereira et 
al [27], other factors are more important than capitation in people’s decision to enroll or 
renew their membership with the NHIS.  
 
Chapters 5-7: Members and providers’ attitude towards the capitation payment policy 
and their perception of quality care delivery 
Chapters five, six and seven collectively respond to specific research question four: what is 
the attitude of Ghanaian insurance card-bearing members and credentialed service providers 
towards the capitation payment policy and their perception of quality care delivery? The 
onset of capitation implementation in the Ashanti region of Ghana was characterized by 
policy debate between the leadership of the Association of Private Medical and Dental 
Practitioners and civil society groups on the one hand; and leadership of NHIA and policy 
makers on the other hand. The debate was centred on the perceived negative effects of 
capitation payment on health care delivery under the capitation payment dispensation [28]. 
Frontline health care providers and insured clients who experience the realities of the health 
care delivery system on daily basis never had the opportunity to express their views on the 
issue. Meanwhile, the literature has it that patients’ perception of service quality is an 
important aspect of quality assessment of health care because of the relationship between 
health care utilization and user perception of quality [29], [30]. It is also noted that even 
though patients’ perception of quality may not necessarily reflect the technical quality, 
knowing patients’ perception of quality could help improve quality care delivery [31]. 
Chapters five, six and seven of our thesis, thus, provide the views of the frontline health care 
providers and the insured members through findings of our study that explored the perception 
of both providers and clients about the quality of care provided under the capitation payment 
regime and by examining the attitude of NHIS members towards capitation payment under 
the national health insurance scheme.  
 
Quality perception (chapter 5) 
Chapter five specifically assesses NHIS subscribers and care providers’ perception of quality 
of care under the capitation payment policy. In general, findings from the quality perception 
study show that both users of health care services and their providers have relatively good 
perception of the quality of health care delivered. That notwithstanding, the study found that 
subscribers in the Central region were more positive about the quality of care than those in 
the Ashanti region whilst those in the Volta region were slightly less positive than those in 
the Ashanti region. It was significant to note that client perception of quality health care is 
associated with their characteristics, including geographical location and income 
levels[32],[33], [34], [35], [36], [37]. Therefore, our findings, supported by findings from 
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these studies, demonstrate that region of residence is a factor that influences subscribers 
perception of quality of care under the capitation payment policy in the Ashanti region. The 
higher quality perception rate by respondents in Central region over that of Ashanti region 
supports findings of a study by Amo-Adjei et al [28] and is also consistent with  findings 
from similar studies in Ghana [38], [39] and  Iraq [40] but at variance with those of other 
studies from Tanzania [41], Korea [42] and Ghana [28].  
 
On the health provider side, a substantial proportion of NHIS-credentialed providers 
expressed good perception of quality of care they deliver to patients, but unlike the 
subscribers, their perception differs significantly by region. Care providers in the Volta 
region were less likely to rate their perception of quality of care as good compared to those in 
the Ashanti region. This trend, however, is contrary to expectation that providers in Ashanti 
would express relatively lower perception of quality considering the health care providers 
associations’ agitations that heralded the introduction of capitation payment in the Ashanti 
region. Next to the negative media rapportage on capitation experience in the Ashanti that 
may have caused uncertainty about the positive attributes of capitation payment, this regional 
differences in quality perception may also have partially been influenced by the inequitable 
distribution of health care infrastructure and personnel in the country. It would, however, be 
important to probe further to understand whether type of health care facility could be a 
plausible reason for the low quality perception of care providers in the Volta region. This is 
because, one variable that showed significant difference among providers was type of health 
care facility that care providers operate as health care providers working in hospital level 
facilities were significantly more likely to perceive the quality of care as good compared to 
those working at the health centre levels. On the international front, whereas the differences 
in quality perception between Ghana and Korea may be attributed to the level of development 
in these two countries, considering that Korea’s health care system is much more advanced 
than that of Ghana, the differences in perception among different studies from Ghana and 
between those of Ghana and Tanzania may be attributed to the respective study settings.  
 
Provider-patient trust relationship (chapter 6) 
In our literature review, we found that capitation payment had some effect on provider-
patient trust relationship. These were studies conducted in high income countries. In order to 
determine whether the phenomenon could manifest itself in Ghana and for that matter 
low/middle-income country, we devoted chapter six to a study that determined whether 
capitation payment affected insured-patients’ trust relationship with their care providers; and 
their trust in the National Health Insurance Scheme in general during the period of capitation 
payment implementation. Our study did not establish significant negative findings on 
subscriber trust in their primary care providers, a finding that is consistent with those of Hall 
et al [43] and Pereira et al [27]. We rather found a high level of trust in the care provider as 
reflected in the level of satisfaction that respondents expressed by rating their health 
providers highly and showing little intention to  switch provider, their willingness to renew 
their membership card upon expiry and willingness recommend the NHIS to others.  
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One may, however, argue that Ghanaians, especially the poor and needy, do not have any 
better choice than the National Health Insurance Scheme and, therefore would want to remain 
active members of the Scheme. It is also worth noting that only a fifth of respondents rated 
capitation payment and, therefore, one may wonder whether the poor response to the rating of 
capitation payment could not mean a silent protest against it. This conjecture is premised on 
the fact that many Ghanaians have a culture of not willing to openly speak to issues about 
which they have reservations or those with which they are not comfortable. Amidst the 
positive results, one emerging trend that seems disturbing to the district health delivery 
system in Ghana under capitation payment, however, is the threat of crowding out lower level 
facilities by those of district hospital level as majority of respondents selected facilities that 
are of district hospital status and clinics where they perceive to have access to better qualified 
health personnel to manage their health conditions. Policy makers may therefore want to 
apply geographic capitation to the lower levels of care and assign all active members of the 
Scheme that live within their catchment areas to those facilities as their first point of call for 
health care services. They could then be referred to the next higher level of care if need be. 
Such an arrangement will also help strengthen primary health care and the referral system in 
the country. 
 
Provider preference for payment method (chapter 7) 
One way of determining the attitude of health care providers towards the capitation payment 
method was to do a study of provider preference for payment method under the NHIS. This 
was deemed important because different payment methods attract different responses from 
providers and provider perception of a payment method could influence their preference for a 
particular payment method. Findings from our study show that the G-DRG payment method 
is the most preferred method for providers across the three regions. The data, however, show 
that Volta region exhibited high consistency with their preference for the G-DRG and their 
dislike for capitation and fee-for-service payment methods. In Ashanti region, looking at the 
absolute proportions, capitation payment seems to be a preferred payment method for both 
primary and non-primary out-patients services as well as in-patients services, which is an 
indication of a positive attitude of Ashanti providers towards the capitation payment method. 
However, considering that all three payment methods scored below 50%, it could be said that 
providers in the region are indifferent towards any of the payment methods that may be used 
by the NHIA for re-imbursing their credentialed providers. Thus, findings from our study 
may suggest that the initial resistance in the Ashanti region is attributable to the reported lack 
of clarity in the minds of providers between the capitation payment and the G-DRG[44],[45] 
and the perception that the introduction of capitation payment policy in Ashanti was 
politically motivated [46],[47],[48] to induce a reduction in the quality of care in the region 
which is tagged as the then opposition New Patriotic Party’s political stronghold. Other 
plausible reason was that  providers perceived the capitated rates to be on the low side [45],  
[49]. The trend in Ashanti, therefore, seem to suggest that after resisting its introduction at the 
initial stage, providers in the region  may have later recognized and, therefore, come to terms 
with the positive attributes of capitation payment method. The situation is, however, different 
in the Volta region where providers exhibited negative attitude towards capitation payment 
method by rejecting it. By implication, one could conjecture that providers in the Volta 
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region are more likely to resist the implementation of capitation payment in the region while 
those in Ashanti and Central regions are likely to accommodate its implementation. The 
reasons adduced for the initial resistance to the introduction of capitation payment in the 
Ashanti region, which attracted widespread, and to some extent, negative media reportage, 
may have negatively influenced the perception of providers in the Volta region to reject 
capitation as a payment method under the NHIS.  
 
 Limitations of the study 
The literature review 
The review was limited to publications in English while the number of articles included in the 
final analysis was limited to eleven articles out of which nine are set in high income countries 
with different health system and context from those of LMICs. Besides, the context in Ghana 
and other LMICs does not compare favorably with that of the countries from which the 
articles were retrieved for the study. However, since the aim was to look for illustrative 
evidence for adaption to Ghana’s specific situation, insights from the review bring relevant 
lessons to Ghana’s NHIA and health insurance agencies in other low and middle-income 
countries that are considering capitation as payment method for primary out-patient care.  
 
Administrative dataset 
One limitation with the administrative dataset used for our study is the missing values that 
were detected during data cleaning but that was only one type of variable and of one or two 
years per district. In order to reduce the effect, however, a scatter plot was made for that 
particular district and type of utilization or costs over the entire time period. A linear 
regression line with intercept and slope was used to estimate the missing value. Another 
limitation was the relatively short period that the administrative data (2010–2014) and this 
also applies to the membership dataset used in the analysis of membership enrolment and 
retention. Another limitation is that the capitation pilot was started in 2012 and thus, the time 
period of analysis after capitation is no more than three years. That notwithstanding, since the 
dataset is derived from all the districts in both the intervention and control regions, the 
results, as presented, provide a reasonably rapid appraisal of the capitation payment policy in 
the pilot region. It also provides a quick overview of important insights into motivations for 
enrolment and renewal decisions; and, therefore, could serve as prospective evaluation results 
to guide policy makers on the way forward, having decided to implement the policy across 
the country.  
  
Survey data/design 
Our study takes its strength from its design since survey design is relatively suitable for the 
collection of substantial data on socio-demographics, perception, attitude and behaviour of 
large samples for quantitative analysis. We, however, acknowledge as limitation that it 
missed out on the strengths of qualitative study which would have allowed for further probing 
into the responses of respondents to better understand the reasons for respondents’ responses 
to the questionnaires administered for enhanced discussion of findings. Another limitation is 
the disproportionate balance in representation between male and female respondents. It is, 
however, common in Ghana for more females than males to access health care services and 
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that their opinion about the capitation payment could provide a reasonable reflection of the 
situation. Yet another limitation may be seen from the study design which is cross-sectional 
instead of an initially planned step-wedged design before-after study as originally envisaged, 
but which was thwarted due to delayed roll-out of capitation. 
 
The acknowledged limitations notwithstanding, since the subject under study is a policy that 
is intended to be rolled out across the country, what this study sought to do was to identify 
issues that need attention of policy makers to improve on the implementation process. 
Findings from the study, thus, provide valuable insight that can aid the debate surrounding 
the capitation payment policy in Ghana and elsewhere, and also provide valuable input to 
enrich the re-design of the capitation.   
 
Conclusion  
We conclude from findings of our review of the literature that there is no perfect payment 
method in health care delivery. Each payment method has its strengths and weaknesses and 
different payment methods and incentives produce different effects in different contexts. 
Governments should, however, do their utmost best to guarantee the optimal response to the 
needs of patients. We further conclude that whereas capitation payment has a positive effect 
of slowing down growth in claims expenditure thereby meeting the expectation of the NHIA; 
it also had a small negative but unsustainable effect on membership enrolment and retention 
in Ashanti region. Drawing on the findings from our survey, we conclude that capitation 
payment as a policy, is not a significant factor in NHIS members’ enrolment and renewal 
decision. We further conclude that health insurance subscribers are guided by proximity and 
quality of care considerations in their choice of provider and that a majority of respondents 
have high trust in their primary care provider giving them quality care under capitation 
payment despite their negative attitude towards capitation payment. With regard to quality 
perception, we conclude that both providers and subscribers have relatively good perception 
of quality of care under the capitation payment method. Findings from our analysis of the 
provider preference study suggest that, in general, health care providers prefer the G-DRG 
that was introduced in 2008 to capitation and fee-for-service payment methods. However, the 
regional level analysis suggests that whereas providers in the Volta region strongly reject 
capitation as payment method, those in the Ashanti and Central regions seem indifferent with 
their preference for payment method.  
 
We, finally, conclude that with more education on the positive attributes of capitation 
payment method and active involvement of healthcare providers in the design, development 
and implementation of the policy, capitation payment could be an acceptable payment 
method for primary care services in Ghana’s health delivery system. 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. Policy and practice:  
Firstly, policy implications from the review suggest that policy makers in Ghana and other 
low/middle-income countries would have to consider adapting the positive experiences of 
146 
 
payment reforms noted in literature to their country specific context while being cautioned of 
the negative effects and coveting them into opportunities for improvement. They would also 
have to appreciate the need for a mix of payment methods to leverage the positive incentives 
of each of them and mitigate their negative effects since there is no provider payment method 
that is a panacea to the rising health care cost. 
 
Secondly, we noted that capitation payment method achieved some positive effect on 
utilization and claims expenditure while its effect on membership retention was minimal and 
unsustainable beyond the year of its introduction. Therefore, we recommend that Ghana 
scales up the capitation payment implementation nationwide. We, however, recommend to 
NHIA to consider re-designing the capitation payment method taking into consideration the 
need to develop a single capitated package at the primary care for outpatients’ services to 
avoid gaming of the system by service providers and to minimize cost at the primary care 
level before rolling it out nationwide. We further recommend to NHIA to apply the 
“geographic” capitation system to the lower level facilities by making it possible for all active 
members in a particular catchment area of those facilities to access them as their first point of 
call and be referred to higher levels of care if need be.  
 
Thirdly, finding from the quality perception study suggests that healthcare providers have 
good interactions with their clients during healthcare delivery and this should encourage the 
NHIA to integrate non-technical quality care indicators into its mainstream post credentialing 
monitoring tools used for their routine monitoring of health care providers in order to 
promote client-centered quality care improvement alongside the technical quality care 
standards.  
 
Fourthly, whereas findings relating to subscriber trust in their primary care provider provide 
potential support for the scaling up of capitation payment in Ghana, the NHIA would, none 
the less, have to address itself to the negative perceptions of subscribers about the capitation 
payment policy. This would require the NHIA to invest in adequate knowledge and 
communication training of NHIS managers, especially those at the district level, concerning 
capitation so as to foster a more balanced public opinion on the issue. 
 
2. Further research 
Firstly, we recommend to the Ministry of Health and its relevant agencies, in particular the 
Ghana Health Service and the National Health Insurance Authority, to undertake studies on 
costing of health care services in order to provide realistic and evidence-based information 
for the development of system-wide provider payment systems. Such an intervention could 
help address the issue of whether or not the capitated rate is adequate. Secondly, we 
recommend a longitudinal study of the utilization and claims data to better appreciate the real 
effect of capitation payment on cost of primary care services. Finally, we recommend to the 
Ministry of Health to consider monitoring progress towards the achievement of universal 
health coverage in Ghana. 
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Summary of thesis 
 
Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme in 2003 to provide financial access to 
health care service and has since achieved 35% population coverage. The Scheme is faced 
with challenges, notably, cost escalation partly due to both demand-side and supply-side 
moral hazards. Committed to address these challenges, the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA) is implementing measures, including provider payment reforms with the 
introduction of capitation as payment mechanism for primary out-patient services. This study, 
thus, aimed to shed light on whether the capitation payment mechanism contributed to 
reduction in primary out-patient utilization and related cost to the NHIS. The scope of study 
was limited to the cost containment objective and the effects on provider and subscriber 
attitude towards the payment method and their perception of quality care delivery. Main 
research question was: Does capitation payment method affect health care utilization and 
related claims expenditure of the NHIS; and quality health care delivery under Ghana’s 
national health insurance scheme? Specific research questions were:   
1. What international experience of capitation implementation exists in literature and 
what lessons can Ghana learn from such experience? 
2. What effects does capitation payment method have on primary out-patients 
utilization and related claims expenditure in Ghana? 
3. Does capitation payment affect membership enrolment and retention among 
members of the Ghana national health insurance scheme? 
4. What is the attitude of Ghanaian insurance card-bearing members and credentialed 
service providers towards the capitation payment policy and their perception of 
quality care delivery?  
Next to the introductory chapter, chapter two of the thesis addresses research question one by 
presenting findings of a narrative review of the literature on effects of capitation payment for 
primary care. Chapters 3 and 4 addressed research questions two and three by assessing the 
effects of capitation payment on utilization and claims expenditure and on enrolment, 
membership retention among NHIS members. Chapters 5 to 7 address research questions four 
and five by exploring the perception of both providers and clients about the quality of care 
provided under the capitation payment regime and by examining the attitude of NHIS 
members towards capitation payment under the national health insurance scheme. Finally in 
chapter 8, findings of the study are discussed and recommendations made for the benefit of 
policy makers in Ghana and beyond. 
 
Chapter 2: Effects of capitation payment on primary care 
Background: Ghana commits to reform its provider payment mechanism by introducing 
capitation payment for primary care. However, since provider payment mechanisms elicit 
specific responses from providers and subscribers/patients such reform should be guided by 
empirical evidence to minimize possible challenges. This paper seeks to analyse and 
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synthesize available international experiences and information on the motivation for, and 
effects of capitation payment method on country health systems.   
Methods: We did narrative review and synthesis of the literature on the effects of capitation 
payment on primary care.  
Results.  Eleven articles were reviewed. Capitation payment encourages efficiency: drives 
down cost, serves as critical source of income for providers, promotes adherence to 
guidelines and policies, encourages providers to work better and give health education to 
patients. It, however, induces reduction in the quantity and quality of care provided and 
encourages skimming on inputs, underserving of patients in bad state of health, “dumping” of 
high risk patients and negatively affect patient-provider relationship.    
Conclusion: The illustrative evidence adduced from the review demonstrates that capitation 
payment in primary care can create positive incentives but could also elicit un-intended 
effects. However, due to differences in country context, policy makers in Ghana and other 
low/middle-income countries may only be guided by the illustrative evidence in their design 
of a context-specific capitation payment for primary care.  
 
Chapter 3: Effect of capitation on health insurance claims expenditure in Ghana. 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment under the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) with the objective of controlling utilization and related claims expenditure. 
This study sought to analyze the utilization and claims expenditure data before and after 
capitation payment to understand whether the intended objective was achieved.  
Methods: The study was cross-sectional, comparing utilization and claims expenditure data 
from three administrative regions of Ghana, namely Ashanti (intervention) region with those 
from two control regions, Central and Volta over a 5-year period. We did trend analysis of 
the data and performed multivariate analysis to determine differences in utilization and 
claims expenditure between the intervention and control regions, and the effect of capitation 
on utilization and claims expenditure in the Ashanti region. We examined socio-demographic 
factors that influence health care utilization and claims expenditure in the three regions.  
Results: Findings indicate that growth in outpatient utilization and claims expenditure 
increased in the pre capitation period but slowed in post capitation period in the intervention 
region. There were significant differences in outpatient utilization (p=0.0041) and claims 
expenditure (p=0.0009) between the intervention and the control regions before 
implementation of the capitation payment. However, no significant differences were observed 
after the introduction of capitation payment. A difference-in-differences analysis showed that 
capitation payment had a negative effect on utilization (p<0.000) and claims expenditure 
(p<0.000) in the intervention region. A multivariate regression analysis showed that 
availability of primary hospitals was significant predictor of health care utilization and claims 
expenditure.  
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Conclusion: We conclude that outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased 
in both pre and post capitation periods, but the increase in post capitation period was at 
slower rate, suggesting that implementation of capitation payment yielded some positive 
results.  
 
Chapter 4: Capitation payment method and health insurance membership retention in 
Ghana. 
Background: Ghana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 
applying fee-for-service method for paying NHIS-credentialed health care providers. The 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) later introduced diagnosis-related-grouping 
(DRG) payment to contain cost without much success. The NHIA then introduced capitation 
payment, a decision that attracted complaints of falling enrolment and renewal rates from 
stakeholders. This study was done to provide evidence on this trend to guide policy debate on 
the issue.  
Methods: We applied mixed method design to the study. We did a 5-year trend analysis of 
NHIS membership data in Ashanti, Volta and Central regions to assess growth rate and 
performed independent-sample t-test to compare sample means of the three regions. We also 
analyzed data from qualitative interviews, using Atlas-ti, to understand any relationship 
between capitation and subscribers’ renewal decision. 
Results: Analysis of membership renewal data showed no significant differences in mean 
growth rates between Ashanti (M = 65.47, SE 6.67) and Volta (M = 69.29, SE 5.04), p 
=0.660; r = 0.03; and between Ashanti and Central (M=50.51, SE 9.49), p = 0.233. Results of 
new enrolment data analysis, however, showed differences in mean growth rates between 
Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) and Volta (M = 40.72, SE 3.10), p =0.041; r = 0. 15; and 
between Ashanti and Central (M=47.38, SE6.49) p = 0.043; r=0. 42. Analysis of both new 
enrolment and renewal data also showed no significant differences in mean growth rates 
between Ashanti (M = -13.76, SE 17.68) and Volta (M = 5.48, SE 5.50), p =0.329; and 
between Ashanti and Central (M= -6.47, SE 12.68), p = 0.746. However, capitation payment 
had some effect in Ashanti compared with Volta    (r = 0. 12) and Central (r = 0. 14); but 
could not be sustained beyond 2012. Responses from the in-depth interviews did not also 
show that capitation payment is a key factor in subscribers’ renewal decision. 
Conclusion: Capitation payment had a small but unsustainable effect on membership growth 
rate in the Ashanti region. Factors other than capitation may have played a more significant 
role in subscribers’ enrolment and renewal decisions in the NHIS.  
 
Chapter 5: Perception of quality health care delivery under capitation payment: a cross-
sectional survey of health insurance subscribers and providers in Ghana 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with 
resistance for its perceived poor quality of care. This paper assesses National Health 
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Insurance Scheme subscribers and care providers’ perception of quality of care under the 
capitation payment method.  
 
Methods: This was a policy intervention study administered through a cross-sectional survey 
of subscribers and care providers perception of quality of care in three administrative regions 
of Ghana using a 5-point Likert scale for the assessment based on a set of quality of care 
measures. We performed descriptive analysis to determine average perception of quality of 
care scores for each of the measures used. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were also 
performed to examine relationships between respondent’s characteristics and their perception 
of quality of care.  
 
Results: In general, subscribers expressed relatively positive perception about the quality of 
care. Analysis of health care providers’ responses showed significant differences in their 
perception of quality of care by region (p<0.001) and by facility type (p=0.019). Multivariate 
logistic regression showed that health care providers in the Volta region (OR=0.14, 95% CI: 
0.03-0.58) and Central region (OR=0.98, 95% CI: 0.21-4.43) were less likely to perceive 
quality of care as good compared to those in the Ashanti region. A bivariate analysis showed 
significant differences in subscribers’ perception of quality of care by occupation (p=0.003), 
length of NHIS membership (p=0.008), and age (p=0.034). Multivariate analysis also showed 
that factors, other than region of residence, were significantly associated with perceived good 
quality of care.  
 
Conclusion 
Findings from the study show that even though both subscribers and care providers across the 
three regions have relatively positive perception of quality of health care in general, 
respondents in the Ashanti region were more negative about the quality of care in the region, 
plausibly due to capitation implementation. We, therefore, conclude that capitation payment, 
as a policy, seem to have negatively influenced people’s perception of quality of care in the 
Ashanti region.   
 
Chapter 6: Does capitation payment under national health insurance affect subscribers’ 
trust in their primary care provider? a cross-sectional survey of  insurance subscribers 
in Ghana.  
 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment for primary care in 2012 with the view 
to containing escalating claims expenditure. This shift in provider payment method raised 
issues about its potential impact on patient-provider trust relationship and insured-patients’ 
trust in the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme. This paper presents findings of a study 
that explored insured-patients’ perception about, and attitude towards capitation payment in 
Ghana; and determined whether capitation payment affect insured-patients’ trust in their 
preferred primary care provider and the National Health Insurance Scheme in general.  
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Methods We adopted a survey design for the study. We administered closed-ended 
questionnaires to collect data from insurance card-bearing members aged 18 years and above. 
We performed both descriptive statistics to determine proportions of observations relating to 
the variables of interest and chi-square test statistics to determine differences within gender 
and setting.  
 
Results: Sixty-nine per cent (69%) out of 344 of respondents selected hospital level of care 
as their primary care provider. The two most important motivations for the choice of a 
provider were proximity in terms of geographical access (40%) and perceived quality of care 
(38%). Eighty-eight per cent (88%) rated their trust in their provider as (very) high. Eighty-
two per cent (82%) actively selected their providers. Eighty-eight per cent (88%) had no 
intention to switch provider. A majority (91%) would renew their membership when it 
expires. Female respondents (91%; n=281) were more likely to renew their membership than 
males (87%; n=63). Notwithstanding capitation payment experience, 81% of respondents 
would recommend to their peers to enrol with the NHIS with rural dwellers (87%; n=156) 
being more likely to do so than urban dwellers (76%; n=188). Almost all respondents (92%) 
rated the NHIS as (very) good.  
 
Conclusion: Health Insurance subscribers in Ghana have high trust in their primary care 
provider giving them quality care under capitation payment despite their negative attitude 
towards capitation payment. They are guided by proximity and quality of care considerations 
in their choice of provider. The NHIA would, however, have to address itself to the negative 
perceptions about the capitation payment policy.  
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Provider preference for payment method under a national health insurance 
scheme: a survey of health insurance-credentialed health care providers in Ghana.    
 
Background: Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with 
resistance from provider groups and civil society organizations for its perceived negative 
effects on quality care delivery. The leadership of the faith-based provider groups was, 
however, supportive of the capitation payment method. Evidence shows that tension between 
providers and reformers of the payment system slow down the reform process and that such 
reforms require the intense involvement of all stakeholders, both in the preparation, and 
implementation of the reform in order to achieve the intended objective. This study, 
therefore, seeks to explore the views of providers to understand their preferred payment 
method for the various types of services they provide in order to inform the discussion and 
negotiations during this period of reform. Findings will not only aid the NHIA to improve the 
implementation arrangements but also provide useful inputs for other low/middle countries in 
their quest to reform their provider payment systems.   
 
Materials and methods:  A cross-sectional survey of 200 credentialed health care providers’ 
in the three regions of Ghana on providers’ preference for payment method. We administered 
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closed-ended questionnaires during face-to-face interviews employing 5-point Likert scales 
for measurement of payment method preference. We performed descriptive analysis of 
healthcare providers’ background characteristics and chi-square test to determine relationship 
between their background characteristics and their preferred payment method for primary 
care.  
 
Results: Findings from our analysis suggest that, in general, health care providers prefer the 
G-DRG that was introduced in 2008 to fee-for-service and more recently, capitation payment 
method. However, results of the individual level analysis suggest that whereas providers in 
the Volta region strongly reject capitation as payment method, those in the Ashanti and 
Central regions seem indifferent with their preference for payment method.  
 
Conclusion: We conclude that the initial resistance exhibited by providers in the Ashanti 
region may have been influenced by the negative perception they held about the capitation 
payment method and that with more education on the positive attributes of capitation 
payment method and active involvement of healthcare providers in the design and 
implementation of the policy, capitation payment could be an acceptable payment method for 
primary care services in Ghana’s health delivery system. 
 
Chapter 8: Summary of general discussion and conclusion. 
This study was designed to assess the implementation of the capitation payment to determine 
whether or not capitation payment achieved the objective for which it was introduced and to 
identify any un-intended effects it may have on primary care delivery. We adopted a mixed 
method design including narrative review, database review and surveys. The narrative review 
provided evidence that capitation payment policy has both positive and negative effects. We 
therefore note that while the positive experiences of capitation payment should motivate 
health policy makers in Ghana to invest time and efforts in the capitation implementation 
process to secure its utmost benefit for the population, measure should also be put in place to 
reduce the negative effects 
A major aim for the introduction of capitation payment for primary care services was to hold 
down growth in total health care expenditure by controlling outpatient’s utilization. Although 
we found some positive results of the capitation payment method we note that NHIA could 
have maximized the gains from capitation implementation if a single capitated package at the 
primary care for outpatients’ services had been implemented instead of the split into 
“primary” outpatients’ services and “non-primary” outpatients’ services. This study on the 
effects of capitation payment on membership retention in the NHIS was borne out of an 
argument put forward by opponents of the policy that the payment method would lead to 
erosion of confidence in the NHIS. Our analysis confirmed this concern as the payment 
method had some negative effect on membership enrolment and retention in Ashanti region 
compared with the Volta region. We, however, note that the effect was small and could not 
be sustained beyond the year of its introduction. Results of individual in-depth interviews 
conducted as part of the study however also showed that factors other than capitation 
payment were more important in people’s decision to enroll or renew their membership with 
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the NHIS. Therefore if the issue of membership enrolment and retention in the Scheme is the 
only deciding factor, then prospects hold for nationwide scale up of the policy.  
The onset of capitation implementation in the Ashanti region of Ghana was characterized by 
policy debate that was centered on the perceived negative effects of capitation payment on 
health care delivery under the capitation payment dispensation. This is an important issue for 
consideration because the literature has it that patients’ perception of service quality is an 
important aspect of quality assessment of health care because of the relationship between 
health care utilization and user perception of quality. Findings from the quality perception 
study show that both users of health care services and their providers have relatively good 
perception of the quality of health care delivered. It is also significant to note that client 
perception of quality health care was associated with their characteristics, including 
geographical location and income levels. In our literature review, we found that capitation 
payment had some effect on provider-patient trust relationship. Our study did not establish 
significant negative findings on subscriber trust in their primary care providers, a finding that 
is consistent with those of Hall et al [43] and Pereira et al [27]. We rather found a high level 
of trust in the care provider as reflected in the level of satisfaction that respondents expressed 
by rating their health providers highly and showing little intention to  switch provider, their 
willingness to renew their membership card upon expiry and willingness recommend the 
NHIS to others. One may, however, argue that Ghanaians, especially the poor and needy, do 
not have any better choice than the National Health Insurance Scheme and, therefore would 
want to remain active members of the Scheme. Nonetheless, amidst the positive results, one 
emerging trend that seems disturbing to the district health delivery system in Ghana under 
capitation payment is the threat of crowding out lower level facilities by those of district 
hospital level as majority of respondents selected facilities that are of district hospital status 
and clinics where they perceive to have access to better qualified health personnel to manage 
their health conditions. Policy makers may therefore want to apply geographic capitation to 
the lower levels of care and assign all active members of the Scheme that live within their 
catchment areas to those facilities as their first point of call for health care services. They 
could then be referred to the next higher level of care if need be. Such an arrangement will 
also help strengthen primary health care and the referral system in the country. 
 
Conclusion  
We conclude that whereas capitation payment has a positive effect of slowing down growth 
in claims expenditure thereby meeting the expectation of the NHIA; it also had a small 
negative but unsustainable effect on membership enrolment and retention in Ashanti region. 
We further conclude that both providers and subscribers have relatively good perception of 
quality of care under the capitation payment method and, in addition, have high trust in their 
primary care provider giving them quality care under capitation payment despite their 
negative attitude towards it. Findings from our analysis of the provider preference study, 
however, suggest that, in general, health care providers prefer the G-DRG that was 
introduced in 2008 to capitation and fee-for-service payment methods. Results from further 
analysis, however, suggests that whereas providers in the Volta region strongly reject 
capitation as payment method, those in the Ashanti and Central regions neither rejected nor 
approved of it in totality. We therefore consider that with more education on the positive 
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attributes of capitation payment method and active involvement of healthcare providers in the 
design, development and implementation of the policy, capitation payment could be an 
acceptable payment method for primary care services in Ghana’s health delivery system. 
 
Recommendations 
1. Policy and practice:  
We noted that capitation payment method achieved some positive effect on utilization and 
claims expenditure while its effect on membership retention was minimal and unsustainable 
beyond the year of its introduction. Therefore, we recommend that Ghana scales up the 
capitation payment implementation nationwide. We, however, recommend to NHIA to 
consider re-designing the capitation payment method taking into consideration the need to 
develop a single capitated package at the primary care for outpatients’ services to avoid 
gaming of the system by service providers and to minimize cost at the primary care level 
before rolling it out nationwide.  
2. Further research 
Firstly, we recommend to the Ministry of Health and its relevant agencies, in particular the 
Ghana Health Service and the National Health Insurance Authority, to undertake studies on 
costing of health care services in order to provide realistic and evidence-based information 
for the development of system-wide provider payment systems. Secondly, we recommend a 
longitudinal study of the utilization and claims data to better appreciate the real effect of 
capitation payment on cost of primary care services.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Ghana introduceerde een nationale zorgverzekering (National Health Insurance Scheme 
ofwel NHIS) in 2003 met het doel de toegang tot betaalbare zorg te garanderen met name 
voor mensen met lage inkomens. Deelnemers worden geacht een door de NHIS 
geaccrediteerde zorgverlener te kiezen die door het NHIS vergoed worden voor verleende 
zorg aan verzekerden. De zorgverzekering heeft sindsdien een participatiegraad van de 
Ghanese bevolking bereikt van rond de 35%. Het verzekeringsstelsel ziet zich echter gesteld 
voor diverse uitdagingen, met name uit de hand lopende kosten, veroorzaakt door factoren 
aan zowel de zorgvraag- als zorgaanbod zijde.  
 
Om deze uitdagingen het hoofd te bieden heeft de Autoriteit Nationale Zorgverzekering 
(National Health Insurance Authority - NHIA), diverse maatregelen getroffen, vooreerst de 
invoering van diagnose-behandel-combinaties (DBC), maar nadat dit weinig effect sorteerde, 
een hervorming van het financiële vergoedingssysteem, met introductie van 
populatiebekostiging via vergoeding met abonnementstarief voor zorgverleners in de 
eerstelijnsgezondheidzorg. Doelstelling van deze studie is om licht te werpen op het effect 
van de invoering van abonnementstarief in de eerstelijnsgezondheidszorg. Meer specifiek 
analyseert de studie in hoeverre het abonnementstarief een reductie teweeg heeft gebracht in 
zorggebruik en de daaraan gerelateerde kosten voor de NHIS; of het abonnementstarief 
invloed heeft op de levering en kwaliteit van poliklinische zorg en hoe het abonnementstarief 
de perceptie van verzekerden heeft beïnvloed en daaraan gerelateerd hun aanmelding en 
verlenging van de zorgverzekering in Ghana.        
 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag is geformuleerd als volgt: Heeft de invoering van het 
abonnementstarief een effect gehad op zorggebruik en op de door zorgverleners geclaimde 
kosten, en op kwaliteit van zorg onder Ghana’s national zorgverzekeringssysteem. De 
specifieke vragen waren:  
1. Wat zijn de internationale ervaringen met implementatie van het abonnementstarief 
voor zorgverleners en welke lessen kan Ghana hieruit trekken?     
2. Welke effecten heeft het abonnementstarief op gebruik van poliklinische zorg en de 
daaraan gerelateerde zorgkosten?  
3. Heeft het abonnementstarief een effect op inschrijving en bestendiging van deelname 
aan de nationale zorgverzekering?  
4. Wat is de perceptie van Ghanese zorgverzekerden en geaccrediteerde zorgverleners 
ten aanzien van de het abonnementstarief en de kwaliteit van geleverde zorg?  
 
Het inleidende hoofdstuk beschrijft de algemene context en geeft een beknopt overzicht van 
de Ghanese bevolking, economie, zorgstelsel en zorgfinanciering, gevolgd door een overzicht 
van het doel van de studie, het conceptuele kader en de onderzoeksvragen.   
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Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert de uitkomsten van een review van de internationale 
wetenschappelijke literatuur over de effecten van populatiebekostiging en abonnementstarief, 
in de eerstelijnsgezondheidszorg om antwoord te geven op de eerste onderzoeksvraag. Het 
blijkt dat populatiebekostiging de doelmatigheid bevorderd: het drukt de uitgaven, 
functioneert als kritische inkomstenbron voor zorgverleners, stimuleert naleving van 
beleidsrichtlijnen en protocollen, en moedigt zorgverleners aan om betere prestaties te 
leveren en patiënten gezondheidsvoorlichting te geven. Aan de andere kant, induceert 
populatiebekostiging een reductie in de kwantiteit en kwaliteit van zorg en bevorderd het 
afromen van input, suboptimale zorg aan patiënten met slechte gezondheid, en het dumpen 
van hoog risico patiënten, naast een mogelijk negatief effect op patiënt-zorgverlener relatie. 
Op basis van deze review kan geconcludeerd worden dat populatiebekostiging in de 
eerstelijnsgezondheidszorg positieve prikkels kan genereren, maar ook onvoorziene 
onwenselijke effecten kan sorteren. Afhankelijk van de nationale context, zullen 
beleidsmakers in Ghana en/of andere lage- en midden inkomenslanden deze uitkomsten 
meenemen bij het ontwerpen van een contextspecifieke op populatiebekostiging gebaseerd 
zorgverlenerbetalingssysteem.      
 
De onderzoeksvragen twee en drie over respectievelijk de effecten van populatiebekostiging 
op de zorgkosten en inschrijving en bestendiging van deelname aan de zorgverzekering, 
worden bestudeerd in Hoofdstukken 3 en 4.  Een centrale doelstelling van de invoering van 
het abonnementstarief in Ghana is het verminderen en onder controle brengen van de 
zorgkosten. Om te bezien of deze doelstelling is behaald is een multivariate analyse van het 
zorggebruik en daaraan gerelateerde financiële vergoedingen aan zorgverleners in drie 
administratieve regio’s over vijf jaren uitgevoerd (regio’s Ashanti -interventie regio- en de 
controle regio’s Central en Volta). De uitkomsten in Hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat de groei in 
poliklinische zorg en zorgkosten al toenam voor de introductie van het abonnementstarief,  
maar dat de groei wel afremde in de interventie regio. Er waren significante verschillen in 
poliklinisch zorggebruik (p=0.0041) en zorgkosten (p=0.0009) tussen de interventie en 
controle regio’s voor de implementatie van populatiebekostiging. Echter, er bleken geen 
significante verschillen na de introductie van het abonnementstarief. Een ‘verschil in 
verschillen’ (difference in difference) analyse liet zien dat de introductie van  het 
abonnementstarief een negatief effect had op zorggebruik (p<0.000) en zorgkosten (p<0.000) 
in de interventie regio Ashanti. Multivariate regressie analyse wees uit dat de 
beschikbaarheid van districtziekenhuizen een significante voorspellende variabele is van 
zorggebruik en zorgkosten. Concluderend kan men stellen dat het gebruik van poliklinische 
zorg en de zorgkosten toenamen zowel voor als na de invoering van het abonnementstarief, 
maar de mate van toename nam af na introductie, wijzend op een bescheiden positieve effect 
op kostenreductie.                       
 
De vraag in hoeverre de invoering van het abonnementstarief een effect heeft gehad op de 
inschrijving en verlenging van deelname aan de nationale zorgverzekering wordt in 
Hoofdstuk 4 beantwoord. De invoering van het abonnementstarief in de eerstelijnszorg leidde 
tot protesten en een vermeende afname van het aantal zorgverzekerden in Ghana. Om dit 
empirisch te staven is in deze studie een trend analyse gedaan van aanmeldingen en behoud 
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van deelnemers aan de nationale zorgverzekering. Over vijf jaren is in de regio’s Ashanti, 
Volta en Centraal het groeipercentage vastgesteld en significante verschillen in aantal 
verzekerden tussen de regio’s is bepaald door middel van onafhankelijke t-test. Om beter 
zicht te krijgen op de mogelijke associatie tussen het introduceren van het abonnementstarief 
en verlengen van de ziektekostenverzekering door cliënten zijn daarnaast kwalitatieve 
interviewdata geanalyseerd m.b.v. Atlas-ti. 
De data ten aanzien van nieuwe aanmeldingen laten verschillen zien in gemiddelde groei 
tussen Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) en Volta (M = 40.72, SE 3.10), p =0.041; r = 0. 15; en 
tussen Ashanti and Central (M=47.38, SE6.49) p = 0.043; r=0. 42. De analyse ten aanzien van 
verlenging van de ziektekostenverzekering brachten geen significante verschillen in 
gemiddelde lidmaatschapsgroei aan het licht. Dit laatste geldt ook voor de gepoolde data 
(nieuwe aanmelding en verlengingen). Echter, de introductie van het abonnementstarief had 
wel een significant effect in Ashanti in vergelijking met de Volta regio (r = 0.12) en Centrale 
regio (r = 0.14) maar dit effect werd niet geconsolideerd na het jaar van invoering van het 
abonnementstarief  (2012). Analyse van interview data laat zien dat bij de beslissing om deel 
te nemen aan de ziektekostenverzekering of niet kwaliteit van zorg, samenstelling van het 
verzekeringspakket en hoogte van de premie meer zwaarwegende overwegingen zijn dan het 
abonnementstarief.   
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt ingegaan op de perceptie van zorgverzekerden en zorgverleners ten aan 
zien van de kwaliteit van geleverde zorg en op de vraag in hoeverre de introductie van het 
abonnementstarief hierop een effect heeft (onderzoeksvraag 4). Een survey is uitgevoerd 
onder verzekerden en zorgverleners in de drie regio’s en de gemiddelde kwaliteitsperceptie 
scores op de afzonderlijke zorgkwaliteitscriteria zijn bepaald met gebruik van Likert-schalen 
en bi- en multi-variate analysetechnieken zijn toegepast om de associatie tussen 
zorgkwaliteitsperceptie en karakteristieken van de respondenten te bepalen. In het algemeen 
bleek dat verzekerden en zorgverleners een relatief positieve perceptie van de kwaliteit van 
zorg hebben. Wel waren er regionale verschillen waarbij de perceptie op kwaliteit van zorg 
van verzekerden in Ashanti en Volta kwaliteit negatiever was dan in Central region. Bivariate 
analyse wijst op significante verschillen in perceptie van verzekerden gemeten naar beroep 
(p=0.003), duur van verzekeringsdeelname (p=0.008), en leeftijd (p=0.034).  
 
De analyse van data van zorgverleners bracht significante verschillen tussen de regio’s aan 
het licht (p<0.001) alsook tussen typen zorginstellingen waar de zorgverleners werkzaam 
waren (p=0.019). Multivariate logistische regressie analyse zien dat in vergelijking met de 
Ashanti regio, de zorgverleners in de Volta regio (OR=0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.58) en Centrale 
regio (OR=0.98, 95% CI: 0.21-4.43) minder geneigd zijn de kwaliteit van zorg als goed in te 
schatten. Naast regio zijn andere factoren ook significant geassocieerd met een positieve 
perceptie op de zorgverlening. Uitkomsten laten zien dat ondanks het feit dat in het algemeen 
zowel verzekerden als zorgaanbieders een relatief positieve perceptie hebben ten aanzien van 
de kwaliteit van zorg, dit voor de verzekerden minder het geval is in Ashanti, waar 
populatiebekostiging het eerst is ingevoerd, wat deels te wijten is aan invoering van het 
abonnementstarief in Ashanti.        
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De invoering van het abonnementstarief roept de vraag op in hoeverre het een effect sorteert 
op de vertrouwensrelatie tussen patiënt en zorgverlener aan de ene hand, en, aan de andere 
hand, het vertrouwen van verzekerden in de nationale zorgverzekering als zodanig. Gegevens 
hierover zijn verzameld middels een enquête onder verzekerden en worden in Hoofdstuk 6 
geanalyseerd. De uitkomsten zijn overwegend positief te noemen; van de 344 respondenten 
had  88% een (zeer) hoge graad van vertrouwen in hun zorgverlener, had 82% actief hun 
zorgverlener gekozen, terwijl 88% geen intentie had om van zorgverlener te veranderen. Een 
grote meerderheid (91%) zou hun verzekering verlengen indien nodig en 81% zou deelname 
aan de nationale zorgverzekering aanbevelen. Ondervraagden woonachtig in rurale gebieden 
(87%) zijn hiertoe meer geneigd dan die in stedelijke centra (76%). Bijna alle ondervraagden 
(92%) beoordelen de nationale zorgverzekering als (zeer) goed. Concluderend kan men 
stellen dat verzekerden in Ghana veel vertrouwen hebben in hun primaire zorgverlener en de 
nationale zorgverzekering, ondanks aanvankelijke negatieve perceptie ten opzichte van het 
abonnementstarief bij velen. De Autoriteit Nationale Zorgverzekering wordt aanbevolen deze 
negatieve houding om te buigen door middel van betere voorlichting.  
 
Ervaring leert dat frictie tussen zorgverleners en financiële beleidshervormers 
hervormingsprocessen vertraagd en dat een succesvolle interventie zoals invoering van het 
abonnementstarief de steun en participatie van alle belanghebbenden vereist, zowel in 
voorbereiding als implementatie. Hoofdstuk 7 beoogt de visie van zorgverleners op en keuze 
voor een vergoedingsysteem voor verleende zorg in kaart te brengen. In totaal zijn 200 
geaccrediteerde zorgverleners in drie regio’s geïnterviewd en bevraagd over hun visie op en 
hun voorkeur voor het vergoedingssysteem. De vragenlijst gebruikt gesloten vragen en 
Likert-schalen voor meting van preferenties. Naast een descriptieve analyse van achtergrond 
kenmerken van respondenten is middels Chi2-tests de associatie tussen achtergrond 
variabelen en preferenties bepaald. De uitkomsten laten zien dat voor de drie regio’s als 
geheel de meerderheid van zorgverleners een voorkeur hebben voor vergoeding op basis van 
Diagnose-Behandel Combinaties (Ghana-Diagnosis-Related Groupings), ingevoerd in 2008, 
boven directe patiënt betalingen (fee-for-service) of het populatiebekostiging. Nadere analyse 
wijst er echter op dat zorgverleners in de Volta regio abonnementstarief sterk afwijzen, 
terwijl zorgverleners in de Ashanti en Centrale regio een minder duidelijke voorkeur laten 
zien. De aanvankelijke tegenstand en negatieve perceptie van zorgverleners in Ashanti ten 
aanzien van het abonnementstarief, kan worden verminderd met een betere voorlichting, 
alsmede bevorderen van een meer actievere deelname van zorgverleners aan planning en 
implementatie van de zorghervorming. 
         
Het laatste Hoofdstuk 8 vat de belangrijkste bevinden samen, en geeft aanbevelingen voor 
beleid en onderzoek. Blijkend uit de literatuur review kan het abonnementstarief zowel 
positieve als negatieve effecten bewerkstelligen en beleidsmakers dienen voor beiden oog te 
hebben bij de implementatie van dit vergoedingssysteem. Hoewel het doel van terugbrengen 
en onder controle houden van zorgkosten in enige mate is bereikt, zouden er betere resultaten 
behaald zijn indien de NHIA een uniforme vergoedingspakket had aangeboden in plaats van 
het huidige tweeledige pakket (“primary” outpatients’ services and “non-primary” 
outpatients’ services). De vraag in hoeverre introductie van het abonnementstarief een 
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negatief effect zou sorteren op het vertrouwen van verzekerden en daarmee behoud van 
verzekerden, werd door onze analyse bevestigd doordat het aantal verzekerden in de 
interventie regio Ashanti afnam ten opzichte van de regio Volta. Het effect is echter klein was 
en tijdelijk, en andere overwegingen dan het vergoedingsysteem wogen zwaarder in de 
beslissing al dan niet deel te nemen aan de zorgverzekering.       
 
De hervorming van het vergoedingssysteem in Ashanti heeft een verhit publiek debat rond 
het vermeende negatieve effect op de kwaliteit van zorg in gang gezet. Dit wordt echter niet 
gestaafd door de uitkomsten van deze studie; zowel verzekereden als zorgverleners hebben 
een relatief positieve waardering van de kwaliteit van zorg. Er is evenmin sprake van een 
negatief effect op de vertrouwensrelatie tussen patiënt en zorgverleners, wat in lijn is met 
andere studies zoals Hall et al [43] en Pereira et al [27]. Er is juist een hoge mate van 
vertrouwen in de zorgverlener en de zorgverzekering en een hoge bereidheid de 
zorgverzekering aan te houden, aan te bevelen bij derden en niet te veranderen van 
zorgverlener. Een tegenwerping zou kunnen zijn dat er weinig alternatief is voor Ghanezen 
met zorgbehoefte en weinig inkomen, dan aan te sluiten bij de nationale zorgverzekering.  
 
Een zorgwekkende ontwikkeling is de trend tot verdringing van de eerstelijns faciliteiten door 
een voorkeur voor zorgverleners in districtsziekenhuizen en klinieken waar hoger 
gekwalificeerd personeel werkzaam is. Een aanbeveling aan beleidsmakers is dan ook om een 
poortwachters systeem met geografische afbakening te hanteren bij het toewijzen van 
zorgverleners aan patiënten. Hiermee wordt de eerstelijnszorg versterkt en de doorverwijzing 
efficiënter.       
 
Concluderend kunnen we stellen dat het abonnementstarief een positief effect heeft op het 
verminderen van zorgkosten(toename) en een klein, tijdelijk negatieve effect op 
verzekeringsdeelname. Van een negatief effect op de perceptie van de kwaliteit van zorg en 
het vertrouwen in zorgverleners is geen sprake. De voorkeur van zorgverleners voor een 
bepaald vergoedingsysteem verschilt sterk per regio, met sterke voorkeur voor DBCs in 
Volta, maar een minder sterke voorkeur in de andere regio’s. Met een betere voorlichting 
over de positieve aspecten van populatiebekostiging middels het abonnementstarief en een 
meer actieve betrokkenheid van zorgverleners bij de ontwikkeling en implementatie, kan de 
acceptatie van populatiebekostiging in de eerstelijnszorg sterk worden verbeterd.   
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